Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Shane Clark Johnson was charged with deliberate homicide in 2013 for the death of his brother, Travis. The jury could not reach a verdict on deliberate homicide but convicted Johnson of negligent homicide with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The State again charged Johnson with deliberate homicide but amended the charge to negligent homicide after Johnson filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The second jury found Johnson guilty of felony negligent homicide and that he used a weapon in the commission of the offense.In the first trial, Judge Daniel Boucher allowed Johnson to present a defense of justifiable use of force, but limited evidence about Travis’s violent behavior and other specific acts. Johnson testified that Travis attacked him, leading to a struggle over a gun, which resulted in Travis’s death. The jury convicted Johnson of negligent homicide. On remand, Judge Matthew J. Cuffe presided over the second trial. Johnson did not present a self-defense theory but argued the shooting was accidental. The prosecutor’s closing arguments included comments on the State’s charging decisions and the lack of evidence that Travis was suicidal, which Johnson’s counsel did not object to at trial.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court found that the prosecutor’s comments were permissible and did not warrant a mistrial. The court also declined to exercise plain-error review for the unobjected comments about the State’s charging decisions. Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were deemed not record-based and more appropriate for postconviction relief. The court held that the District Court legally imposed a consecutive weapon enhancement sentence in addition to the persistent felony offender sentence. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant, Charles Geoffrey Santoro, was convicted of negligent homicide after a retrial. The case stemmed from an incident at a bar where Santoro and another patron, Levi, had a confrontation. Santoro claimed that Levi choked him, leading him to reverse his truck in an attempt to escape, which resulted in Levi being run over and killed.In the first trial, Santoro was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, with five years suspended and no parole restriction. However, this conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana due to ineffective assistance of counsel.In the retrial, the District Court granted the State's motion to exclude expert testimony on the effects of strangulation, which had been admitted in the first trial. Santoro was again convicted and this time sentenced to 20 years in prison with a full 20-year parole restriction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony on strangulation. The court held that this testimony was relevant and could have assisted the jury in determining whether Santoro's actions were a "gross deviation" from that of a reasonable person in Santoro's situation. The court also found that the State's enhanced sentencing recommendation after retrial was vindictive and that the District Court erred by failing to allow Santoro the opportunity to speak prior to sentencing. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Santoro" on Justia Law

The case involves Clark Ryan Ramsey, an attorney who represented Justin Kalina in a felony assault case. Jessica Foote, a witness in the assault case, was investigated for alleged theft from Kalina's Uber Eats account, but no charges were brought against her. Ramsey sought information from the prosecutor in the assault case that had been gathered in the theft investigation, which he believed could be used to impeach Foote. He submitted a modified form to the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Office (YCSO) requesting copies of the Confidential Criminal Justice Information (CCJI) in the theft case, noting he sought copies of CCJI regarding Foote. The YCSO disseminated the CCJI to Ramsey.The State filed a motion in the Justice Court, seeking to charge Ramsey with misdemeanor forgery and misdemeanor solicitation of the misuse of confidential criminal justice information, stemming from Ramsey’s submission of the form to the YCSO and subsequent receipt of CCJI from that agency. Ramsey filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting the matter must be dismissed due to a lack of probable cause because, as a matter of law, the State could not prove the elements of forgery or solicitation. The Justice Court denied Ramsey’s motion to dismiss.Ramsey then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for a writ of supervisory control directing the Yellowstone County Justice Court to reverse its order denying Ramsey’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that there was not probable cause to believe Ramsey committed either offense charged in this case and the Justice Court should not have granted the State’s motion for leave to file a complaint. The Supreme Court accepted and granted Ramsey’s petition, reversed the Justice Court’s finding of probable cause and accompanying order allowing filing of amended complaint, and remanded the matter to the Justice Court with instructions to dismiss. View "Ramsey v. Yellowstone County Justice Court" on Justia Law

Duane Burchill was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit deceptive practices, and one count of possession of dangerous drugs in 2017. Following his conviction, Burchill filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct during his trial. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of Burchill's petition for postconviction relief.Burchill's claim of ineffective assistance centered on two main arguments. First, he argued that the prosecutor repeatedly asked him to comment on the credibility of other witnesses by asking "were they lying" questions. Second, he alleged that the prosecutor posed questions suggesting his personal opinion that Burchill's testimony was not truthful.The court, however, found that the "were they lying" questions were not improper because they had probative value in evaluating the credibility of a defendant who is claiming that everyone else is lying. The court also disagreed that the prosecutor had expressed personal opinions on Burchill's credibility. The court concluded that the prosecutor's questions were within the scope of permissible questions allowed on cross-examination. Therefore, the court found that Burchill's counsel's failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance.The court did not find it necessary to address Burchill's claim of prejudice due to the failure of his counsel to object, as it had already determined that his counsel's performance was not deficient. Thus, Burchill's petition for postconviction relief was denied. View "Burchill v. State" on Justia Law

