Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. The complaint was originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee. That same day, the Attorney General forwarded the complaint to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and SLED carried out a 10-month criminal investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Chief of SLED and the Attorney General petitioned the presiding judge of the state grand jury to impanel the state grand jury on January 13, 2014. Acting presiding judge of the state grand jury, the Honorable L. Casey Manning, subsequently impaneled the state grand jury. On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion after which the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Another hearing was held, and the court found, as presiding judge of the state grand jury, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. The court discharged the grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation. The Attorney General appealed that order to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the original complaint. While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While the Court reversed the circuit court's order, it "in no way suggest[ed] that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was 'conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity.'" The case was remanded for a decision on whether the Attorney General should have been disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings. View "Harrell v. Attorney General of South Carolina" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal complaint against Wayne Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, alleging 10 counts of judicial misconduct that arose out of criminal cases over which he had presided. After hearing argument on objections to the master’s report, a majority of the JTC concluded that the evidence established judicial misconduct in eight of the ten allegations and recommended that respondent be suspended for 90 days without pay. After review of the entire record and due consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court agreed with the JTC’s conclusion that respondent committed judicial misconduct, but the Court was not persuaded that the recommended sanction was appropriate in this case. Instead, the Court held that a 60-day suspension without pay was proportionate to the body of judicial misconduct established by the record. View "In re Hon. Bruce Morrow" on Justia Law

Powell was adjudicated a disabled adult due to severe mental disabilities in 1997. His parents, Perry and Leona, were appointed as co-guardians of Powell’s person, but were not appointed as guardians of his estate. In 1999, Perry died following surgery. Leona engaged the Wunsch law firm to bring a claim against the doctors and hospital, Leona was appointed special administratrix of Perry’s estate. Wunsch filed a complaint under the Wrongful Death Act on behalf of Leona individually and as administratrix estate. The estate’s only asset was the lawsuit. A 2005 settlement, after attorney fees and costs, amounted to $15,000, which was distributed equally between Leona, Emma (the couple’s daughter) and Powell. The settlement order provided that Powell’s share was to be paid to Leona on Powell’s behalf. Leona placed both shares into a joint account. The probate court was not notified. Wunsch had referred the action to attorney Webb, for continued litigation. Emma waived her rights under a second settlement, Leona and Powell each received $118,000. A check was deposited into the joint account. The order did not provide that Powell’s was to be administered under supervision of the probate court and Powell did not have a guardian of his estate. Wunsch purportedly advised that it was “too much trouble” to go through the probate court for funds every time Leona needed money for Powell. In 2008, Emma petitioned to remove Leona as guardian of Powell’s person. The probate court appointed Emma as guardian of Powell’s person and the public guardian as guardian of his estate. Leona had withdrawn all but $26,000 and provided no accounting. The public guardian sued the attorneys and Leona. The trial court dismissed as to the attorneys, finding that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege defendants owed Powell a duty and to allege proximate cause. The appellate court determined that an attorney retained by a special administrator of an estate to bring a wrongful death action for the benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin owed a fiduciary duty to those beneficiaries and remanded, with respect to the second settlement. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.View "In re the Estate of Powell" on Justia Law

Appellant Cynthia Holmes, M.D. appealed a circuit court's grant of a directed verdict on her malpractice claim in favor of respondents Haynsworth, Sinkler & Boyd, P.A., Manton Grier, and James Becker, and award of sanctions against her. Appellant, an ophthalmologist, was previously a member of the consulting medical staff of Tenet HealthSystem Medical, Incorporated, d/b/a East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc. In 1997, appellant lost her privileges to admit patients and perform procedures at the Hospital. Appellant hired respondents to represent her in a legal action against the Hospital in 1998. Respondents pursued an unsuccessful appeal for reinstatement of full admitting privileges through the Hospital's administrative process. In 1999, Respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court on Appellant's behalf. As a result of that suit, the federal district court granted a temporary injunction reinstating Appellant's admitting privileges based, in part, on Appellant's averments in an affidavit that her patients needed urgent surgeries and her inability to perform surgery at the hospital was causing her to lose patients. However, because Appellant did not perform a single surgery in the wake of the temporary injunction, the district court dissolved the injunction in 2000, because "the alleged harm suffered by [Appellant's] current patients had not materialized." Appellant blamed Respondents for the dissolution of the injunction, claiming that Respondents did not act with due diligence on her behalf because she disputed their fees and refused to pay her legal bills. Respondents, however, attributed the dissolution of the injunction to Appellant's failure to utilize the injunction to perform surgery while it was in place and her lack of cooperation during discovery. On January 31, 2000, Appellant filed a pro se motion requesting the district court reconsider the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. In this motion, she also indicated she was dissatisfied with Respondents' representation and was critical of how Respondents had handled her case to that point and sought additional time to obtain substitute counsel and complete discovery. Because Appellant still refused to pay her legal bills, Respondents filed a motion to be relieved as counsel. A few months later, the district court granted summary judgment in the Hospital's favor, and dismissed the pendant state law claims without prejudice. After Respondents and Appellant ended their professional relationship, Appellant sought the return of the $43,000 in attorney's fees she paid pursuant to an addendum to their fee agreement. Respondents refused, and subsequently Appellant filed a Complaint alleging professional malpractice in handling her federal antitrust claims. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Holmes v. Haynsworth, Sinkler & Boyd" on Justia Law

