Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

After obtaining a judgment against Defendants in a prior case, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants, their attorney, and others for fraudulent transfer, quiet title, and declaratory relief. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the entire complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. At issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling Defendants failed to meet their initial burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity and the claims for relief supported by them. Further, the issue is whether the trial court’s earlier order granting the Defendants’ attorney’s anti-SLAPP motion compels the same outcome here.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The court explained that where a defendant moves to strike the entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument, specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not arise from protected activity. Here, Defendants not only failed to identify specific claims for relief arising from protected activity, they expressly asked the court to perform the type of gravamen analysis disapproved in Bonni. At no point did the Defendants “identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” And there are obviously claims in the complaint that do not arise from anti-SLAPP protected activity. View "Park v. Nazari" on Justia Law

After a prior remand to the district court, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the propriety of that court’s revised award of attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which permitted monetary sanction when an attorney has unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. Appellant Karen Hammer claimed the district court failed to make the findings necessary to support an award under § 1927, failed to abide by the statutory requirement that a court award only excess fees incurred because of the sanctioned attorney’s multiplication of proceedings, and failed to apply the law of the case. She also argued the court erred in striking a surreply that she filed without leave. With one exception, the Tenth Circuit found no merit in these arguments. The Court affirmed except to remand for one reduction in the fee award. View "Chung v. Lamb, et al." on Justia Law

After the 2020 presidential election, Michigan election officials canvassed the results. Michigan law allows any candidate with a “good-faith belief” that he lost the election due to “fraud or mistake” to request a recount within 48 hours after the canvass. No candidate did so. On November 23, the bipartisan Board unanimously certified results indicating that Biden had won the state by 154,188 votes. On November 25, Plaintiffs sued several “state defendants,” asserting that they had “fraudulently manipulat[ed] the vote” through “a wide-ranging interstate—and international—collaboration” and that unspecified “foreign adversaries” and “hostile foreign governments” had accessed Dominion voting machines; that Detroit election officials had participated in countless violations of state election law, including an “illegal vote dump”; and that expert analysis showed that the election results were fraudulent. The Supreme Court declined to intervene. Michigan’s electors cast their votes for Biden. Detroit served plaintiffs and their attorneys with a “safe harbor” letter, warning that it would seek sanctions under Rule 11 if plaintiffs did not voluntarily dismiss their complaint. Plaintiffs did not respond. The district court held that plaintiffs’ counsel had violated Rule 11 by filing their suit for an improper purpose, failing to conduct an adequate prefiling inquiry into the legal and factual merits of their claims; and ordered plaintiffs’ attorneys to pay the reasonable legal fees of the moving defendants.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. The selective-enforcement claim (42 U.S.C. 1983) and a state-law claim were non-sanctionable under Rule 11. Plaintiffs’ other claims were all sanctionable. Counsel are liable for the defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees after December 14 because they failed to dismiss their case after it had concededly become moot the allegations in the complaint itself refuted allegations about the Dominion system used in Michigan. Allegations of harassment and intimidation, however, were credible. View "King v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant did not file a response.The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court wrote that consistent with Crawley, it holds that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition filed by Petitioner Andrew H. Warren, the elected State Attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, arguing that Governor Ron DeSantis lacked authority to issue Executive Order 22-176 suspending him on the grounds of neglect of duty and incompetence, holding that the petition is denied on the ground of unreasonable delay.Within two weeks of his suspension Petitioner sued in federal district court requesting a writ of quo warranto on the basis that the suspension order was facially insufficient under Florida law. The federal court dismissed the claim. More than six months after Governor DeSantis issued the executive order at issue Petitioner filed this petition requesting the issuance of a writ of quo warranto and, alternatively, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Governor to reinstate him. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that, under the circumstances involving "dilatory conduct" on the part of Petitioner, this Court declines to consider Petitioner's claims for relief. View "Warren v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant has not filed a response.   The Fifth Circuit reviewed counsel’s brief, and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein and granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court held that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order issued by the district court denying Montana Opticom, LLC's motion to disqualify counsel for Scott Rysewyk, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to disqualify Rysewyk's counsel.Rysewyk, represented by Rabb Law Firm (RLF), filed a complaint alleging trespass, ejectment, negligent civil conspiracy, and inverse condemnation by Opticom and Jim Dolan, Jr., a partial owner of Opticom. Opticom filed a motion to disqualify Rysewyk's counsel, arguing that Rysewyk's counsel of record was disqualified from representing him because of the firm's earlier representation of Dolan. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Opticom offered "no proof of any actual prejudice flowing from the alleged conflict of interest." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the district court was presented with no evidence that Opticom was actually prejudiced, the court did not act arbitrarily or exceed the bounds of reason by denying Opticom's motion to disqualify. View "Rysewyk v. Mont. Opticom, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's legal malpractice complaint against Appellees, her attorneys, and finding that there were no facts in the complaint sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations based on fraudulent concealment, holding that there was no error.In the motion to dismiss, Appellees argued that Appellant's malpractice claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and should be dismissed. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case and finding there were no facts contained in the complaint sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations based on fraudulent concealment. View "Nichols v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Zaal Aresh appealed an order vacating a judgment he obtained to enforce his attorney fee lien and to collect the fees and costs he earned in two cases from the settlement funds recovered in those cases. His dispute was with respondent Daniel Williams, the attorney who took over the clients’ representation after Aresh’s services were terminated. Aresh had initially included Williams as a defendant in his lawsuit, along with all the other potential claimants to the settlement funds recovered in the cases, with the intent that all interested parties could participate in resolving their claims to those funds in a single action. But Williams demurred, arguing Aresh was required to establish the validity, value, and enforceability of his own attorney fee liens in an action against just his former clients before he could state any cause of action involving a third party. Aresh dismissed Williams and the other third parties as defendants in the case and litigated his fee claims against only his former clients. A trial court determined Aresh was entitled to recover his earned fees and costs from the settlement amounts pursuant to his liens. However, over Aresh’s objection, the court also purported to determine the amount of fees and costs Williams was entitled to be paid from the settlement funds in the two cases, and ordered that the remainder of the two settlement funds be dispersed to the clients. Williams moved to vacate the judgment, arguing the court could not adjudicate the amount of fees and costs he was entitled to receive in a case in which he was not a party. Williams also argued the court was required to vacate the entire judgment because if the court allowed the remaining provisions of the judgment to stand, it would dispose of all the settlement funds other than those awarded to Williams, and thus would implicitly preclude him from recovering a greater share of the settlement funds than had been awarded in his absence. The trial court agreed and vacated the entire judgment. The Court of Appeal disagreed, however, and reversed in part: where the trial court erred was in failing to distinguish between the provisions of the judgment awarding fees and costs to Aresh, and those awarding the remaining portion of the settlement funds to Aresh’s former clients. Only the latter could not be severed from the properly vacated provisions adjudicating Williams’s rights. The provisions adjudicating Aresh’s rights to specific portions of the settlement funds remained intact. View "Aresh v. Marin-Morales" on Justia Law

The trial court entered judgment for Respondent in this breach of contract claim. The Second Appellate District affirmed and also imposed sanctions against Appellant's counsel for filing a frivolous appeal.The Second Appellate District explained "An appeal is frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive – to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment – or when it indisputably has no merit – when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." The court held that here, the appeal was frivolous because it "indisputably has no merit." The matter was entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and the fact that Appellant's counsel consulted with two other attorneys who believed the claim had merit did not change the court's opinion. View "Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery" on Justia Law