Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint and charged Steve Little with judicial misconduct. The Commission filed its Finding of Facts and Recommendations with this Court stating that Steve Little should be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office for ninety days without pay, and assessed the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $100. After thorough review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commission's findings and recommendations, and denied the Joint Motion for Approval of Recommendations. The Court found that as a justice court judge, Little individually and in concert with others, allowed certain misdemeanor charges to be remanded, nonadjudicated and "retired to the files." Specifically, Little allowed the "de facto nonadjudication" of sixteen charges of driving under the influence (DUI) over the course of two years, allegedly in violation of Mississippi Code. The Commission found by clear and convincing evidence that, by engaging in this conduct, Little had violated Canons 2A, 3B(2) and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, Little's conduct is said to constitute willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, which brings the judicial office into disrepute.

After receiving complaints about the alleged misconduct of Catoosa County Magistrate Court Judge Anthony Peters, the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) initiated an investigation and subsequently filed formal charges to have Judge Peters permanently removed from his position as a judge and barred from ever holding or seeking elected or appointed judicial office in the State of Georgia. The court agreed with the recommendation of the JQC where Judge Peters, among other things, obtained and consumed marijuana at least once a week from March to May of 2010; inappropriately used his judicial office to advance the personal interests of a family member; pointed a firearm at himself and indicated to another Magistrate Judge that he was not afraid to die; appeared on a local cable television show, made derogatory remarks about the Chief Magistrate Judge, publicly disclosed that he had filed a complaint against the Chief Magistrate Judge, and displayed a photograph of an individual and identified the individual by name as a confidential informant; made a phone call to a local cable television show after initially trying to disguise his voice with multiple foreign accents and made certain comments; and refused to work certain hours.

This case arose when respondent, a resident of New York, filed a petition for administration asserting that he was entitled to be appointed personal representative of the estate of the decedent because he was the decedent's stepson and was nominated as personal representative in the will. At issue was whether an objection to the qualifications of a personal representative of an estate was barred by the three-month filing deadline set forth in section 733.212(3), Florida Statutes, a provision of the Florida Probate Code, when the objection was not filed within the statutory time frame. The court held that section 733.212(3) barred an objection to the qualifications of a personal representative, including an objection that the personal representative was never qualified to serve, if the objection filed under this statute, except where fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct with regard to the qualifications was not apparent on the face of the petition or discovered within the statutory time frame. Accordingly, because fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct was not alleged in relation to the objection to the personal representative in this case, the court approved the decision of the First District Court. The court also held that, to the extent that the decision of the Third District Court in Angelus v. Pass involved allegations of fraud or misrepresentation not revealed in the petition for administration, the court approved the result in Angelus. However, the court disapproved Angelus to the extent that it held section 733.212(3) did not bar objections that a personal representative was never qualified to serve.

The United States appealed an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, section 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519, and two attorneys, Sean Cronin and Andrea Hoffman, appeal public reprimands entered against them based on their work as Assistant United States Attorneys in an underlying criminal action marked by hard adversarial tactics. The court held that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions against the United States for a prosecution that was objectively reasonable, and the district court violated the constitutional right to due process of the two lead prosecutors, when it denied them notice of any charges of misconduct and an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the court vacated the award of attorney's fees and costs against the United States and the public reprimand of Cronin and Hoffman, but the court denied the request of Cronin and Hoffman that the court reassign the case to a different district judge at this stage.

Plaintiff was a secretary of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. during his service as a district judge until Porteous was impeached and the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit suspended Porteous's authority to employ staff, which resulted in plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff sued the Judicial Council and fifteen of its members seeking declaratory relief, reinstatement to her position, monetary relief, and attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's order insofar as it dismissed her claims against the members of the Judicial Council. The court held that plaintiff lacked prudential standing to bring her constitutional challenge to the Judicial Council's action. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the ultra vires exception applied to sovereign immunity where her claims for injunctive relief were moot in light of Porteous's removal from office; claims for back pay and retirement credits were barred by sovereign immunity; and plaintiff lacked the necessary injury-in-fact to pursue declaratory relief. The court also held that even if plaintiff had standing to seek declaratory relief, she had not pleaded a sufficient claim of ultra vires action by the Judicial Council to overcome the jurisdictional bar of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The parties agree that the company attempted to collect an overdue hospital bill in a way that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 and that plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages of $1,000. Plaintiff's lawyer endeavored to transform the case into a class action, and the district court, frustrated by the effort, dismissed the whole action. The Seventh Circuit held that dismissal for want of prosecution was an abuse of discretion. All of the errors at issue were the fault of the lawyer and had nothing to do with the claim. The court should have considered other alternatives before dismissal.

