Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommended that Mendenhall municipal court judge Bruce B. Smith be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office for thirty days without pay, and pay costs for: (1) failing to properly adjudicate criminal matters assigned to him; (2) engaging in ticket-fixing; and, (3) dismissing criminal charges against multiple defendants in exchange for simultaneous payments to a "drug fund" established and maintained by the Mendenhall police chief. The Commission found that Judge Smith's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute under Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Specifically, the Commission found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Smith violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), 3B(2), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court concurred with the Commission’s findings and adopted its proposed discipline. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Homeowners challenged the validity of the foreclosure of their home mortgages. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the law firm as fraudulently joined and concluded that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction was inapplicable. The court concluded that Homeowners' pleadings mirrored those in Karnatcheva v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and affirmed the district court's dismissal. Homeowners have failed to plead factual content that permitted the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct where the pleadings contained nothing but naked assertions that one or more of the named defendants suspected that Wells Fargo lacked legal title to the mortgages yet chose to publish statements to the contrary. The district court was well within its discretion to file sanctions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Dunbar, et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a chief municipal court judge whose son became a member of the police department in the same municipality could hear cases involving that police department. The Supreme Court held that, "consistent with the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a municipal court judge whose child becomes a police officer in the same municipality may not hear any cases involving that police department. The judge also may not supervise other judges who hear those cases." View "In the Matter of Advisory Letter No. 7-11 of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Extrajudicial Activities" on Justia Law

From 2002 through 2004, George Harper and his law firm at that time, Jackson Lewis, represented EnerSys Delaware, Inc. in a variety of employment and labor law matters. Harper served as EnerSys' attorney of record in at least five employment-related lawsuits during this time. The relationship between Jackson Lewis and EnerSys deteriorated in 2004 when EnerSys brought a malpractice claim against the firm based on some labor-related legal advice that it claimed resulted in fraudulent testimony. In 2011, EnerSys filed this suit against a former EnerSys employee, Tammy Hopkins, alleging six causes of action including breach of contract based on violations of the confidentiality agreement and various computer use policies and agreements, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. When EnerSys learned that Hopkins had retained Harper to represent her, it moved to have him disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Harper's previous assistance in developing EnerSys' litigation strategy was insufficient grounds upon which to disqualify him due to the dissimilarities of his previous representations and the current suit. EnerSys then filed this appeal. This case presented the question of whether the denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court held it was not and dismissed the case as interlocutory. View "EnerSys Delaware v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

In an infringement suit, the district court declared Minton’s patent invalid under the “on sale” bar since he had leased his interactive securities trading system to a brokerage more than one year before the patent application, 35 U. S. C. 102(b). Seeking reconsideration, Minton argued for the first time that the lease was part of testing and fell within the “experimental use” exception to the bar. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, concluding that the argument was waived. Minton sued for legal malpractice in Texas state court. His former attorneys argued that Minton’s claims would have failed even if the experimental-use argument had been timely raised. The trial court agreed. Minton then claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 1338(a), which provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over any case “arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.” The Texas Court of Appeals rejected Minton’s argument and determined that Minton failed to establish experimental use. The state’s highest court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 338(a) does not deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over Minton’s malpractice claim. Federal law does not create that claim, so it can arise under federal patent law only if it necessarily raises a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which may be entertained without disturbing an approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. Resolution of a federal patent question is “necessary” to Minton’s case and the issue is “actually disputed,” but it does not carry the necessary significance. No matter the resolution of the hypothetical “case within a case,” the result of the prior patent litigation will not change. Nor will allowing state courts to resolve these cases undermine development of a uniform body of patent law. View "Gunn v. Minton" on Justia Law

In 2010 the U.S. and Wisconsin sued, alleging that defendants polluted the Lower Fox River and Green Bay with PCBs, and had liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, for response costs and destruction of natural resources, estimated at $1.5 billion. The Justice Department submitted a proposed consent decree, negotiated among the state, defendants (Brown County and the City of Green Bay), and Indian tribes. The U.S. offered $4.5 million because federal agencies might have contributed to the pollution. Menasha opposed the decree and counterclaimed against the U.S. for costs that Menasha would incur if found liable. Ordinarily a non-party to a consent decree is not bound by it, but approval of the consent decree would otherwise extinguish Menasha’s claims. Menasha sought information under the Freedom of Information Act, claiming that U.S. attorneys, being from defense and prosecution teams, actually have adverse interests, and that their communication concerning the case resulted in forfeiture of attorney work product privilege. The district court held that Menasha was entitled to the documents. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Menasha’s claim actually amounted to assertion that the federal attorneys “ganged up” to reduce federal liability and that the documents are privileged. View "Menasha Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Hancock County Justice Court Judge Tommy Carver. It alleged that Judge Carver had ex parte communication with Steven K. Roche about his pending criminal case; failed to disclose such ex parte communication to the prosecutor; dismissed the charges against Roche without a hearing and without any motion to dismiss by the prosecutor; and falsified court records by noting on the file that two witnesses, Officers Bryce Gex and John Grimsley of the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources Marine Patrol, were absent when Roche's case was called for trial. A three-member committee appointed by the Commission recommended that Judge Carver be suspended thirty days from office without pay, publicly reprimanded, and assessed costs. The Commission adopted the committee's findings. After conducting an independent inquiry of the record and giving careful consideration to the findings of fact and recommendations of the Commission, the Supreme Court ordered that Judge Carver be publicly reprimanded and assessed costs. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Carver" on Justia Law

Justin S. Reynolds, Kristine Reynolds, and their construction company, Sunrise Development, LLC (Reynolds) brought a malpractice action against their law firm, Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., and its attorney-employee, David T. Krueck. Reynolds alleged professional negligence in both the drafting of a real estate agreement between Reynolds and Quasar Development, LLC, and in the subsequent handling of the litigation regarding that agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Trout Jones, holding that the two-year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) applied to bar the action and Reynolds timely appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reynolds v. Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, P.A." on Justia Law

his matter came before the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana that respondent Judge Leo Boothe of the Seventh Judicial District Court, Parishes of Catahoula and Concordia, be removed from office and ordered to reimburse and pay the Commission for costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this case. The Commission determined that Judge Boothe violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), 3A(6), and 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in willful conduct relating to his official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brought his judicial office into disrepute, in violation of La. Const. art. V, sec. 25(C). After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found that certain charges against Judge Boothe were proven by clear and convincing evidence; however, the Court rejected the recommendation that he be removed from office. The Court suspended the Judge from office for one year, without pay, and ordered him to reimburse and pay the Commission $11,731.79 in costs. View "In re: Judge Leo Boothe, Seventh Judicial District court Catahoula & Concordia Parishes" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Idaho certified a question of law to the State Supreme Court: whether a legal malpractice claim that is transferred to an assignee in a commercial transaction (along with other business assets and liabilities) is assignable under law. The issue stemmed from St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center's purchase of Magic Valley Medical Center. Thomas Luciani and his law firm Stamper, Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P.S. represented Magic Valley in defending a wrongful termination and False Claims Act action brought by former hospital employees. After the sale of the medical center closed, Magic Valley no longer existed. The operation and management of the center was taken over by St. Luke's. St. Luke's then sued its former lawyer and law firm. The District Court noted that the assignability of a legal malpractice claim in the factual context presented had not yet been squarely addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Upon review, the Idaho Supreme Court answered the district court's question in the affirmative: although legal malpractice claims are generally not assignable in Idaho, where the legal malpractice claim is transferred to an assignee in a commercial transaction, along with other business assets and liabilities, such a claim is assignable. View "In re: St. Lukes Magic Valley RMC v. Luciani, et al." on Justia Law