Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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Petitioners Conley Hoskins and Jane Medicals, LLC, sought to vacate a trial court's order disqualifying the Peters Mair Wilcox (PMW) law firm as their counsel. The trial court disqualified the firm on the grounds that the firm previously represented another party, All Care Wellness, LLC, in the same matter for which PWM represented petitioners. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that All Care and petitioners had materially adverse interests. Petitioners argued on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' retained counsel of choice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court record was insufficient to support the finding that the interests of petitioners and All Care were materially adverse to one another. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court indeed abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' counsel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

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Respondent Wickham Corwin, judge in the East Central Judicial District, objected to the Judicial Conduct Commission's findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and its recommendation that he be suspended for two months, without net pay, and be assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence Judge Corwin violated N.D. Code Jud. Conduct Canons 3(C)(1), and N.D. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(C)(2). The Court ordered Judge Corwin be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay effective December 1, 2014, and that he be assessed costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Corwin" on Justia Law

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In 2008, defendants K. William Clauson and the law firm of Clauson, Atwood & Spaneas, represented plaintiff James Yager in an action against D.H. Hardwick & Sons, Inc. (Hardwick), which alleged that Hardwick was the party who "trespassed on Plaintiff's land and cut timber belonging to Plaintiff." The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hardwick because the action was filed more than three years after the timber cutting ceased and, therefore, was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the discovery rule applied to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Plaintiff subsequently filed a malpractice action against defendants, alleging that they "breached the duty of care owed to [plaintiff] by failing to file the D.H. Hardwick action within the timeframe allowed by the applicable statute of limitations, and by otherwise failing to represent [plaintiff's] interests with reasonable professional care, skill, and knowledge." Defendants moved to dismiss the case, alleging that plaintiff: (1) failed to provide requested discovery information; and (2) failed to disclose the experts required to prove his case. The trial court granted the defendants' motion. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that expert testimony was not required to prove legal malpractice where defendants failed to file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court did not examine the specific facts of the case to determine whether the nature of the case was such that expert testimony was required. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's dismissal order and remand for further proceedings. View "Yager v. Clauson" on Justia Law

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In this judicial disciplinary matter, respondent Former Abbeville County Magistrate George Ferguson and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent. Respondent was indicted on two counts of Misconduct in Office: the first indictment alleged respondent offered and gave Jane Doe #1 money and/or other benefits for the handling and disposition of legal matters involving Jane Doe #1 before him in his official capacity as Magistrate in return for sexual contact with her from 1996 to 2009; the second indictment alleged respondent offered and gave Jane Doe #2 money and/or other benefits for the handling and disposition of legal matters involving Jane Doe #2 before him in his official capacity as Magistrate in return for sexual contact with her from 2001 to 2011. In the Agreement, respondent admitted misconduct, consented to the imposition of a public reprimand and agreed never to seek nor accept a judicial office in South Carolina without the express written permission of the Supreme Court after written notice to ODC. The Supreme Court accepted the Agreement and publicly reprimanded respondent, the most severe sanction it was able to impose under these circumstances. View "In the Matter of Former Abbeville County Magistrate George T. Ferguson" on Justia Law

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The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a complaint charging Tate County Youth Court Referee, Drug Court Judge, and Family Master Leigh Ann Darby with judicial misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission and Judge Darby entered into an “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation” providing that Judge Darby had violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and recommended that she be removed from office, prohibited from holding judicial office in the future, and assessed costs of $200. The Commission unanimously accepted and adopted the “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation.” In this latest incident, Judge Darby stipulated to multiple incidents in which she denied citizens their due-process rights. Between 2008 and 2010, she “unlawfully ordered the incarceration of” eight parents and denied each his or her “constitutional right of due process” prior to being “order[ed] . . . to jail for conduct allegedly occurring outside of court.” In 2011, three fifteen-year-old minors (two girls and one boy) were arrested by Senatobia police after a neighbor of one of the children complained that they had walked across her yard. Judge Darby, in her official capacity as youth court referee and youth court judge, but without authority of law, ordered that the three minors be drug-tested while in custody. Without conducting any hearings, Judge Darby ordered the minors to be taken into custody and transported to a detention facility in Alcorn County, Mississippi. Unrepresented by counsel and denied due process, the minors spent Friday until the following Monday in the detention facility. On October 3, 2011, the Tate County Board of Supervisors passed a “No Confidence Resolution” regarding Judge Darby. That resolution declared that it was not in the best of interest of Tate County that she continue in her judicial capacity and called upon the senior chancellor of the district to remove her from all Tate County judicial offices. Judge Darby was suspended from office for a period of sixty days. Thereafter, she tendered her resignation to the senior chancellor. The Supreme Court performed its mandated review of the Commission’s recommendation consistent with Miss. Const. art. 6, section 177A, Miss. Comm’n on Jud. Perf. R. 10, M.R.A.P. 16(a), and Mississippi case law. The Supreme Court concluded Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Court ordered that Judge Darby be removed from office, fined $1,000, and assessed costs of $200. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Darby" on Justia Law

