Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Judicial Conduct Board filed a complaint against Magisterial District Judge (MDJ) Thomas Carney, alleging that appellee Carney violated Article V, section 18(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Rules 2A and 11 of the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of Magisterial District Judges. Following the Court of Judicial Discipline’s dismissal of the Board’s complaint, the Board appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CJD erred in concluding that appellee did not violate any of the enumerated provisions. Two separate incidents gave rise to charges against appellee. One involved his work on an anti-graffiti task force and the solicitation of donations for the group’s work. The other involved a traffic incident in which appellee displayed his middle finger to the occupants of another car he tried to pass along the interstate; the drivers exchanged obscenities, and the incident ended with appellee rolling down his window, driving alongside the other vehicle, and displaying a silver handgun for the other car to see. Police were called, and charges were filed: making terroristic threats, simple assault, disorderly conduct and recklessly endangering another person. Following a trial, the CJD concluded appellee did not violate Rule 11 with regard to the solicitation of donations for the task force. Further, the CJD concluded the Board failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellee’s conduct was so extreme as to bring his office into disrepute. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and part. The Court affirmed the CJD in its conclusion with regard to the task-force solicitations. But the Court disagreed that the Board did not establish appellee’s conduct was “so extreme as to brought the judicial office itself into disrepute.” That portion of the CJD’s order was reversed and the case remanded for the imposition of a sanction consistent with the misconduct. View "In Re: Carney, Magisterial District Judge" on Justia Law

Respondent, a candidate for county probate judge, was found to have violated former Jud. Cond. R. 4.4(E) for having received campaign contributions from judicial fundraising events during the judicial campaign that categorized or identified participants by the amount of the contribution made to the event. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended that no disciplinary sanction be imposed but that Respondent be ordered to pay the costs and a portion of the complainant's attorney fees. A commission of five judges appointed by the Supreme Court upheld that panel's judgment and ordered Respondent to pay a $1,000 fine, the costs of the proceeding, and a greater portion of attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent did not knowingly violate Jud. Cond. R. 4.4(E) and, even if Respondent's conduct constituted a technical violation of the rule, no sanction would be warranted in this case.View "In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Stormer" on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiffs S. Lavon Evans Jr. and his companies S. Lavon Evans Jr. Operating Company, Inc.; S. Lavon Evans Jr. Drilling Ventures, LLC; and E & D Services, Inc. sued Defendants the law firm of Baker & McKenzie, LLP, and one of its partners, Joel Held. The complaint also named as defendants Laredo Energy Holdings, LLC, and its related subsidiaries S. Lavon Evans Operating Texas, LLC, and E & D Drilling Services, LLC. Plaintiffs listed seven causes of action in the complaint: counts one and seven charged the Baker Defendants with legal malpractice and breach of contract; counts two through six charged all the defendants with breach of fiduciary duty, negligent omission and misstatements of material facts, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, tortious interference, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants Laredo Energy Holdings, LLC; S. Lavon Evans Operating Texas, LLC; and E&D Drilling Services filed a cross-claim against the Baker Defendants claiming legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. Evans asserted that in 2007, he lost access to his companies’ two largest assets (two oil drilling rigs) and was sued in Texas by the Baker Defendants on behalf of Reed Cagle (Evans’s business partner), who was acting on behalf of Laredo Energy Holdings, LLC. This triggered a flurry of liens and suits by vendors against Evans and his companies – all because, as Evans claims - he made decisions and entered agreements based on advice and recommendations from the Baker Defendants, who Evans believed to be his lawyers. Evans claimed that his businesses once were worth more than $50 million but now were accountable for debts exceeding $31 million as a result of the conduct by the Baker Defendants. The Mississippi case was tried, and the jury returned a verdict of $103,400,000 in actual damages for Plaintiffs and Cross-Plaintiffs. S. Lavon Evans Jr. was awarded $1 million from defendant Joel Held and $30 million from Baker & McKenzie. S. Lavon Evans Operating Company, Inc., was awarded $1 million from Joel Held and $29 million from Baker & McKenzie. E&D Services, LLC, was awarded $1 million from Joel Held and $19 million from Baker & McKenzie. The jury also assessed Evans, individually, with ten-percent comparative fault. And the trial court reduced the $31 million amount awarded to Evans, individually, by ten percent. The Cross-Plaintiffs were separately awarded $22.4 million from Joel Held and Baker & McKenzie, collectively. A divided jury awarded $75,000 in punitive damages to Plaintiffs and $75,000 in punitive damages to Cross-Plaintiffs. The trial court denied the Baker Defendants’ post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur. This appeal followed. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed as to the Baker Defendants’ liability. But because the Court found the jury was not properly instructed, it reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on proximate cause and damages.View "Baker & McKenzie, LLP v. Evans, Jr." on Justia Law

