Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In a case heard by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the defendant, Christian Portillo, was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the State’s witnesses regarding evidence that the district court had previously ruled as inadmissible. The defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied by the district court. During the closing-argument rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant no longer held the presumption of innocence based on the evidence presented during the trial. The defendant did not object to this statement. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.The defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial errors committed by the State. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the prosecutor's misstatement of the law did not affect the defendant's substantial rights.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during the closing-argument rebuttal was a plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The court held that the defendant is entitled to a new trial as the error must be addressed to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Portillo" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision, finding that the Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) violated the due process rights of two landowners, Merlin Brown and Uhrich & Brown Limited Partnership, by having the same attorneys act as both prosecutors and participants in the adjudicatory process of the case. The court held that such a combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the same individuals posed an intolerably high risk of actual bias, thus, infringing on the landowners' right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal. In this case, the NRD had accused the landowners of violating certain ground water management rules. The case was initially heard by the Board of Directors of the NRD, whose decision to impose penalties on the landowners was informed by the same attorneys who had prosecuted the case on behalf of the NRD. The landowners appealed the Board's decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), leading to the district court's reversal. The NRD then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court's ruling. View "Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part. v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice claim, Rachel Breal sued her former attorneys, the Downs Law Group and others, for allegedly negligent representation in a dismissed BP Deepwater Horizon oil-spill claim. The case was filed in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, but was then removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi by Downs Law. The case was later remanded back to the Hinds County Circuit Court. During a hearing, the trial court raised, on its own initiative, a forum-selection clause in Breal's retainer agreement with Downs Law, which stated that the proper forum and venue for any litigation relating to the agreement should be in the court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Miami-Dade County. Based on this clause, the trial court dismissed the case for improper venue, and Breal appealed.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court could not sua sponte enforce the forum-selection clause a year into the litigation. The court reasoned that improper venue could be waived if not timely raised, and therefore, the trial court could not enforce the forum-selection clause when Downs Law had failed to do so. The court found that Downs Law had waived any claim of improper venue by actively participating in the litigation in both federal and state courts in Mississippi without ever raising the issue of the forum-selection clause until prompted by the trial court. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court erred by dismissing the case due to improper venue and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Breal v. The Downs Law Group" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed a decision by the Court of Appeals that had remanded a case back to the Fayette Circuit Court over the perception of a jurisdictional error. The original plaintiff, Timothy Poole, had filed a lawsuit against Valetta Browne, Executive Director of the Kentucky Office of Bar Admissions (KYOBA), alleging she had negligently performed her duties and caused him damages. This allegation came after Poole was erroneously informed that he had passed the bar exam, only to be told three days later that he had not due to a data entry error. Browne had filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the practice of law and her own immunity from Poole's claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Poole's complaint, though on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had failed to adequately consider the Supreme Court's full authority over bar admissions. The court also recognized that individuals who serve in a judicial capacity, such as Browne, are immune from civil liability for conduct and communications occurring in the performance of their duties. The court further clarified that Browne's actions, which Poole complained of, were the functional equivalent of judicial duties, thereby granting Browne absolute immunity. View "BROWNE V. POOLE" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which had denied Adam Carson's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Carson had been convicted of robbing a bank and tampering with a witness, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In his motion, Carson argued that his trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to initiate plea negotiations and by committing several mistakes during the trial. He also claimed that he did not knowingly waive his right to testify. The Court of Appeals held that Carson's ineffective-assistance claims failed because they lacked grounds for prejudice. The court ruled there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Carson's case would have been different if his attorney had acted differently. The court also held that Carson had not demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to testify, as he did not object on the record to his attorney's statement that he did not want to testify. View "Carson v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction against Richard Lee David Brown for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Law enforcement found Brown in an apartment during the execution of a search warrant, along with drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a cell phone that Brown admitted was his. Brown appealed his conviction, alleging multiple pre-trial and trial-related errors. However, the court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Brown's claims that he was improperly denied a jury instruction regarding "mere presence," that the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, among other issues. The court held that the instructions given to the jury were adequate and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that Brown's claims of ineffective assistance were best left for a post-conviction relief proceeding, such as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court concluded that none of the alleged errors either individually or cumulatively warranted reversal of the conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Joseph James Tippet was initially charged with first-degree murder for allegedly shooting and killing his father. However, due to a series of discovery violations by the Eleventh Judicial District Attorney's Office, Tippet's charge was reduced to second-degree murder by the district court as a deterrent sanction. