Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In this professional malpractice action, the Supreme Court overruled Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1994), and its progeny insofar as they hold that, for a non-litigation legal malpractice claim, a claimant's damages are not irrevocable and non-speculative until the claimant knows the exact dollar amount of damages he or she incurred because of the malpractice, holding that Broadbent was wrongly decided.Plaintiff filed the underlying professional malpractice claim against Defendants for negligently providing her poor legal advice regarding a business she co-owned. The trial judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff's legal harm did not become "irrevocable and non-speculative" sufficient to trigger Ky. Rev. Code 413.245 until July 2017, and therefore, Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on slightly different grounds, holding (1) because Broadbent has led to inconsistencies in jurisprudence regarding when damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative for a professional malpractice claim, Broadbent and its progeny are overruled; and (2) for a non-litigation legal malpractice claim, a claimant's damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative when the claimant is reasonably certain that damages will indeed flow from the defendant's negligent act. View "Wolfe v. Kimmel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on their legal-malpractice and Vermont Consumer Protection Act (VCPA) claims. Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC (MBP) owned property abutting Lake Champlain in Colchester, Vermont, and leased the property to Malletts Bay Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Under the lease, the Association had the obligation to keep the property in good condition. In 2011, following major erosion damage on a portion of the embankment on the lakefront, MBP’s manager notified the Association it was in default for failing to maintain the property and gave the Association forty-five days to make specified, substantial repairs. After the Association failed to make the repairs, MBP filed a complaint against the Association seeking damages and to void the lease for the Association’s violation of its terms. The Association retained defendant Heilmann, Ekman, Cooley & Gagnon, Inc. In the following months, the Association took steps to address MBP’s complaints. However, following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the Association breached the lease and was in default but declined to grant MBP’s request for lease forfeiture. Instead, it awarded MBP damages for remediation and attorney’s fees and costs. Both parties appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the Association breached the lease and that MBP was entitled to termination of the lease. Ultimately, the lease was terminated, and the Association’s members were evicted. Members then sued the Association, alleging that it was negligent in its administration of the provisions of the lease requiring it to keep the property in good condition. Members and the Association settled in 2018. As part of the settlement, the Association assigned members its right to sue defendant for legal malpractice. The Association and members filed a complaint against defendant in the instant case in December 2019, alleging legal malpractice and a violation of the VCPA. The crux of their legal-malpractice claim is a lost opportunity to settle. They proposed that, had defendant tried to settle, the Association and MBP would have likely agreed to terms involving repairs and payment of MBP’s attorney’s fees thus avoiding lease termination and eviction of the Association’s members. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded summary judgment was appropriate on the legal-malpractice claim but not on the VCPA claim, and thus reversed and remanded. View "Mansfield, et al. v. Heilmann, Ekman, Cooley & Gagnon, Inc." on Justia Law

The Hearing Panel of the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) recommended that Gerald Johnson be removed from office for violating Rules 1.1, 1.2 (A), and 1.2 (B) of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”). Johnson, however, submitted his resignation to Governor Kemp shortly after the Hearing Panel filed its Report and Recommendation. Removal from office was the only sanction the JQC seeks, and the Georgia Supreme Court could not remove a former judge from an office he no longer holds. Accordingly, this matter was dismissed. View "Inquiry concerning Judge Gerald Johnson" on Justia Law

Georgia Court of Appeals Judge Christian Coomer was charged with patterns of behavior regarding his use of campaign funds and his dealings with a legal client that allegedly undermined public confidence. The Hearing Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) found that he indeed committed those acts, that he did so in bad faith, that those acts violated the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, and that the violations warranted his removal. The Georgia Supreme Court found that enough of the Hearing Panel’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence that, notwithstanding alternative ways that the evidence could have been viewed, the Court deferred to the Hearing Panel’s findings regarding Judge Coomer’s actions and the bad faith in which the Hearing Panel found those actions to have been taken. The Court concluded the appropriate sanction was to remove Judge Coomer from the bench. View "Inquiry concerning Judge Christian Coomer" on Justia Law

After several instances of inappropriate behavior and twice failing to show up for a client’s sentencing hearing, mostly due to a problem with substance abuse, attorney Plaintiff was referred by a presiding judge to a three-judge disciplinary panel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Following an investigation and hearing, the panel sanctioned Plaintiff by suspending him from practicing before that court for 12 months, with the option to reapply upon proof of sobriety during the period of suspension. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that a three-judge panel could not sanction him because the rules say only that “[a] presiding judge” may take disciplinary action. He also says the 12-month suspension is excessive.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court explained that the district court did try a less severe option. An informal panel of judges privately reprimanded him in June 2020. That lesser sanction did not work. The court was thus justified in imposing a harsher sanction like the suspension. Moreover, the sanction here is appropriately tailored to Plaintiff’s unique situation: his inability to practice law stemmed from his alcohol abuse, so the court ordered him not to practice until he is able to demonstrate sustained sobriety for one year. Further, the court wrote that the district court here considered that a lesser, non-suspension sanction had not deterred Plaintiff from reverting to his old ways. The panel also considered that Plaintiff’s conduct had persisted for some time and that he was not remorseful for his conduct. View "In re Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law

