Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In 1991, a group of flight attendants initiated a class action suit against several tobacco companies. The suit resulted in a settlement agreement. Subsequently, the Flight Attendant Medical Research Institute (FAMRI) was formed, and several of the flight attendants who were part of the class action became members of FAMRI’s board, including Patricia Young and Alani Blissard. Thereafter, several flight attendants filed individual suits against the tobacco companies. Steve Hunter and Philip Gerson were among the attorneys who represented the flight attendants. In 2010, a group of attorneys, including Gerson and Hunter, filed a petition against FAMRI on behalf of some of the flight attendants who were part of the original class, seeking an accounting of FAMRI’s funds and requesting that the settlement funds be dispersed directly to their clients. Young, Blissard and FAMRI moved to disqualify the attorneys on the ground of conflict of interest. The trial court entered an order disqualifying several attorneys, including Hunter and Gerson. The Third District Court of Appeals quashed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that disqualification was warranted in this case.View "Young v. Achenbauch" on Justia Law

Herbert Lee Jr., the attorney who handled the 2001 settlement of thirteen diet-drug claims (for approximately $32 million), agreed that six percent of the gross settlement would be used to pay for “common benefit” discovery materials generated in the federal multi-district litigation (MDL) of the claims. Lee billed the MDL fee to the plaintiffs. After the settlement, the MDL court ordered a partial refund of the fee. Two of the plaintiffs, Gloria Thompson and Deborah Dixon, sued Lee, alleging that his attorney’s fee had exceeded the amount set out in the retainer agreement and that he had failed to accurately refund their portions of the MDL fee. The trial court granted summary judgment to Lee on the contract issue and to the plaintiffs on the MDL fee issue. Both Lee and the plaintiffs appealed, and in "Lee I)," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial on the contract issue. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the MDL fee issue, but remanded for the trial court to “determine if the MDL fees were paid in accordance a MDL Pre-Trial Order . . . and if not, to order such distribution.” On remand, the jury found in favor of Lee. The trial court determined that the MDL fees had not been paid in accordance with the MDL pretrial order, and ordered that Lee pay Thompson $420,000 and Dixon $180,000. Lee appealed, arguing: (1) the Supreme Court erred in "Lee I" by finding that the MDL order required him to pay the entire MDL fee from his attorney’s fees; (2) the plaintiffs were entitled to only $140,000 and $60,000 based on a prior representation of their attorney as to the amount owed; and (3) the plaintiffs’ warranted dismissal with prejudice due to their wrongful conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Lee’s assertion that the pretrial orders did not require to him to pay the entire MDL fee was decided in the first appeal and was barred by the law of the case doctrine. Furthermore, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ letter brief did not constitute a binding admission on the amount of damages and that Lee’s assertion that the plaintiffs should have been sanctioned for misconduct was procedurally barred. View "Lee v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Roger Collins died following an inpatient stay at Ridgeway Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Facility. Stella Collins, Roger's wife, subsequently brought an action against Ridgeway alleging wrongful death and nursing home neglect. After pretrial discovery, Ridgeway moved to disqualify Wilkes & McHugh (W&H), the lawfirm representing Collins, alleging that an investigator for W&H violated the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct by making contact with three of Ridgeway's employees. The trial court denied the motion. Ridgeway then sought a writ of mandamus seeking the dismissal of the claims brought against it or, alternatively, the disqualification of W&H. The court of appeals declined to issue the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in finding that Ridgeway had an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise for the admission of unfairly and unethically obtained evidence. View "Ridgeway Nursing & Rehabilitation Facility, LLC v. Circuit Court " on Justia Law

In an earlier litigation, Kleem retained Julian Vanni and Vanni & Associates (collectively, Vanni) to appraise certain real property in dispute between the parties. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Kleem and against Southwest Sports Center. Southwest subsequently filed suit against Kleem and Vanni. The case was assigned to Judge Richard McMonagle. Vanni sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge McMonagle from hearing the litigation, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction based on the jurisdictional-priority rule, claim preclusion, and witness immunity. The court of appeals dismissed the case, concluding that Judge McMonagle did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McMonagle did not patently lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy by way of appeal.View "State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joe Encinias and his parents hired defendants Russell Whitener ad the Whitener Law Firm to represent plaintiff in a possible suit against the Robertson High School and the Las Vegas School District after he was badly beaten by a classmate at the school two years earlier. Plaintiff called the firm out of concern on the applicable statute of limitations on his case. In fact, the statute had run by that time. A Whitener attorney testified that he and his colleagues had been aware of the statute of limitations, but allowed it to run because they were concerned about the strength of plaintiff's case. In 2007, Whitener realized the case was barred; in early 2008, the firm decided not to pursue the suit. Whitener waited until the spring of 2008 to tell plaintiff and his family that it had missed the statute of limitations. Later that fall, plaintiff sued the firm for malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the firm. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its grant of summary judgment, finding genuine issues of fact remained with regard to plaintiff's case. View "Encinias v. Whitener Law Firm" on Justia Law