Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Members of a local union sued their national parent organization for imposing an illegal trusteeship. The plaintiffs, members of NABET-CWA Local 41, claimed that the national union imposed the trusteeship in bad faith following a local officer election. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a temporary restraining order, later converting it into a preliminary injunction. The parties eventually settled, resulting in a consent judgment that dissolved the trusteeship and required the national union to pay Local 41 approximately $26,000 in trusteeship costs. The only unresolved issue was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. The court acknowledged its broad discretion and the American Rule, which presumes against fee shifting. It considered two exceptions: bad faith and common benefit. The court found that while the national union acted in bad faith in imposing the trusteeship, both parties litigated the dispute in good faith, thus not justifying fee shifting. Additionally, the court recognized that the plaintiffs conferred common benefits on Local 41 and the national union but concluded that these benefits were not substantial enough to merit an award of attorneys' fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the lower court had appropriately applied the American Rule and its exceptions. The district court's decision to deny attorneys' fees was deemed reasonable and within its broad discretion, as it provided a sound explanation for its conclusions. The appellate court emphasized the highly deferential standard of review for such decisions and upheld the district court's judgment. View "Siddiqui v National Association of Broadcast Employees & Tec" on Justia Law

On January 12, 2020, Harold Walker Jr. was involved in a shooting incident at the intersection of Colonial Circle and Old Canton Road in Jackson, Mississippi. Witnesses saw a white car swerve to block a van, and the driver of the white car, identified as Walker, fired multiple shots into the van, killing Bryant Robinson. Walker fled the scene but was pursued by police and later apprehended. Evidence included eyewitness testimonies, security footage, and physical evidence linking Walker to the crime.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County convicted Walker of first-degree murder, shooting into an occupied vehicle, and felony fleeing from law enforcement. Walker appealed, raising five issues: the trial court's refusal to give a lesser-included-offense instruction for heat of passion manslaughter, the sufficiency and weight of the evidence for the first-degree murder conviction, the admission of his statement to law enforcement, the failure to transcribe the jury instructions conference, and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found no reversible error. The court held that there was no evidentiary basis for a heat of passion manslaughter instruction, the evidence was sufficient to support the first-degree murder conviction, and the trial court did not err in admitting Walker's statement. The court also found that the failure to transcribe the jury instructions conference did not prejudice Walker, and his counsel was not ineffective. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Walker v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Daniel Escamilla, a certified fugitive recovery agent, searched the home of Lan Ting Wu and Andy Yu Feng Yang in 2012, looking for Yang’s brother, who was wanted on felony drug trafficking charges. Yang, Wu, and their minor son sued Escamilla for assault, battery, trespass, false imprisonment, and emotional distress. Their lawyer, John Vannucci, represented them. Escamilla defended the search as supported by probable cause and cross-complained against Yang for abuse of process. In 2019, a jury found in favor of Escamilla on all claims and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On August 30, 2021, Escamilla filed a malicious prosecution action against Yang, Wu, and Vannucci.The Alameda County Superior Court granted Vannucci’s motion to strike Escamilla’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), agreeing that the one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys under section 340.6 applied, making the suit time-barred. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action against an attorney. The court held that section 340.6, which provides a one-year limitations period for certain suits against attorneys, does not apply to claims brought by parties who were never their clients or the intended beneficiaries of their clients. Instead, the two-year statute of limitations under section 335.1 applies to malicious prosecution claims brought by formerly adverse parties. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to consider any unaddressed arguments in the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Escamilla v. Vannucci" on Justia Law

