Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, Inez Gollersrud and David Gollersrud, individuals, filed a case against LPMC, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company. The case revolved around the question of whether email communications between a client and their attorney, sent from and stored on the client’s employer’s email system, are confidential and protected by attorney-client privilege. The court was also asked to consider if an employee leaving those email messages on the employer’s email system upon ending employment constitutes a waiver of attorney-client privilege.The court held that communications between a client and an attorney for the purpose of facilitating professional legal services are presumptively confidential. The client’s mere use of an employer’s email system does not overcome this presumption. Additionally, it was determined that leaving emails on the employer's system does not establish actual disclosure of communications, a necessary condition for a waiver of privilege under OEC 511. The court concluded that the record was insufficient to demonstrate a lack of privilege or that such privilege had been waived. As a result, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus. View "Gollersrud v. LPMC, LLC" on Justia Law

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In a contentious guardianship case involving Kathleen June Jones, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Elizabeth Brickfield, to aid in determining Jones's best interests. The GAL filed a notice of intent to seek fees and costs at her standard hourly rate. The court awarded her those fees over Jones's objection. Jones appealed, arguing that the GAL had no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that Jones waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court’s order by failing to raise the issue below. The court also held that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program, but this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the complexity of this matter. Lastly, the court held that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL’s fee request and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her requested fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order awarding the GAL fees. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho upheld a lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, George and Jesse’s Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc., and two of its owners, Bruce and Richard Byram. The plaintiff, Adam Davis, had been employed as an assistant manager at Les Schwab from April 2016 till June 2019. In March 2019, there was a shortage in the cash deposits and surveillance footage showed Davis bending down out of camera view in the area where the cash deposits were kept while he was alone in the store. This led to Davis being arrested and charged with grand theft, and his employment was terminated. Although the charges against Davis were later dropped, he sued the defendants for breach of his employment contract, false arrest, defamation per se, and for knowingly giving a false report to the police. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Davis’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact that could support Davis’s claims. The court found that Davis was an at-will employee who could be terminated without cause and that there was no evidence to show that the defendants had acted with malice. The court also found that the plaintiff's attorney had violated Rule 11.2 by submitting arguments that were not well grounded in fact, and awarded a portion of the defendants' attorney fees to be paid by the plaintiff's counsel. View "Davis v. George and Jesse's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a lower court's decision to terminate a mother's parental rights to her two children. The mother appealed the termination of her rights, asserting that she was deprived of effective legal counsel during the proceedings. The lower court had determined that the children were in jeopardy due to the mother's chronic alcohol abuse, unsafe behavior, and poor decision-making, which included permitting a convicted sex offender to care for the children unsupervised. Despite repeated opportunities, the mother failed to demonstrate sufficient improvement to safely care for her children.The mother also proposed that her own mother or aunt should be appointed as permanency guardians for the children. However, the court found that neither individual was suitable for this role due to their loyalties to the mother and lack of objectivity regarding her addiction and reckless behavior. As such, the court determined that adoption was in the children's best interests.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found no evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court noted that the attorney had adequately presented the mother's case and had advocated for the possibility of a familial permanency guardianship. The court concluded that the mother's claim of ineffective assistance did not meet the threshold for a prima facie case, as there was no evidence of serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention from her attorney, nor was there any indication that the outcome of the trial was unjust. Consequently, the decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was upheld. View "In re Children of Shannevia Y." on Justia Law