The Gallia County (Ohio) Public Defender Commission contracted with the non-profit Corporation for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. The Corporation hired Bright, who represented R.G. before Evans, the county’s only trial judge. Bright negotiated a plea agreement, but R.G. hesitated during the plea colloquy. “Mere seconds” later, R.G. informed Bright and Evans that he would take the deal after all. Evans refused. Bright and the prosecutor met with Evans to convince the judge to accept R.G.’s plea. He refused. In pleadings, Bright criticized Evans’s policies as “an abuse of discretion,” “unreasonable,” “arbitrary … unconscionable.” Bright’s language did not include profanity and did not claim ethical impropriety. Evans subsequently contacted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and filed a grievance against Bright and filed a public journal entry stating that Bright’s motion, although not amounting to misconduct or contempt, had created a conflict. He ordered that Bright be removed from the R.G. case. He then filed entries removing Bright from 70 other felony cases. The Corporation terminated Bright’s employment, allegedly without a hearing or other due process. Bright sued Evans, the Board, the Corporation, and the Commission. The district court concluded that Evans was “not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were completely outside of his jurisdiction.” The court held that Bright failed to sufficiently plead that the Board or the Commission retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights or that liability attached under the Monell doctrine, then dismissed claims against the Corporation. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Evans. While Evans’s conduct was worthy of censure, it does not fit within any exception to absolute judicial immunity. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the Board and Corporation; the First Amendment offers no protection to an attorney for his speech in court.View "Bright v. Gallia Cnty." on Justia Law

The Formal Charge against respondent Justice of the Peace Mary Foret arose from a small claims case in her court brought by Norris and Gloria Comeaux against Charles and Carol LeBlanc. Both prior to and after the filing of the lawsuit, respondent engaged in numerous ex parte communications with the parties concerning the substantive issues in the case. Respondent also engaged in improper independent investigation into the background of the case by having her constable obtain the police report of an altercation between Comeaux and LeBlanc. Despite these ex parte communications and independent fact-finding about the case, respondent did not recuse herself. When the Comeaux case was set for hearing, respondent knowingly allowed the constable to participate in the hearing to a significant extent. Respondent also allowed the Constable to participate in her decision-making process by asking him at the conclusion of the hearing what he thought of the case. The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana recommended, and the Supreme Court adopted, that respondent be suspended with pay for sixty days and ordered to pay the costs of the prosecution of these proceedings.View "IIn re: Justice of the Peace Mary Foret" on Justia Law

James Forbes settled a personal-injury action while he was represented by Louis St. Martin. Forbes later sued St. Martin, challenging the validity of his contingency-fee arrangement and the associated attorneys’ fees. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to St. Martin; the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, finding that summary judgment in favor of St. Martin was proper. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Louis St. Martin, Deceased: Forbes v. Hixson" on Justia Law

The Judicial Conduct Board concluded that respondent Judge Ernest Balivet violated Canon 3(B)(8) of the Vermont Code of Judicial Conduct. The Supreme Court ordered review on its own motion. The alleged violation stemmed from the judge's handling of a grandfather's petition for guardianship of his granddaughter, and a subsequent request for termination of the parents' parental rights to the child. Before the hearing before the Judicial Conduct Board, the parties identified three disputed issues : (1)whether respondent failed to rule in a timely manner on the motion to revoke guardianship filed by the child’s parents; (2) whether respondent caused unnecessary delay in failing to schedule a hearing on the grandfather’s motion to terminate the father’s parental rights; and (3) whether respondent failed to respond in a timely manner to the order of remand from the family court. The Board’s sanction order recognized respondent’s responsibility for undue delay and endemic court management issues, but also acknowledged that the choices and actions of others played a significant role in the overall duration of the underlying case. It took into account respondent’s forthrightness in his dealings with the Board, his good intentions toward the parties, the reasonableness of his rulings in the underlying case, and his willingness to accept conditions intended to prevent this type of problem from recurring. The Supreme Court saw no reason to set aside the recommended conditions of respondent's sanctions. The Court did conclude, however, that characterization of respondent’s reprimand as “private,” rather than “public,” despite the conceded public character of the reprimand, was confusing and "cannot stand." Accordingly, the Court amended the sanction to characterize it as a “public reprimand.” In all other respects, the Court affirmed the Board’s sanction for respondent’s violation of Canon 3(B)(8). View "In re Balivet" on Justia Law

Marie Reed appeared before Judge Clark as a plaintiff in "Reed v. East Baton Rouge Sheriff Dept." Specifically, the Formal Charge at issue centers on a colloquy which took place in open court between Judge Clark and Ms. Reed while Ms. Reed’s lawyer was absent and on Judge Clark’s order dismissing Ms. Reed’s suit without prejudice after Ms. Reed was unable to prove her eligibility to proceed in forma pauperis. Ms. Reed had an unusual history of continuing to act many times as her own lawyer, even after she hired counsel. The Supreme Court found that because Judge Clark had signed an order dismissing Ms. Reed’s case without prejudice on April 18, 2011, the brief exchange she had with Ms. Reed on April 19th was of no substantive moment. Judge Clark testified, as the written order confirmed, that she denied the motion to stay and dismissed the case without prejudice the prior day. She took the bench only to announce her ruling on the record (an oral entry which would have been made even if no one associated with the case had been present that morning). The Court was "fully persuaded" that nothing with which the Commission charged Judge Clark warranted the Court’s sanction for judicial misconduct.View "In re Hon. Janice Clark" on Justia Law

A client sued his lawyer for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and professional negligence in a fee agreement dispute. After a jury found in favor of the lawyer and judgment was entered, the client appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by issuing certain jury instructions regarding contract interpretation and by denying the client's motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that any error in the superior court's jury instructions was not prejudicial, and affirmed the superior court's decision to deny the client's post-trial motions because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find for the lawyer on each of the claims. View "Zamarello v. Reges" on Justia Law