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review this decision.The People (prosecution) had a history of neglecting their discovery obligations, leading to multiple discovery violations in Tippet's case and others. Despite several warnings from various judges, the District Attorney's Office continued to neglect its discovery obligations. As a result, Tippet's defense counsel was unable to effectively prepare for his preliminary hearing.The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Tippet's charge as a sanction for the District Attorney's Office's consistent neglect of its discovery obligations. The court emphasized the importance of the discovery process in advancing the search for truth and protecting the integrity of the truth-finding process. The court affirmed the sanction as a necessary deterrent to encourage the District Attorney's Office to modify its discovery practices. The court also rejected the People's argument that the district court lacked the authority to reduce the charge as a discovery sanction, explaining that the decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations was within the court's discretion.In conclusion, the court discharged the rule to show cause, upholding the district court's decision to reduce Tippet's charge from first-degree murder to second-degree murder as a deterrent sanction for the District Attorney's Office's discovery violations. View "People v. Tippet" on Justia Law

The case involves the district attorneys of Los Angeles and San Francisco (the People) filing a complaint against the law firm Potter Handy, LLP and several of its attorneys (collectively, Potter) for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The People allege that Potter Handy has filed numerous ADA complaints containing false standing allegations as part of a scheme to extract settlements from small business owners in California. The People claim that this conduct constitutes an “unlawful” business practice under California's unfair competition law (UCL).Potter Handy demurred on the ground that the litigation privilege, which generally protects communications made as part of a judicial proceeding, immunizes their alleged conduct. The People argued that the litigation privilege does not bar their UCL claim as it is predicated on violations of a regulatory statute or rule that is itself exempt from the privilege. The trial court sustained Potter’s demurrer without leave to amend, and the People appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the litigation privilege does apply to the People's UCL claim. The court concluded that carving out an exception to the litigation privilege for the People’s UCL claim would not be proper because the Legislature’s prescribed remedies—prosecution directly under section 6128(a) and State Bar disciplinary proceedings—remain viable. View "People v. Potter Handy, LLP" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Manegabe Chebea Ally, was convicted of first-degree manslaughter for the death of a 16-month-old child. He was sentenced to a 45-year prison term with 20 years suspended. Following his conviction, Ally appealed, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. After a series of evidentiary hearings, the habeas court granted him relief, determining that his counsel was indeed ineffective and that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies prejudiced his defense. The habeas court determined that Ally's right to a fair trial was violated.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, however, reversed the decision of the habeas court. The Supreme Court found that while Ally's counsel's opening statement included an imprecise remark, this mistake did not undermine the adversarial process or deprive Ally of a fair trial. The Court also found that Ally's defense counsel made a reasonably strategic decision to exclude parts of Ally's three interviews with a detective and to not elicit additional testimony from a medical expert. Although the Court acknowledged that the defense counsel's failure to disclose a certain video to the prosecutor deviated from prevailing professional norms, it did not result in significant prejudice to Ally. The Court therefore concluded that Ally did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at his 2012 trial, and the decision of the habeas court was reversed. View "Ally V. Young" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska was tasked with determining whether a judgment against a self-represented litigant, Jon Buchholdt, was void due to improper service of process. Jeremy Nelson, Buchholdt's former client, had sued him for legal malpractice and won a judgment of $200,000, but Buchholdt argued that he was not properly served and therefore the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.The main issue in this case was whether Buchholdt was properly served with the summons and complaint by certified, restricted mail sent to his law office, which was rerouted to his home and signed by his alleged agent, "Suz Miller." Buchholdt contended that he was not properly served as he never personally signed for the service, and therefore the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.The court held that Buchholdt failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the judgment was void. Despite his claims, Buchholdt did not provide any evidence to contradict Nelson's evidence of service or to show that Suz Miller was not authorized to receive service on his behalf. Additionally, Buchholdt had listed Nelson's lawsuit as a contingent liability when he filed for bankruptcy, indicating he had knowledge of the suit.Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Buchholdt's motions to set aside the judgment and for reconsideration. The court did not find that the judgment was void due to a lack of personal jurisdiction resulting from improper service of process. View "Buchholdt v. Nelson" on Justia Law