David Abraham Lorenz was convicted in 2003 for operating an illegal drug lab and possessing illegal drugs in the state of Montana. His initial sentence was partially suspended, but multiple violations led to the suspension being lifted and further sentencing in 2005 and 2014. In 2020, the State sought to revoke his suspended sentences again. Lorenz, who initially represented himself, requested counsel in July 2021. However, prior to the dispositional hearing in August 2021, his attorney, Michael Haase, filed a motion to withdraw. Lorenz consented to this but then indicated he did not want to proceed without a lawyer. Despite a perceived conflict, Haase continued to represent Lorenz in the hearing, and Lorenz was resentenced after his suspended sentences were revoked.Lorenz appealed, arguing that the District Court had not adequately investigated his complaint about his lawyer. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed, ruling that Lorenz had not directly raised any issues about Haase's effectiveness or requested a substitution of counsel. The court further noted that Lorenz had agreed to Haase's motion to withdraw, then reaffirmed his desire for Haase's representation during the dispositional hearing. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the District Court's decision. View "State v. Lorenz" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the decision of the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, committing the appellant, C.M., a youth, to the custody of the Department of Corrections for placement in a state youth correctional facility until the age of 18. The appellant was charged with sex offenses against three of his high school classmates and he appealed the decision on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to make objections to the admission of various hearsay statements.The court concluded that the appellant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of hearsay statements did not result in substantial prejudice. The court noted that the state presented sufficient admissible evidence to the jury that proved the same facts as the prior consistent statements and bus records. Furthermore, the court found that the appellant's counsel vigorously challenged the complaining witnesses' testimony by highlighting inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony, as well as aspects of the investigation. As a result, the court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by his counsel and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Matter of C.M" on Justia Law

In this case, Lindsay Burns Barbier contested the validity of the 2016 will of her father, Horatio Burns, alleging that her brother Cameron and his wife Alison exerted undue influence over Horatio. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the validity of the will and the awarding of attorney fees to Horatio’s Estate, but reversed the awarding of attorney fees to Alison and the calculation of interest on the attorney fees. The court found that the lower court did not err in allowing Alison to file a response to Lindsay's petition contesting the will, despite Lindsay's objection that it was untimely and that Alison's interests were fully represented by the Estate. The court also found that Lindsay was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. In terms of attorney fees, the court determined that Alison was not entitled to an award of fees under state law as she was defending her own interest in the will and her participation was not required to defend the validity of the will. Finally, the court found that the lower court incorrectly calculated the applicable interest rate on the attorney fees awarded to the Estate. View "In re Burns" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order issued by the district court denying Montana Opticom, LLC's motion to disqualify counsel for Scott Rysewyk, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to disqualify Rysewyk's counsel.Rysewyk, represented by Rabb Law Firm (RLF), filed a complaint alleging trespass, ejectment, negligent civil conspiracy, and inverse condemnation by Opticom and Jim Dolan, Jr., a partial owner of Opticom. Opticom filed a motion to disqualify Rysewyk's counsel, arguing that Rysewyk's counsel of record was disqualified from representing him because of the firm's earlier representation of Dolan. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Opticom offered "no proof of any actual prejudice flowing from the alleged conflict of interest." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the district court was presented with no evidence that Opticom was actually prejudiced, the court did not act arbitrarily or exceed the bounds of reason by denying Opticom's motion to disqualify. View "Rysewyk v. Mont. Opticom, LLC" on Justia Law

Shayna Hubbard appealed a district court judgment convicting her of driving with a suspended license and for failing to show proof of liability insurance. Hubbard went to a Montana casino to gamble. She was 19 and could legally gamble, but only patrons who were 21 years old and older were eligible to receive a gambling coupon. She provided another person’s identification to a casino employee to get the coupon. An employee who recognized Hubbard and knew she was using another person’s identification called the police. Police learned that Hubbard’s Oregon driver’s license was suspended, and informed Hubbard that it was illegal to use another person’s identification. Police decided not to cite her for the offense, and left the casino. The same responding officer at the casino observed Hubbard a short while later driving on the suspended license, and pulled her over. Hubbard was arrested for driving with a suspended license (and failing to provide proof of insurance). Hubbard appeared in Libby City Court, pled not guilty to the charges, and asked for appointment of a public defender. Counsel was appointed, and Hubbard was tried in absentia. Counsel thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal; a jury trial in district court was scheduled for later that year. Counsel and Hubbard conversed by email, wherein Hubbard explained her belief that the arresting officer entrapped her by allegedly telling her to drive from the casino, with knowledge her license was suspended, because her companion had been drinking. Counsel ultimately moved to withdraw from Hubbard’s representation, arguing that a new trial in District Court “would be frivolous or wholly without merit.” Counsel filed a supporting memorandum and attached several documents, including the email Hubbard had sent to him explaining why she believed she was entrapped. The District Court denied Counsel’s motion to withdraw. Hubbard argued on appeal that Counsel violated his duties of loyalty and confidentiality to her by attaching the email explaining her view on trial strategy, violating attorney-client privilege, and revealing inculpatory information that was not previously in the city court record, which the prosecution used to file a motion in limine to prevent the entrapment defense. She also argued the improperly disclosed information prejudiced her during trial, because it gave the prosecution the idea to inquire into where she lived and how she arrived in Libby, prior to the incident at the casino. The District Court denied the motion and, further, gave an instruction regarding the entrapment defense to the jury. Hubbard presented an entrapment defense and the jury considered whether entrapment applied. The Montana Supreme Court concluded Counsel’s disclosure did not render the trial result “fundamentally unfair” or “unreliable,” and that Hubbard could not show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for her counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. View "City of Libby v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Appellees’ joint motion to declare John Stokes a vexatious litigant is granted in part and ordered that, before Stokes could file any pleading pro se in a Montana district court or the Montana Supreme Court, he was required to obtain pre-filing approval from the court in which he sought to file. The court ordered that any such filing may be prohibited upon a determination that the claims asserted are harassing, frivolous, or legally not cognizable. The pre-filing requirement applies to pro se filings by Stokes in cases where his counsel has withdrawn from representation. View "Stokes v. First American Title Co. of Montana, Inc." on Justia Law