Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Allegan Circuit Court of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the presiding judge exchanged emails with the county prosecutor, expressing concerns about the police investigation. The defendant later discovered these communications and moved for a new trial, alleging judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who granted the motion for a new trial due to the appearance of impropriety created by the emails. The prosecution appealed this decision.The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The appellate court concluded that the trial judge's ex parte communications were permissible for administrative purposes under the judicial conduct code and did not influence the jury's verdict. The defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial judge's ex parte communications violated the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. The court found that these communications were not for administrative purposes and created an appearance of impropriety. However, the court concluded that the communications did not show actual bias or a high probability of bias that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The court also determined that the trial judge's failure to recuse herself did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as the jury was unaware of the communications and the trial prosecutor did not alter her strategy in response to them. Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the trial court had no legal basis to grant a new trial. View "People of Michigan v. Loew" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (the JTC) filed a formal complaint against Third Circuit Court Judge Tracy E. Green, alleging that she covered up evidence of child abuse (Count I) and that she made false statements about her knowledge of the abuse (Count II). Respondent admitted she was aware that her son had slapped one of her grandsons, GD, across the face, and she further admitted that she covered the resultant handprint with makeup, claiming that she had done so after her other grandson, RD, had teased GD about the handprint. In March 2019, respondent testified at a juvenile court hearing as a witness for her son; she denied that she had ever seen bruises on her grandsons’ bodies but admitted to seeing the handprint on GD’s face. Respondent also denied that any of her grandchildren had ever told her that they had been abused. The master concluded that respondent committed misconduct in office with respect to Counts I and II but not III. The JTC unanimously accepted and adopted the master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to Counts I and II. Although the JTC was troubled by the allegations in Count III, it concluded that disciplinary counsel did not satisfy its burden of proving the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. It therefore adopted the master’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence that respondent intentionally made false statements to the JTC in her answer. The JTC addressed the factors set forth in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291 (2000), and concluded that the totality of the factors weighed in support of respondent’s removal from office. Respondent petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, requesting that the Court reject the JTC’s recommendation and dismiss the amended complaint against her. The Supreme Court concluded the JTC proved by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent knowingly covered up evidence of child abuse. The JTC’s finding that respondent lied under oath at the juvenile court proceeding was rejected; however, the JTC sustained its burden of proving that respondent knowingly made false statements about evidence of child abuse in her answer to the JTC’s requests for comment. A six-month suspension without pay, along with a public censure, was imposed after consideration of the JTC’s recommendation, the Brown factors, and similar and dissimilar judicial sanctions that have previously been imposed. View "In Re Tracy E. Green, Judge" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal three-count complaint against Third Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, arising from comments he made to two female prosecutors during a murder trial. An appointed master found respondent, in Counts I and II respondent had violated Canons 2(B), 3(A)(3), and 3(A)(14) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and in Count III, the master found that respondent had violated Canons 3(A)(3) and 3(A)(14). The JTC issued a decision and recommendation for discipline in which it largely agreed with the master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law but found that respondent had also violated Canon 2(B) by his conduct in Count III. After determining that the majority of the factors set forth in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291 (2000), weighed in favor of a more serious sanction, the JTC unanimously recommended that respondent be sanctioned with a public censure and a 12-month suspension without pay. Respondent petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, requesting that the Court reject or modify the JTC’s recommendation. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the JTC correctly found that respondent committed misconduct in office and that public censure and suspension were appropriate. However, a 6-month rather than the JTC’s recommended 12-month suspension was proportionate. View "In Re Morrow " on Justia Law

The Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal three-count complaint against Third Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, arising from comments he made to two female prosecutors during a murder trial. The JTC issued a decision and recommendation for discipline on June 14, 2021, in which it largely agreed with a special master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but found that respondent had also violated Canon 2(B) by his conduct in Count III. After determining that the majority of the factors set forth in In re Brown, 461 Mich. 1291 (2000), weighed in favor of a more serious sanction, the JTC unanimously recommended that respondent be sanctioned with a public censure and a 12-month suspension without pay. Respondent petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, requesting that the Court reject or modify the JTC’s recommendation. The Supreme Court found the JTC correctly found that respondent committed misconduct in office and that public censure and suspension were appropriate. However, the Court determined a 6-month rather than the JTC’s recommended 12-month suspension was proportionate. View "In Re Morrow " on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal three-count complaint against Third Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, arising from comments he made to two female prosecutors during a murder trial. The JTC unanimously recommended that respondent be sanctioned with a public censure and a 12-month suspension without pay. Respondent petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, requesting that the Court reject or modify the JTC’s recommendation. The Supreme Court found the JTC correctly found that respondent committed misconduct in office, and that public censure and suspension were appropriate. However, the Court determined a 6-month rather than the JTC’s recommended 12-month suspension was proportionate. View "In Re Morrow " on Justia Law

