Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Goldberg, a medical malpractice attorney, appeared before Judge Maloney in several cases. Following complaints that Goldberg concealed assets and retained unearned fees, Maloney ordered Goldberg to pay the estates involved. Goldberg failed to do so. Maloney directed him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Following a hearing, Maloney found Goldberg to be in criminal contempt and cited Goldberg for attempting to suborn witnesses, charges that did not appear on the hearing notice. Goldberg received a sentence of 18 months. An Ohio appellate court affirmed. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Goldberg argued for the first time that he had not received sufficient notice of the charges and ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to raise this notice claim. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2004, the district court granted habeas relief on the basis that Goldberg received constitutionally inadequate notice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Goldberg had procedurally defaulted on his lack-of-notice claim by failing to raise it in the state court of appeals. On remand, the district court determined that Goldberg had not demonstrated sufficient cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default, and denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Goldberg v. Maloney" on Justia Law

El-Gazawy a citizen of Jordan, entered the U.S. in 1990 as a non-immigrant, overstayed, and failed to appear for special registration in 2003, required by the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System program. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security served notice that he was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(3)(A) and 1305. At his hearing, El-Gazawy admitted the charges and stated that he would seek cancellation of removal (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)) or voluntary departure (8 U.S.C. 1229c). The IJ allowed 90 days for the necessary paperwork and advised that failing to timely file fingerprints could result in denial of relief. With an additional schedule change, El-Gazawy had about 14 months to file the necessary paperwork. The IJ concluded that no good cause had been demonstrated for delay, deemed the cancellation claim abandoned, and granted voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed an appeal. El-Gazawy had been represented by attorney Abuzir throughout, but obtained new counsel for filing a motion to reopen, seven months later, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. El-Gazawy claimed that he had given notice to Abuzir and had filed a claim with the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The BIA denied his motions. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "El-Gazawy v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2005, attorneys White and Beaman, assisted securities broker-turned-real estate investor Seybold with a plan to buy, rehabilitate, and then sell, or refinance and rent, residential and commercial properties in Marion, Indiana. That plan involved the creation of two business entities, one partially owned by a group of private investors who contributed more than $1 million. When the plan failed, the investors sued. The district court entered summary judgment on all of the claims against the attorneys: state and federal RICO violations, conversion, federal and state securities fraud, common-law fraud (both actual and constructive), civil conspiracy, and legal malpractice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs failed to establish either that an attorney-client relationship existed or that the attorneys owed them some other legal duty for purposes of the malpractice, constructive fraud, and securities-fraud claims. Plaintiffs relied solely on representations that concerned only future conduct, or on representations of existing intent that were not yet executed, so claims of actual fraud failed, Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the lawyers acted in concert with Seybold to commit an unlawful act or to accomplish a lawful purpose through unlawful means. View "Rosenbaum v. White" on Justia Law

Appellant RFT Management Co., L.L.C. (RFT) brought this action against respondents Tinsley & Adams, L.L.P. and attorney Welborn D. Adams (collectively, Law Firm) based on their legal representation of RFT during the closing of its purchase of two real estate investment properties in Greenwood County. RFT alleged claims for (1) professional negligence (legal malpractice), (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act1 (UTPA), and (4) aiding and abetting a securities violation in contravention of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005 (SCUSA). The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's causes of action regarding the UTPA and SCUSA, and it merged RFT's breach of fiduciary claim with its legal malpractice claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's remaining claim for legal malpractice. RFT appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case from the Court of Appeals for its review. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with respect to all issues brought on appeal. View "RFT Management Co. v. Tinsley & Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s counsel failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment or order (Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A)). Defendant sought attorneys’ fees and costs under FRCP 68. The motion was withdrawn. Plaintiff then moved for issuance of an order pursuant to RCP 58(e), or, in the alternative, for an order granting an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, arguing that his attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was caused by excusable neglect as the result of a busy caseload. The court granted the extension. The Third Circuit vacated the extension as improvidently granted and dismissed plaintiff’s appeal. A ruling in favor of plaintiff “in the current circumstances could be read as condoning and even rewarding otherwise avoidable mistakes—and even outright incompetence—on the part of even experienced attorneys.” View "Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits" on Justia Law

