Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Peraica represented Dordevic in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding and submitted a Statement of Financial Affairs (Rule 2016 disclosure) in which he reported that Dordevic had paid him $5,000. As the Trustee learned during discovery, Dordevic had actually paid Peraica $21,500. The Trustee informed Peraica that he needed to file an updated Rule 2016 fee disclosure. Peraica instead sent the Trustee an informal accounting document listing $21,500 in fees. The Trustee responded: “The Rule 2016 disclosures actually need to be filed with the Court” by submitting “an official form.” Peraica repeatedly ignored the Trustee’s reminders. The Trustee filed a motion, 11 U.S.C. 329, to examine the fees. Peraica failed to respond; the Trustee then requested that all fees be forfeited. The bankruptcy court granted the motion.The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beyond Peraica’s brazen disregard of the Trustee’s advice, Peraica’s proffered explanation for not updating his fee disclosure lacking, if not false. Peraica had been involved in more than 350 bankruptcy cases in the Northern District of Illinois alone. The bankruptcy court ordered Peraica to disgorge all past fees as a penalty for his blatant lack of compliance with his obligations. There is no leeway for partial or incomplete disclosure. View "Peraica v. Layng" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and petition for writ of mandamus seeking to direct Appellees to allow Appellant to carry a firearm inside the district court, holding that there was no error.Appellant, an attorney, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief seeking a declaration that Act 1087 of 2017, codified at Ark. Code Ann. 5-73-122(b), authorizes attorneys as "officers of the court" to carry a firearm in any of the state's courts or courthouses and a declaration that Appellees' conduct in refusing to allow Appellant to enter the Pulaski County District Courthouse with a firearm violated Arkansas law. Appellant further sought mandamus relief asking that the court direct Defendants to permit attorneys in court with a firearm. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's mandamus petition. View "Corbitt v. Pulaski County Jail" on Justia Law

Bouye financed a furniture purchase with Winner through a retail installment contract (RIC). Winner supposedly sold the debt to Mariner. Bouye defaulted. Mariner, through its attorney (Bruce), sued in state court to recover the debt and attorney’s fees “of one-third of the amount" collected; the RIC limited fees to 15% of the unpaid balance. The attached RIC did not establish a transfer to Mariner. The court ordered Mariner to file proof of assignment. Mariner filed an updated RIC that listed Winner’s store manager as assigning the debt to Mariner. The court granted Mariner summary judgment. The Kentucky appellate court found that Mariner had not sufficiently demonstrated a valid transfer. Mariner dismissed the case.Bouye sued Bruce in federal court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692(e), 380 days after Mariner sued in state court. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely under FDCPA’s one-year limitations period. Bruce sought attorney’s fees. Meanwhile, Bouye and Mariner entered into a settlement that released Mariner, later clarifying that Bruce was not released.Three months before the court denied motions for reconsideration and attorney’s fees, Bruce learned of the settlement. The Sixth Circuit first held the settlement did not moot the appeal, then reversed, The statute of limitations did not bar an allegation Bruce filed an updated RIC and moved for summary judgment on that basis, affirmatively misrepresenting that the assignment occurred before Mariner filed suit. View "Bouye v. Bruce" on Justia Law

With new counsel, a client sues his former attorneys, alleging they accepted $27,500 in fees from him but did not perform the promised legal services. New counsel engages in communications via email and telephone with the former attorneys’ representative and discusses the possible filing of a State Bar claim. The former attorneys file a cross-complaint against the client and his new counsel for extortion, among other claims. The client and his new counsel file an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found that none of the communications presents extortion as a matter of law. The court concluded that cross-defendants made the threshold showing that the cross-complainants’ complaint is based on protected activity and thus subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that the cross-complainants did not carry their burden of showing a probability of overcoming cross-defendants’ litigation privilege defense. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the special motions to strike the cross-complaint. View "Geragos v. Abelyan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendant and the law firm (collectively, the lawyers) for legal malpractice on the theory that the lawyers in drafting the LLC operating agreements did not adhere to the intent of their mother’s trust. The lawyers moved for summary judgment on three grounds—namely, (1) they owed Plaintiffs no duty of care, (2) Plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred, and (3) the parties had too contingent of an interest to have standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment. Specifically, the court ruled that Plaintiffs had presented “no evidence of decedent’s” intent to disinherit specific grandchildren from obtaining membership interests in the LLCs, such that the lawyers owed Plaintiffs no duty to effectuate that intent.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the lawyers did not owe Plaintiffs a duty to draft the LLC operating agreements in a way that disinherited decedent’s grandchildren because decedent’s intent to disinherit the specific grandchildren from being assigned any interest in the LLCs was not, as a matter of law, clear, certain or undisputed. Further, the court wrote that because summary judgment was properly granted due to the absence of any duty running from the lawyers to Plaintiffs, the court does not have occasion to reach the alternative grounds for affirmance (namely, that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred or that the parties lack standing.) View "Gordon v. Ervin Cohen & Jessup LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this original action seeking to challenge the validity of a common pleas court's determination that Huber Heights Veterans Club, Inc. (HHVC) was a vexatious litigator, holding that HHVC's failure to file an application for leave deprived the court of appeals of jurisdiction.HHVC filed a complaint against a court of common pleas judge alleging that the judge had not yet ruled on a motion for partial summary judgment. The common pleas court declared HHVC to be a vexatious litigator and denied relief. HHVC then sought a writ of mandamus compelling the judge to withdraw his decision. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint after construing HHVC's response to a show-cause order as a belated application for leave to proceed under Ohio Rev. Code 2323.52(D)(3). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in determining that there were no reasonable grounds to grant leave. View "State ex rel. Huber Heights Veterans Club, Inc. v. Skelton" on Justia Law