Stewart Title Guaranty Company hired the law firm Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, PS to defend its insured, Sterling Savings Bank, from a claim of lien priority on real property by a construction company. The claim was resolved in favor of the construction company, and Stewart Title sued the firm for malpractice. Witherspoon moved for summary judgment arguing it owed a duty to the client Sterling Bank and not Stewart Title, and that the alleged malfeasance (not arguing equitable subrogation) was not a viable argument in the lien priority suit. The trial court ruled against Witherspoon on the first, no-duty, ground but agreed with it on the second, no-breach, ground. The court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Witherspoon. Stewart Title appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in dismissing Stewart Title's malpractice case on the basis that Witherspoon owed Stewart Title no duty. The Court did not address the subrogation issue.View "Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling Sav. Bank" on Justia Law

Circuit Court Judge for the Thirteenth District Eddie H. Bowen failed to disclose a conflict to the parties in a civil lawsuit and failed to rule on counsel's motion to recuse made after the conflict was discovered. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommended that Judge Bowen be publicly reprimanded and assessed $200 in costs. After review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the recommended sanctions were insufficient. The Court ordered that Judge Bowen be publicly reprimanded, fined $500, and assessed $200 in costs. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a last will and testament from LegalZoom.com. Before receiving the requested document, Plaintiff agreed to LegalZoom.com's terms of service, which included an arbitration provision. The agreement also provided that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed the interpretation and enforcement of the agreement's provisions. Plaintiff later filed a class-action lawsuit, alleging that LegalZoom.com engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, among other claims. LegalZoom.com filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion based upon the allegations concerning the unauthorized practice of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred because Arkansas law does not prohibit the enforcement of arbitration agreements requiring resolution through arbitration of private claims when a dispute concerns allegations of the unauthorized practice of law; and (2) any rule prohibiting arbitration of unauthorized practice-of-law claims were preempted by the FAA in this case. View "Legalzoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain" on Justia Law

The underlying divorce proceedings were initiated by the husband in 2010 through his attorney, James, and were complicated because the couple had a three-year-old son. Both parties had debts and neither was able to pay attorney fees, but husband’s family contributed more than $8,000 on his behalf, which was paid to James. When James received the money, husband signed an agreement, designating the sum as an “advance retainer” and the attorney’s property, not placed in a client trust account. Citing the “leveling of the playing field” provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the trial court entered a “disgorgement” order for James to turn over to wife’s attorney half of the fees paid to him ($4,000). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Marriage Act reflects a policy of giving trial courts discretion to do equity in dissolution proceeding by making interim fee awards where parties lack resources. Case law and ethics rules concerning attorney fees come from a different context and are not pertinent to marriage dissolution. The advance payment retainer argued by James might be appropriate in some circumstances, such as bankruptcy or a forfeiture proceeding. View "In re Marriage of Earlywine" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Municipal Court Judge Robert Fowlkes following a verbal altercation he had with a probation officer outside the courtroom. The Commission and Judge Fowlkes filed a joint motion asking the Court to approve agreed-upon sanctions of a public reprimand and costs of $200. The Supreme Court agreed that Judge Fowlkes should be publicly reprimanded and assessed $200 for the costs of proceedings, and the Court found he also should be fined $1,000.View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Fowlkes" on Justia Law

Disciplinary charges against Keith, who was admitted to the Nebraska bar in 2003, alleged that he had failed to pay his bar dues for 2012. While the issue was pending, a client claimed that Keith neglect his representation in forming a business. The charges included Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. 3-501.3 (diligence), 3-508.1(b) (bar admission and disciplinary matters), and 3-508.4(a), (c), and (d) (misconduct). The Nebraska Supreme Court continued Keith’s suspension from the practice of law until January 1, 2014. Any application for reinstatement must demonstrate that he has paid all delinquent dues to the Nebraska State Bar Association; has completed at least 10 hours of continuing legal education, including 2 hours of ethics or professional responsibility instruction, within 12 months immediately preceding the date of application; has reimbursed his client all funds previously paid as fees; and has paid all costs assessed against him. View "Counsel for Discipline v. Keith" on Justia Law

Stillwell, admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1989, met the complainant, Akojie, a Maryland licensed real estate agent, in 2009 at a seminar he presented. In 2010 the two entered into a legal services agreement that involved formation of an LLC and transfer of assets from another business. Akojie gave Stillwell a personal check for $2,000, payable to him; Stillwell deposited the check in his personal checking account, rather than in his attorney trust account. Stillwell did not have an active attorney trust account. Stillwell’s communication with Akojie and work on the matters for which he was retained were “sporadic.” Akojie expressed her frustration with attempting to reach him and terminated the representation and requested a refund. He did not provide a refund until after he received notification of Akojie’s grievance. The Attorney Grievance Commission filed a petition for disciplinary or remedial action alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct: 1.3, Diligence, 1.4, Communication, 1.15. The Maryland Supreme Court imposed a sanction of indefinite suspension fro the practice of law.View "Attorney Grievance v. Stillwell" on Justia Law