The Law Offices of Jeffrey Sherbow, PC, brought an action against Fieger & Fieger, PC (the Fieger firm), asserting that the Fieger firm breached its referral- fee contract with plaintiff when the Fieger firm refused to pay plaintiff 20% of a contingent fee that the Fieger firm had received after it successfully represented several clients in a personal- injury and no-fault action related to an automobile accident in Ohio. The primary question in this case was whether, in order to enforce a fee- splitting agreement, MRPC 1.5(e) required the referring attorney to have an attorney-client relationship with the individual he or she refers. The Michigan Supreme Court held that it does but that the relationship could be limited to the act of advising the individual to seek the services of the other attorney if the referring attorney and client expressly or impliedly demonstrate their intent to enter into a professional relationship for this purpose. Consequently, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the extent that it held to the contrary. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, however, that the defendant bore the burden of proving noncompliance with MRPC 1.5(e) when the defendant raised the violation of the rule as a defense against enforcement of the referral agreement. The result in this case was that the trial court properly instructed the jury that an attorney-client relationship was required but erroneously instructed the jury about the burden of proof. This error required a new trial as to only one of the potential clients at issue. View "Law Offices of Jeffrey Sherbow v. Fieger & Fieger, PC" on Justia Law

At issue before the Michigan Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant, Troy Antonio Brown, was entitled to a new trial because the detective who conducted defendant’s police interview testified falsely against him. The Court concluded: (1) the detective’s testimony against defendant was false; (2) the prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony; and (3) there was a reasonable likelihood that the uncorrected false testimony affected the judgment of the jury. Therefore, judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, defendant’s conviction was vacated, and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission filed a formal complaint against 53rd District Court Judge Theresa Brennan alleging 17 counts of judicial misconduct related to both her professional conduct and to her conduct during her divorce proceedings. After a hearing, the master concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent had committed misconduct in office with respect to all but one count of the second amended complaint. In particular, the master found that respondent had: (1) failed to disclose when she presided over Michigan v. Kowalski (No. 08-17643-FC) that she was involved in a romantic relationship with the principal witness, and did not disqualify herself from the case on that basis; (2) failed to immediately disqualify herself from hearing her own divorce case and destroyed evidence even though she knew that her then-estranged husband had filed an ex parte motion to preserve evidence; (3) failed to disclose her relationship with attorney Shari Pollesch or to disqualify herself from hearing cases in which Pollesch or her firm served as counsel for a party; (4) made false statements under oath when deposed in her divorce case; (5) made false statements during certain cases over which she presided regarding her relationships with Furlong and Pollesch; (6) made false statements under oath to the commission; (7) verbally abused attorneys, litigants, witnesses, and employees; (8) directed employees to perform personal tasks for her during work hours; (9) directed employees to perform work for her judicial campaign during work hours; and (10) interrupted two depositions she attended during her divorce case. The Michigan Supreme Court found the commission’s findings of fact were supported by the record, and its conclusions of law and analysis of the appropriate sanctions was correct. Respondent was ordered removed from her current office and suspended from holding judicial office for six years; the commission was ordered to submit an itemized bill of costs, fees, and expenses incurred in prosecuting the complaint. View "In re Theresa Brennan, Judge" on Justia Law

At issue before the Michigan Supreme Court in this case was whether the rebuttable presumption of undue influence was applicable when the decedent’s attorney breaches Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.8(c), which generally prohibited an attorney from preparing an instrument giving the attorney or his or her close family a substantial gift. Appellants argued that a breach of MRPC 1.8(c) automatically rendered an instrument void, while the appellee attorney argued that, rather than an invalidation of the instrument, a rebuttable presumption of undue influence arose in these circumstances. After considering the applicable provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., and the underlying principles of probate law, the Michigan Supreme Court determined a rebuttable presumption applied to these circumstances. "[T]he adoption of MRPC 1.8(c) has no effect on this conclusion because a breach of this rule, like breaches of other professional conduct rules, only triggers the invocation of the attorney disciplinary process; it does not breach the statutory law of EPIC." View "In re Mardigian Estate" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal complaint against Sixth Circuit Judge Lisa Gorcyca, alleging two counts of judicial misconduct arising from a hearing at which she found three children in contempt of court. The contempt hearing arose in the context of a protracted and acrimonious divorce and custody case. The two younger children, 10-year-old RT and 9-year-old NT, were ordered to participate in parenting time in respondent’s jury room with their father. LT was not scheduled for parenting time with his father on that day, but he came to the court with his siblings. After the children refused to communicate with their father, respondent held a show cause hearing to determine why all three children should not be held in contempt. Among other things, respondent told LT that he was defiant, contemptuous, and “mentally messed up.” She held him in direct contempt of court and ordered LT to be confined at Oakland County Children’s Village. Respondent then addressed RT and NT, who were initially apologetic and indicated that they would try to comply with the court’s order but later stated that they would prefer to go with LT to Children’s Village. All three children were handcuffed and removed from the courtroom. The JTC special master found respondent committed misconduct by: (1) finding LT in contempt of a nonexistent parenting-time order; (2) giving the children’s father the keys to the jailhouse thereby depriving the children of the opportunity to purge their contempt; (3) making a gesture indicating that LT was crazy and making disparaging remarks about the children; and (4) misrepresenting to the JTC that the gesture was intended to communicate LT’s moving forward with therapy. The JTC adopted the master’s findings with one exception: the JTC disagreed with the master that respondent misrepresented the meaning of the gesture and concluded that her answer was merely misleading. The JTC recommended that the appropriate discipline for respondent’s misconduct was a 30-day suspension without pay and costs. After review of the record the Michigan Supreme Court agreed in part with the Commission’s conclusion that respondent committed judicial misconduct, but was not persuaded that the recommended sanction was appropriate. Instead, the Court held public censure was proportionate to the judicial misconduct established by the record. The Court rejected the Commission’s recommendation to impose costs, fees, and expenses against respondent under MCR 9.205(B). View "In re Hon. Lisa Gorcyca" on Justia Law