Judge Carlos Moore was a municipal court judge for the Mississippi cities of Grenada and Clarksdale. He also practiced law with The Cochran Firm. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Judge Moore, alleging that he improperly summoned two local police officers to the municipal courtroom in Grenada and criticized them publicly concerning a discussion about a private client of Moore’s that had occurred several days earlier at Judge Moore’s private law office. The Commission and Judge Moore asked the Mississippi Supreme Court to accept the stipulated findings of fact and to approve the recommended sanctions of a public reprimand and fine of $1,500. After careful consideration of the judicial misconduct at issue, the Supreme Court was unable to agree fully with the recommendation of the Commission. "Because Judge Moore abused the power of his office to chastise and embarrass police officers in open court concerning a matter related to the judge’s private law practice, we order a 60-day suspension from judicial office without pay in addition to the recommended sanctions." View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Moore" on Justia Law

John and Tammy Sadek appealed orders denying their post-judgment motion and sanctioning their attorney under N.D.R.Civ.P. 11. Jason Weber was a Richland County, North Dakota sheriff’s deputy. Sadek acted as a confidential informant for Weber. Sadek was later found in the Red River with a gunshot wound to his head and a backpack full of rocks tied to his body. Sadek’s parents sued Weber and Richland County alleging Weber deceived Sadek by telling Sadek he faced a lengthy prison sentence. They also alleged Weber negligently caused Sadek’s death by failing to adequately train and protect him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Weber and Richland County: the misrepresentation underlying the deceit claim was a prediction of a future event and therefore not actionable as deceit as a matter of law; as to the negligence claim, there was no evidence to establish Weber’s conduct was the proximate cause of Sadek’s death. In the first appeal ("Sadek I"), the Sadeks argued a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Weber’s conduct caused Andrew Sadek’s death. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the evidence only presents a timeline of events and a request that a jury be allowed to speculate what happened as a result of that string of events." The Court's mandate affirming the dismissal judgment was issued on October 7, 2020. In 2022, the Sadeks filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) but requested relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. The Sadeks argued the district court made a mistake by relying on “bad faith” representations by Weber who “successfully hoodwinked [the district court] and obtained a Judgment of Dismissal.” Yet the Sadeks claimed they were entitled to summary judgment because “no triable issue of fact exists as to whether Defendants owed a duty of care to Andrew under the Statute.” The brief was accompanied by a list of signatures “verifying” they agreed with on Supreme Court Justice's dissent in Sadek I. The district court entered an order denying the Sadeks’ post-judgment motion, characterizing it as "baffling and bizarre." After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders and granted the Appellees’ motion for sanctions. View "Sadek, et al. v. Weber, et al." on Justia Law

Gold was the trustee of Biondo’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. Before the bankruptcy filing, Biondo experienced an automobile accident. Biondo sought exemptions for that claim totaling $35,648.74, to prevent that sum from being distributed to her creditors. The statutory maximum exemption for “payment[s]” received “on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss,” 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(11)(D) was then $23,675. Gold did not object to the exemptions and retained the Ratton law firm, which sued Biondo’s insurer, Progressive, and the other driver, Peterson. Progressive settled its case for $48,500 to cover Biondo’s medical expenses, attorney’s fees, “lost wages,” and all “other forms of economic or non-economic loss.” Peterson's $70,000.settlement covered “pain and suffering.”Gold opposed Biondo's motion to compel Gold to release $23,675. The parties settled. Gold’s law firm sought $2,880 in fees for its work opposing the motion. Biondo objected. The bankruptcy court awarded the fees. The district court dismissed her appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The fees compensated the attorneys for services reasonably likely to benefit Biondo’s bankruptcy estate, 11 U.S.C. 330(a)(1)(A). The Peterson settlement was outside section 522(d)(11)(D)'s exemption as covering pain and suffering; the Progressive settlement was also open to attack because it covered Biondo’s medical bills, her attorney’s fees, and lost wages. Gold did not act unreasonably in asking whether 522(d)(11)(D) covered Biondo’s settlements. View "Biondo v. Gold, Lange, Majoros & Smalarz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and as special administrator of the Estate of her father (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appealed following the district court’s dismissal of her claims for legal malpractice, fraud, and deceit against attorneys (collectively, “the law firm”).   The Eighth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record. However, the court affirmed, reasoning that the court predicts the South Dakota Supreme Court would prohibit the assignment of legal malpractice claims and the district court did not err in dismissing the remaining claims. The court explained that Plaintiff asserts the district court erred when it dismissed her fraud and deceit claims against the law firm. To the extent Plaintiff intended to state a claim for fraud or deceit claim, no such claim actually appears in the amended complaint— especially in light of South Dakota’s requirement that fraud and deceit be pled with particularity. While the original complaint contained an allegation of fraud and deceit, the failure to retain that allegation in the amended complaint is dispositive. The only remaining allegations pertain to punitive damages, but an assertion of punitive damages is not a free-standing cause of action under South Dakota law. View "Teresa Thompson v. William Harrie" on Justia Law