In 1990 McCarthy bought land at a mortgage foreclosure sale conducted by defendant, Seamen's, the mortgage holder. The advertisement described the parcel as "at the end of the paved portion of Higgins Hollow Road, Truro." McCarthy obtained a mortgage from Seamen's and retained defendant, Snow, an attorney. Before closing, Snow and issued to Seamen's a certificate of title. McCarthy received a copy. The foreclosure deed and mortgage were recorded. McCarthy purchased the property under the belief that it was in a specific location; it is actually another parcel. Following a land court action concerning a boundary dispute with a neighbor, McCarthy sued those involved in her purchase. During discovery, defendants sought, from the land court action, time sheets, correspondence between or among McCarthy and her attorneys, land surveyors, title abstractors, and title examiners; and all documents concerning the parcels. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the defendants did not establish entitlement to discovery of communications protected by attorney-client privilege under a theory of at issue waiver, but may discover the other information that qualifies as "fact" work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), because they have shown substantial need for the material and cannot without undue hardship obtain it from another source. View "McCarthy v. Slade Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) recommended that the Supreme Court remove Respondent 22nd District Court Judge Sylvia A. James from office for judicial misconduct. Judge James filed a petition asking the Court to reject that recommendation. The evidence established that respondent misappropriated public funds, some of which were intended for victims of crime in the city of Inkster. She inappropriately spent much of this money on self-promoting advertisements and travel expenses for herself and various other court employees. She treated these funds, as the master phrased it, as her own "publicly funded private foundation." In addition, she: (1) denied people access to the court by instituting and enforcing an improper business-attire policy; (2) employed a family member in violation of court policy; and (3) made numerous misrepresentations of fact under oath during the investigation and hearing of this matter. The Court concluded that cumulative effect of respondent's misconduct, coupled with its duration, nature, and pervasiveness meant that respondent was unfit for judicial office. "Although some of her misconduct, considered in isolation, does not justify such a severe sanction, taken as a whole her misconduct rises to a level that requires her removal from office." Therefore, the Court adopted the recommendations of the JTC, except with respect to costs respondent will be ordered to pay, as would be detailed later. View "In re Hon. Sylvia James" on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case was whether a nonparty attorney may bring a writ of error from a trial court's order requiring the attorney to comply with a clear and definite discovery request. The plaintiff in error, Finn, Dixon & Herling, LLP (Finn Dixon) brought this writ of error from an order of the trial court requiring it to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued by the defendants in error, Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, and Carolyn Cavolo (Defendants), who were also the defendants in the underlying case. Finn Dixon contended that the trial court improperly denied its motion to quash, in which it claimed that Defendants sought materials protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the trial court's order was an appealable final judgment; and (2) the trial court improperly denied Finn Dixon's motion to quash the subpoena. Remanded. View "Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a binding arbitration clause in an attorney-client retainer agreement and whether that clause was enforceable where the client filed suit for legal malpractice. This case presented two important countervailing public policies: Louisiana and federal law explicitly favor the enforcement of arbitration clauses in written contracts; by the same token, Louisiana law also imposes a fiduciary duty "of the highest order" requiring attorneys to act with "the utmost fidelity and forthrightness" in their dealings with clients, and any contractual clause which may limit the client's rights against the attorney is subject to close scrutiny. After its careful study, the Supreme Court held there is no per se rule against arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements, provided the clause is fair and reasonable to the client. However, the attorneys' fiduciary obligation to the client encompasses ethical duties of loyalty and candor, which in turn require attorneys to fully disclose the scope and the terms of the arbitration clause. An attorney must clearly explain the precise types of disputes the arbitration clause is meant to cover and must set forth, in plain language, those legal rights the parties will give up by agreeing to arbitration. In this case, the Defendants did not make the necessary disclosures, thus, the arbitration clause was unenforceable. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "Hodges v. Reasonover" on Justia Law

A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on its claim of fraud and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendants. Defendants' misrepresentations induced plaintiff to settle the asbestos exposure claims of two former employees whom defendants represented in a state-court lawsuit. On appeal, defendants contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and alternatively that the case called for Burford abstention. Defendants also contended that the evidence established their statute-of-limitations and waiver defenses as a matter of law. The court concluded, however, that defendants misconceived the legal authorities relevant to their jurisdiction, abstention, and waiver arguments. Regarding the statute of limitations issue, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found for plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Guy, et al." on Justia Law