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The Honorable Robert Rand was publicly censured for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline. The Supreme Court found that Judge Rand engaged in undignified conduct (making inappropriate jokes about the appearance of certain people that appeared before him in proceedings), engaged in ex parte communications with attorneys and witnesses in trials that appeared before him, and failed to promote confidence in the judiciary by engaging in off-the-record conversations with persons in the courtroom, described as "advice or pep talks." View "In the Matter of: Robert A. Rand" on Justia Law

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Although Michael Mandelman entered into a stipulation with the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), under which he pled no contest to 22 counts of misconduct and agreed that his license to practice law in Wisconsin should be revoked, he appealed from the report and recommendation of the referee, which was based on that stipulation. The court stated that “Essentially, he seeks ... to comment on certain characterizations and findings by the referee and to provide additional support for the referee's recommendation to make his revocation effective as of the date of his prior suspension, May 29, 2009. The court accepted the referee's factual findings and legal conclusions and agreed that the 22 counts of misconduct support the revocation of Mandelman's license to practice law effective as of the effective date of his prior suspension. Because the record was not sufficient to award restitution to any particular person, the court directed Mandelman to work with the OLR and his former colleague to determine who is owed money from trust accounts utilized by Mandelman and in what amounts. Because Mandelman litigated the matter vigorously prior to entering into the stipulation, the court ordered him to pay the full costs of the proceeding, which were $16,943.16. View "Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Mandelman" on Justia Law

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Andrea Richard allegedly violated the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct in seven different court proceedings between 2006 and 2012 by failing to comply with discovery requests and orders, causing her clients to be subjected to sanctions and expenses. According to the court she has substantial experience in the practice of law, she acted dishonestly or with a selfish motive, there was a pattern of misconduct, there were multiple offenses, she acted in bad faith to obstruct the disciplinary process by intentionally failing to comply with the rules, she refused until the very end of the process to acknowledge the wrongfulness of her conduct and the victims were vulnerable. The court adopted the recommendation of the Board of Professional Responsibility and suspended Richard from the practice of law for three years, among other sanctions. View "Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, WY State Bar v. Richard" on Justia Law

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Lightspeed operates online pornography sites and sued a defendant, identified only Internet Protocol address, which was allegedly associated with unlawful viewing of Lightspeed’s content, using a “hacked” password. Lightspeed identified 6,600 others (by IP addresses only) as “co‐conspirators” in a scheme to steal passwords and content. Lightspeed, acting ex parte, served subpoenas on the ISPs (then non‐parties) for the personally identifiable information of each alleged coconspirator, none of whom had been joined as parties. The ISPs moved to quash and for a protective order. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the ISPs. Lightspeed amended its complaint to name as co‐conspirator parties the ISPs and unidentified “corporate representatives,” alleging negligence, violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030 and 1030(g), and deceptive practices. Lightspeed issued new subpoenas seeking the personally identifiable information. The ISPs removed the case to federal court. The district judge denied an emergency motion to obtain the identification information. After several “changes” with respect to Lightspeed’s lawyers, the court stated that they “demonstrated willingness to deceive … about their operations, relationships, and financial interests have varied from feigned ignorance to misstatements to outright lies … calculated so that the Court would grant early‐discovery requests, thereby allowing [them] to identify defendants and exact settlement proceeds.” After granting Lightspeed’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the court granted attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927, stating that the litigation “smacked of bullying pretense.” Failing to pay, the lawyers were found to be in civil contempt and ordered to pay 10% of the original sanctions award to cover costs for the contempt litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Duffy v. Smith" on Justia Law

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This matter stemmed from the failure of Raymond Thomas, Jr. (a candidate for the office of justice of the peace) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XL. The hearing officer found that Mr. Thomas failed to file his 2012 personal financial disclosure statement timely, and that he acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule. The hearing officer recommended that Mr. Thomas be ordered to pay a penalty of $500.00 and to reimburse the Judiciary Commission for costs. The Supreme Court agreed with the hearing officer's decision after a review of the case, and affirmed the officer's decision. View "In re Raymond Thomas, Jr. Justice of the Peace Candidate Ward 1, Assumption Parish" on Justia Law