Henry Lamar Willis was admitted to the Bar in 2006 and established a law firm. In 2012, he failed to respond to a Formal Complaint by the State Bar regarding his improper handling and conversion of $30,000 in settlement funds. The special master entered a default judgment, and the Supreme Court of Georgia disbarred Willis in 2013 for violations of several Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including acting with reasonable diligence, keeping client funds separate, and not engaging in dishonest conduct.Willis sought readmission to the Bar, claiming a twelve-year rehabilitation process. The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants reviewed his application and recommended granting it. Willis provided a statement of rehabilitation, explaining personal and professional hardships, including a divorce and loss of a city council re-election bid. He detailed his efforts to rebuild his life, including paying all due funds, engaging in various personal development activities, and receiving support from several attorneys and a city council member.The Fitness Board conducted an investigation, including notifying the State Bar, the public, and the judiciary. The State Bar noted a pending grievance at the time of Willis's disbarment, which was declared moot. Willis paid $4,800 owed to the Clients' Security Fund. At an informal conference, Willis took responsibility for his past conduct and demonstrated his rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the record and concluded that Willis had demonstrated rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence. The Court granted Willis's Application for Certification of Fitness, allowing him to be readmitted to the Bar upon satisfying all requirements, including passing the Georgia Bar Examination. View "In re Willis" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christian L. Johnson sued his employer, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. During the litigation, Caltrans attorney Paul Brown sent an email to Johnson’s supervisor, Nicolas Duncan, which Duncan then shared with Johnson. Johnson forwarded the email to his attorney, John Shepardson, who further disseminated it to several experts and individuals. Caltrans sought a protective order, claiming the email was covered by attorney-client privilege. The trial court granted the order and later disqualified Shepardson and three experts for non-compliance with the order.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County issued the protective order, finding the email privileged. Johnson and Shepardson were ordered to destroy all copies and cease further dissemination. Caltrans later filed a motion to enforce the order and subsequently a motion to disqualify Shepardson and the experts, arguing continued non-compliance and misuse of the privileged email. The trial court granted the disqualification, citing Shepardson’s breach of ethical duties and the potential prejudice to Caltrans.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Brown email was protected by attorney-client privilege. The court found no merit in Johnson’s arguments that the privilege was waived or that the crime-fraud exception applied. The court also upheld the disqualification of Shepardson and the experts, concluding that Shepardson’s actions violated ethical obligations and posed a risk of unfair advantage and harm to the integrity of the judicial process. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining public trust in the administration of justice. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

James Ervin pleaded guilty to possessing a semi-automatic rifle as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He later sought to withdraw his guilty plea through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that the government provided false inculpatory information about the rifle. Ervin's arguments centered on the interpretation of the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g).The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Ervin's motion to vacate his plea. The court found that the rifle had traveled in interstate commerce, thus meeting the statutory requirement. Ervin's ineffective assistance claim failed because he could not establish prejudice, as the firearm's interstate travel was sufficient to satisfy the commerce element of § 922(g). The court also denied his motion for reconsideration and his request for a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g) should be interpreted broadly, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Scarborough v. United States. The court found that the rifle, which traveled from North Carolina to Louisiana, Georgia, and back to North Carolina, met the interstate commerce requirement. Consequently, Ervin's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations were rejected. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Ervin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that his interpretation of the statute was incorrect and that his defense would have been meritless. View "United States v. Ervin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's electronic voting system, arguing it should be replaced with a system using exclusively hand-counted paper ballots. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the use of computerized equipment in elections. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lake v. Fontes. Subsequently, the district court granted the defendants' motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs' lead attorneys, Andrew J. Parker and Kurt Olsen, and their law firms, holding them liable for $122,200.00 in fees.The district court found that the lead attorneys made false, misleading, and unsupported factual assertions in their first amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, and did not conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. Key false allegations included claims that Arizona does not use paper ballots and that its voting machines are not tested. The district court concluded that these misleading statements rendered the complaint factually insufficient and open to sanction. Additionally, the court found that the attorneys acted recklessly and in bad faith, particularly in the timing and nature of their motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the lead attorneys' actions were both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. The court also upheld the finding of bad faith, noting that the attorneys' behavior and timing in bringing the motion for a preliminary injunction were reckless. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

In 1979, Karu Gene White, along with two accomplices, committed a brutal home invasion and murder of three elderly individuals in Kentucky. White, who had known the victims, planned the crime to steal money they had saved. The victims were beaten to death with a crowbar and other weapons. White was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary, robbery, and capital murder.At trial, White's defense initially focused on an alibi, but this strategy collapsed when one of his accomplices agreed to testify against him in exchange for immunity. White's counsel then pursued an insanity defense, presenting evidence of White's abusive and traumatic childhood. Despite this, the jury found White guilty on all counts and recommended the death penalty, which the trial judge imposed.White appealed his conviction and sentence, but the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. White then sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately rejected this claim, finding that counsel's performance was reasonable and that additional mitigating evidence would not have changed the jury's decision.White filed for federal habeas relief, which was denied by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The court found that counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence were reasonable and that the Kentucky Supreme Court's application of Strickland v. Washington was not unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that White's counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that there was no substantial likelihood that additional mitigating evidence would have changed the jury's recommendation for the death penalty. View "White v. Plappert" on Justia Law