A Special Tribunal was convened to impose discipline on former Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice Nathan Coats. The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline recommended approval of an Amended Stipulation for Public Censure. The censure stems from a 2018 allegation against Mindy Masias, the Chief of Staff and second in command of the State Court Administrator’s Office (SCAO), for misconduct while she was employed by the SCAO. She resigned her position, but was still under consideration for a post-resignation services contract with the Court, valued at $2.6 to $2.7 million. After an anonymous letter raised significant allegations of wrongdoing by Masias, the Office of the State Auditor (OSA) opened an investigation. Undisputed evidence revealed that the Judicial Department entered into this contract with Masias before the anonymous letter was received, and Justice Coats asserted he had no knowledge of the execution of Masias’ contract at that time. Months after execution of the contract and receipt of the letter, Justice Coats learned Masias had surreptitiously recorded a conversation with former Chief Justice Rice concerning the reasons Masias was not elevated to become the State Court Administrator. Had Justice Coats exercised due diligence by obtaining and reviewing the Masias separation agreement, he could have learned about the surreptitious recording prior to execution of the services contract. The Court ultimately withdrew from the services contract. Disciplinary proceedings were started against Justice Coats for failing to “perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently” as required by the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended, and the Special Tribunal adopted the recommendation that Justice Coats be publicly censured. View "Colorado v. Coats" on Justia Law

Mac Naughton, a New Jersey attorney, represented Harmelech in a lawsuit filed by RMG until Harmelech failed to pay his legal fees. Mac Naughton later purchased from RMG the rights to the unpaid portion of a settlement judgment and filed multiple actions against Harmelech, seeking to collect the Judgment. He sought to set aside Harmelech’s conveyance of his Highland Park home to his son. Harmelech moved to disqualify Mac Naughton under New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a): A lawyer who has represented a client “shall not thereafter represent another client in … a substantially related matter in which that client’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client.” Judge Holderman barred Mac Naughton from acting as counsel in efforts to collect the RMG Judgment. Mac Naughton continued prosecuting the matter and filed similar actions before different judges. The Highland Park action was dismissed as a sanction for Mac Naughton’s defiance of the Order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals of four other cases.Mac Naughton then sued Harmelech, seeking to set aside a purportedly fraudulent stock transfer to collect the RMG Judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the suit's dismissal. This lawsuit was another attempt to circumvent the Holderman Order. Mac Naughton again argued that he did not violate Rule 1.9(a); he expects a New Jersey proceeding to vindicate him. But this dismissal was based on the Holderman Order, not Rule 1.9(a). Whether or not Mac Naughton violated his ethical duties as a New Jersey lawyer, he has a duty to comply with orders issued by Seventh Circuit courts. The appeal was frivolous; sanctions are warranted. View "Mac Naughton v. Asher Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant did not file a response.The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court wrote that consistent with Crawley, it holds that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's legal malpractice complaint against Appellees, her attorneys, and finding that there were no facts in the complaint sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations based on fraudulent concealment, holding that there was no error.In the motion to dismiss, Appellees argued that Appellant's malpractice claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and should be dismissed. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case and finding there were no facts contained in the complaint sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations based on fraudulent concealment. View "Nichols v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court in this legal malpractice case, holding that there was no error.A media company entered into a purportedly tax-friendly sale with the assistance of a tax law firm, an accounting firm, and Murphy Desmond. After the deal closed and the shareholders had received their payout, the IRS levied various taxes and penalties against the shareholders. Several shareholders brought suit. Terry and Sandy Shockley intervened and filed a complaint against all three entities. The Shockleys subsequently settled with two entities, leaving them with a legal malpractice claim against Murphy Desmond. The jury found Murphy Desmond negligent in part, but the circuit court concluded that it was entitled to indemnification from the entities who settled, leaving the Shockleys with no further recovery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in accord with Fleming v. Thresherman's Mutual Insurance Co., 388 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1986), Murphy Desmond owed no damages to the Shockleys. View "Allsop Venture Partners III v. Murphy Desmond SC" on Justia Law