The United States Trustee, Region 3, appealed a district court’s reversal of sanctions originally imposed by the bankruptcy court on attorneys Mark Udren and Lorraine Doyle and HSBC for violating the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. "This case [was] an unfortunate example of the ways in which overreliance on computerized processes in a high-volume practice, as well as a failure on the part of client and lawyers alike to take responsibility for accurate knowledge of a case, can lead to attorney misconduct before a court." At issue were two pleadings that HSBC’s attorneys filed in bankruptcy court. Both documents contained imperfect information and were filed with the court. The attorneys appealed the sanctions order arguing that the facts contained in the filed documents were "actually literally true." Upon review, the Third Circuit found that the statements therein were not wholly true, and faulted counsel for "rubber-stamping" the information taken from its computerized database without additional investigation as to their veracity: "[w]here a lawyer systematically fails to take any responsibility for seeking adequate information from her client, makes representations without any factual basis because they are included in a "form pleading" she has been trained to fill out, and ignores obvious indications that her information may be incorrect, she cannot be said to have made reasonable inquiry." The Court concluded the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on Doyle or the Udren Firm itself. However, it found the lower court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions on Udren individually.

Plaintiff filed a motion seeking approval of its appointment of James Gallagher as its "Designated Consultant" pursuant to the Stipulation and Order for the Production and Exchange of Proprietary Information entered by the court on February 22, 2010. Defendant objected to Gallagher's designation. The court held that because the terms of the order did not prevent the selection of a likely fact witness as a Designated Consultant - and the order did not otherwise prevent Gallagher's designation - and because compensating Gallagher as a Designated Consultant (and not as a fact witness) would not violate the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct, plaintiff's Motion to Approve Designated Consultant was granted.

A Polish citizen, who entered the U.S. on a visitor's visa in 1994, overstayed, and allegedly tried to bribe an immigration officer in a 1999 sting operation. Before her removal proceedings began, she married a U.S. citizen, who filed a petition for an alien relative visa. In 2006, after the petition was approved, she applied to adjust her status under 8 U.S.C. 1255. The IJ found her removable, denied her motion to suppress evidence collected in the sting, and decided that she was not entitled to adjust her status. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal and forwarded information about petitioner's attorney to the state disciplinary board. The petition included a single, underdeveloped legal argument: that evidence gathered during the sting should have been suppressed because the operation was an egregious violation of petitioner's right to due process, an argument foreclosed by an earlier case. The court noted its jurisdictional limitations, but stated that the agency's evaluation of the equities was not particularly persuasive and that it would have required more than weak circumstantial evidence that an alien had bribed a federal immigration official.

Disciplinary proceedings against Respondent Steven Perskie (who retired from the judiciary in 2010) began with the filing of grievances with the Advisory Committee in July 2008 by Alan Rosefielde, a party to a civil action over which respondent presided between February 2005 and October 2006. The litigation was a business dispute involving issues that arose from Rosefielde's employment with and eventual termination from a business based in Atlantic City. Rosefielde contended that his termination was due to his recommendation that his employer end its business relationship with an insurance broker named Frank Siracusa, whom Rosefielde alleged had engaged in improper and questionable business practices. Siracusa was a central witness to Rosefielde’s counterclaim. Respondent had a longstanding business, social, political, and personal relationship with Siracusa, but informed the parties to the litigation several times that notwithstanding his relationship with Siracusa, he was not uncomfortable presiding over the case and evaluating Siracusa's credibility if Siracusa were to appear as a witness. The Advisory Committee recommended that respondent be censured for violating multiple Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Respondent violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, and 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and R. 1:12-1(f). The Court censured Respondent.