Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Charles Flaherty failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Flaherty to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Flaherty be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Flaherty to pay a penalty.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Kevin Hoffman failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Hoffman to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Hoffman be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Hoffman to pay a penalty.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Randy Thomas, Jr. failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Thomas to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Thomas be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Thomas to pay a penalty.

After a violation report was filed against defendant Ramondo Howard alleging defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, defendant filed a pro se motion indicating that he wished to release his attorney and wanted new counsel to be appointed, confirming on the record he had filed a complaint against his attorney with the court's disciplinary board. The hearing justice excused defendant's attorney. Defendant then filed motions to recuse and change venues, both of which the hearing justice denied. At the violation hearing, the hearing justice found defendant to be a violator of the terms and conditions of his probation. Before the hearing began, however, the hearing justice expressed his belief that defendant needed to be "warehoused" and was "beyond rehabilitation." Defendant appealed, arguing the hearing justice erred by failing to recuse himself from the case because the justice lacked the objectivity and impartiality to fairly hear and render judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the hearing justice chose to express his opinions prior to the commencement of the violation hearing, the justice displayed a clear inability to render fair judgment and erred by declining to recuse under the circumstances. Remanded.

Roger Elliott, who served as a district court judge for almost twenty-five years and who was a member of the Senior Status Judge Program, was indicted on one count of theft of labor already rendered. Elliott entered an Alford plea to the charge. The circuit court entered an order granting Elliott a pretrial diversion. The judicial conduct commission then issued an order of public reprimand. As a condition of the reprimand, Elliott agreed to resign from the judge program and not seek to re-enter it. As a follow-up to resolve the temporary suspension of his bar license, Elliott and the office of bar counsel agreed to a negotiated sanction. Elliott requested that the Supreme Court enter an order suspending him from the practice of law for two years with one year probated and one year to serve, effective from the date of the order, on conditions that Elliott continue compliance with the terms and provisions of his pretrial diversion contract and that he incur no new disciplinary charges during the probationary period. The Court concluded that the sanctions were appropriate.

A discovery dispute arose out of claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty brought by Moreland/Manoogian, LLC and Tamsen Investments, LLC (collectively "M/M"). Richard Judd, Stephen Waters and their firm Robinson Waters & O'Dorisio, PC (RWO) represented M/M in a real estate development deal. Cedar Street Venture, LLC and M/M sought to solidify their partnership, but in the final phases of the deal, Cedar Street's attorney withdrew. RWO continued to represent M/M in the transaction but at times also advised and acted on behalf of Cedar Street. Because of these actions, Cedar Street viewed RWO as its attorney. Eventually the relationship between M/M and Cedar Street soured, and the parties went to arbitration to settle their differences. The basis of M/M and Cedar Street's complaints pertained to RWO's fees. During discovery, M/M sought RWO's financial records. RWO refused to turn them over. With minimal explanation, the trial court found that these documents were directly relevant to the case. In its holding, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to set the framework that trial courts should use when deciding on discovery requests that implicate the right to privacy: (1) the party requesting the information must prove the information is relevant to case; (2) the party opposing the request must show that the materials are confidential and will not otherwise be disclosed; (3) if the court determines there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials, the requesting party must prove disclosure serves a compelling interest; and (4) if successful, the requesting party must show that the information is not available through other sources.

Barbara Roberts sued Steve Lanier and his firm Steve Lanier, PC, and Rodney Stallings and his firm Coggin & Stallings, LLC. In 2006, Ms. Roberts was arrested on murder charges and sent to the Cherokee County jail. She contacted Attorney Lanier, who then met with her and agreed to represent her in her criminal proceedings. The contract between them provided that Ms. Roberts would pay a "nonrefundable retainer" of $50,000. At that time, Ms. Roberts executed a power-of-attorney authorizing Mr. Lanier to withdraw the retainer from her bank accounts. Ms. Roberts testified at trial that she first learned that Mr. Lanier was not licensed to practice law in Alabama when she appeared for her first hearing at the district court. It was then that she was introduced to Mr. Stallings, who "associated" on her case. Seeing no need for two lawyers, she tried to terminate Mr. Lanier's representation. Mr. Stallings eventually managed Ms. Roberts' case, having all her mail sent to his office so that he could "oversee every aspect" of her personal life, including payment of all outstanding bills and expenses. Ms. Roberts alleged that instead of using her money for the purposes she intended, Mr. Stallings misappropriated approximately $100,000 of her funds. Ms. Roberts was eventually convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. She later learned that the "nonrefundable retainer" language in her contract with Mr. Lanier was unenforceable under Alabama law, and sued her former lawyers for legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the lawyers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the lawyers only with respect to employment contract and the "nonrefundable retainer" and the misappropriation of Ms. Roberts' money for expenses while she awaited trial. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Walthall County Justice Court Judge Marion McKenzie for alleged ticket-fixing and for certain ex-parte communications. During a three-year period from January 2006 to January 2009, the Judge disposed of or attempted to dispose of nine citations for misdemeanor offenses. The offenses involved hunting over bait, failing to wear hunter orange, hunting without a license, and littering. On three occasions, the Judge attempted to intervene in cases assigned to another judge. On each occasion, the Judge obtained the violator's ticket and asked the deputy clerk to give the ticket to the citing officer so that the officer could "help" the defendant. The Judge acknowledged his wrongdoing and joined the motion for approval of a recommended public reprimand and $500 fine. After conducting its independent inquiry and giving consideration to the Commission's finding of fact, the Supreme Court ordered a thirty-day suspension from office without pay in addition to the recommended sanctions.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a county judge in Mississippi, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly causing plaintiff to be prosecuted without probable cause. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where the district court did not explain the constitutional right that he had purportedly violated and, under the circumstances of the case, plaintiff had not shown that defendant's actions tainted the deliberations of the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant or the grand jury that returned the indictment. The court also held that, because the appeal was resolved on grounds of qualified immunity, the court need not address whether defendant was entitled to judicial immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment.

Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.