Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Legal Malpractice
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In consolidated appeals of a termination-of-parental-rights judgment, appointed counsel for the appellant parent moved to withdraw on the ground that continued representation was barred by Rule 3.1 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon review of the attorney's brief on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent client consent, a motion to withdraw by appointed appellate counsel in termination proceedings will generally not be granted, and therefore denied the motions.View "In re S.C." on Justia Law

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Roger Collins died following an inpatient stay at Ridgeway Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Facility. Stella Collins, Roger's wife, subsequently brought an action against Ridgeway alleging wrongful death and nursing home neglect. After pretrial discovery, Ridgeway moved to disqualify Wilkes & McHugh (W&H), the lawfirm representing Collins, alleging that an investigator for W&H violated the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct by making contact with three of Ridgeway's employees. The trial court denied the motion. Ridgeway then sought a writ of mandamus seeking the dismissal of the claims brought against it or, alternatively, the disqualification of W&H. The court of appeals declined to issue the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in finding that Ridgeway had an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise for the admission of unfairly and unethically obtained evidence. View "Ridgeway Nursing & Rehabilitation Facility, LLC v. Circuit Court " on Justia Law

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This matter stemmed from the failure of Raymond Thomas, Jr. (a candidate for the office of justice of the peace) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XL. The hearing officer found that Mr. Thomas failed to file his 2012 personal financial disclosure statement timely, and that he acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule. The hearing officer recommended that Mr. Thomas be ordered to pay a penalty of $500.00 and to reimburse the Judiciary Commission for costs. The Supreme Court agreed with the hearing officer's decision after a review of the case, and affirmed the officer's decision. View "In re Raymond Thomas, Jr. Justice of the Peace Candidate Ward 1, Assumption Parish" on Justia Law

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The State Commission on Judicial Conduct brought two charges against Petitioner Glen George, a non-lawyer justice of the Middletown Town Court. Each charge involved allegations of misconduct while Petitioner was acting in his judicial capacity. Specifically, Petitioner was investigated for deciding to hear a case involving a friend and former employer without disclosing the existence of the personal relationship and for having ex parte communications with a prospective litigant and then expressing his views concerning the outcome of the proceeding. After a hearing, the Commission issued a determination finding that Petitioner's conduct violated the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and determined that he should be removed from office. The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of misconduct and concluded that removal was the appropriate sanction.View "In re George" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court found that Chancellor D. Neil Harris abused his contempt powers, failed to recuse himself from contempt proceedings, and prevented those he charged with contempt from presenting any defense. This matter stemmed from Judge Harris' presiding over a 2010 case in which the State hired private process servers to pursue child-support and paternity proceedings. The Judge obtained information that suggested some of the parties had not been properly served with process, and that returns on the summonses were falsified. The Judge instituted contempt proceedings against five process services, the owner of the service company, and two notaries public. The Supreme Court found that appropriate sanctions were: a public reprimand, a $2,500 fine, and a $200 assessment of costs. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Harris" on Justia Law

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In an earlier litigation, Kleem retained Julian Vanni and Vanni & Associates (collectively, Vanni) to appraise certain real property in dispute between the parties. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Kleem and against Southwest Sports Center. Southwest subsequently filed suit against Kleem and Vanni. The case was assigned to Judge Richard McMonagle. Vanni sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge McMonagle from hearing the litigation, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction based on the jurisdictional-priority rule, claim preclusion, and witness immunity. The court of appeals dismissed the case, concluding that Judge McMonagle did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McMonagle did not patently lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy by way of appeal.View "State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle" on Justia Law

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Radojcic, his daughters, his attorney Helfand, and the office manager for one of his companies, were indicted for 52 financial crimes involving fraud on mortgage lenders. It was also alleged that Radojcic, while owing the IRS more than two million dollars, fraudulently obtained rental checks exceeding $500,000 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. After discovery, the state indicated its intent to call Helfand as a witness in exchange for use immunity. Helfand and Radojcic objected, asserting attorney-client privilege, and the trial court struck Helfand’s name from the state’s witness list. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, which applies when a client seeks the services of an attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity. Transcripts of grand jury testimony met the standard of providing a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of a crime or fraud by Radojcic and a reasonable basis to suspect that communications with Helfand were in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. The state met its burden of overcoming the privilege; there was no need to examine Helfand in camera prior before trial testimony. The only attorney-client communications that are subject to disclosure are those related to transactions identified in the indictment.View "People v. Radojcic" on Justia Law

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Karavidas, admitted to practice law in Illinois in 1979, worked for the City of Chicago, the Attorney General, and several law firms. In 1988, he opened his own practice. His father executed will and trust documents prepared by another attorney in 2000, and died later the same day. Karavidas was named executor and successor trustee. His dealings with the estate resulted in charges of conversion of assets entrusted to him; breach of fiduciary obligations; conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and conduct tending to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute. The Review Board of the IARDC recommended that charges be dismissed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Before professional discipline may be imposed under Supreme Court Rule 770, the Administrator must demonstrate that the attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Personal misconduct that falls outside the scope of the Rules may be the basis for civil liability or other adverse consequences, but may not result in professional discipline.View "In re Karavidas" on Justia Law

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The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint against Attorney Doe based on sexual misconduct allegations by the attorney's client, Jane Doe. The Grievance Commission of the Iowa Supreme Court scheduled a hearing on the matter. Jane's attorney requested a continuance of the scheduled hearing so that she could be present when Jane testified before the Commission. The Commission President quashed Jane's attorney's appearance and denied her request for a continuance, stating that witnesses testifying before the Commission were not entitled to have an attorney present during the proceedings and that that absence of Jane's attorney from the hearing would cause no unfairness to Jane. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's order, holding that a person called upon to be a witness before the Commission may be represented by counsel for the limited purpose of protecting rights personal to the witness in the proceeding.View "Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 762" on Justia Law

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Appellant, an attorney, was found to be in contempt of court while representing his client in a hearing. Specifically, the circuit court entered an order finding that Appellant was repeatedly warned about interrupting the court and that after multiple oral warnings, continued to interrupt the court. The court ordered Appellant to pay $100 to the circuit clerk's office. On appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the contempt finding. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's contempt finding where the record reflected that the circuit court repeatedly warned Appellant to refrain from interrupting yet Appellant continued to do so.View "Benca v. Benton County Circuit Court" on Justia Law