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In this case, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) withheld 11 documents from a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request by Appellate Advocates, arguing that the documents were privileged attorney-client communications. These documents had been prepared by DOCCS counsel to train and advise Board of Parole commissioners on how to comply with their legal duties and obligations.The New York Court of Appeals had to determine whether these documents were rightly withheld under the FOIL exemption for privileged matters. The court found that the documents reflected counsel's legal analysis of statutory, regulatory, and decisional law, and were therefore protected attorney-client communications, prepared to facilitate the rendition of legal advice or services in a professional relationship. The court rejected Appellate Advocates' arguments that disclosure was required under FOIL, noting that the privilege applied to proactive advice to assist the client in compliance with legal mandates, and was not limited to communications triggered by a client's disclosure of confidential information or a direct request for advice. The court also rejected the argument that documents identified as Commissioner training materials were categorically not exempt from disclosure.The court concluded that the documents were properly withheld under the FOIL exemption for privileged matters as they were privileged attorney-client communications. The court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "Matter of Appellate Advocates v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction of Roy Lee Waters for felony murder related to the shooting death of his longtime girlfriend, Melvina Dunlap. Waters appealed on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court wrongly denied his motion for a new trial, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not adequately investigating his insanity defense.The court found that the jury was authorized to reject Waters’s insanity defense based on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of any conflicts in the evidence, including the testimony of a forensic psychologist who evaluated Waters and determined he was criminally responsible at the time of the shooting. The court also found that the trial court did not err in denying Waters's motion for a new trial based on "general grounds".On the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that Waters's trial counsel was not deficient for failing to further investigate the insanity defense by procuring an expert to testify about Waters’s criminal responsibility at the time of the shooting, and even assuming that counsel was deficient in failing to procure an expert to testify about the side effects of Waters’s prescription medications, Waters failed to establish prejudice. Hence, the conviction was affirmed. View "WATERS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Raymond Chambliss was convicted of felony murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend, Tonia Herring, during an argument. On appeal, Chambliss raised several claims. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on simple assault and lesser offenses, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request charges for these lesser offenses.The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, disagreed with Chambliss's arguments. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Chambliss's felony murder conviction. Regarding the instructional errors, the court concluded that Chambliss had not shown that the given instruction on simple assault contained any obvious legal error and had not established that the trial court obviously erred by failing to charge the lesser offenses of felony or misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter. Lastly, the court found no merit in Chambliss's claims of ineffective assistance since he had not established that counsel performed deficiently by failing to request charges on lesser offenses that were not available to him.Consequently, the court affirmed Chambliss's conviction. View "CHAMBLISS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant, Michael Angelo Tovar, was found guilty of various drug and firearm charges and was sentenced to 101 months in prison. He appealed his sentence, raising three issues: one surrounding his attempts to withdraw his guilty plea for the firearm charges and two concerning the calculation of his sentence.Tovar had sold cocaine to a confidential source twice and was arrested with cocaine and a large amount of cash on his person. A subsequent search of his home found further cash, a firearm, ammunition, and more drugs. Tovar pleaded guilty to all charges but later attempted to withdraw his guilty plea for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, arguing that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied these motions but removed his counsel from the case.Tovar also contested the district court's calculation of his sentence. The court had applied a "controlled substance offense" enhancement based on Tovar's prior Illinois cannabis conviction and had converted the cash found on Tovar's person and in his home to its equivalent marijuana weight as suspected drug proceeds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. It found no error in the district court's denial of Tovar's motions to withdraw his guilty plea and the calculation of his sentence, including the application of the "controlled substance offense" enhancement and the conversion of the cash to its equivalent marijuana weight. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying Tovar's request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. View "USA v. Tovar" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the constitutionality of Cook County, Illinois's use of cameras to record holding cell toilets in courthouses throughout the county. The plaintiffs, pretrial detainees, claimed that the cameras infringed upon their Fourth Amendment privacy interests and also constituted an intrusion upon seclusion under Illinois law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Cook County and Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, and the plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using the toilets in courthouse holding cells. While it acknowledged that there are questions around the extent to which detainees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodies while in a holding cell, it found that any privacy rights are substantially diminished. The court further held that Cook County's use of cameras in courthouse holding cells was reasonable due to the security risks inherent in the setting. The court also determined that one of the plaintiffs, Alicea, had standing to sue, but the other plaintiffs did not.Furthermore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for intrusion upon seclusion. It held that the plaintiff had not met his burden on the fourth element of the claim, anguish and suffering.Lastly, the court affirmed the district court's decisions related to discovery and attorneys' fees. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in these decisions. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Alicea v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

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The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) in a case involving the SAPD's statutory duty to arrange for substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest arises. The SAPD filed a direct action against the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that the court infringed on the SAPD’s statutory duty to arrange a new attorney for a defendant named Azad Abdullah. The SAPD had identified a conflict of interest in its own office and tried to substitute an attorney from Pennsylvania, but the district court refused the substitution and appointed a new attorney of its own choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court had obstructed the SAPD's statutory duty and authority under Idaho Code section 19-5906. The Court ordered the district court's decisions to be vacated, restored the SAPD as attorney of record for the limited purpose of arranging for substitute counsel, and ordered the appointment of a new district judge to preside over Abdullah’s post-conviction proceeding. View "SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law