Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellant Attorney Kezhaya represented The Satanic Temple, Inc., in its lawsuits against the City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota. The Temple sued the City, claiming that the City opened a limited public forum for a Christian monument, but closed the forum to exclude a Satanic monument. The City sought $33,886.80 in attorney’s fees incurred by responding to the complaint in the second lawsuit and preparing the motion for sanctions. The court determined that the rates charged by the City’s counsel were reasonable but observed that a portion of the work was duplicative of the first lawsuit and that the issues unique to the second lawsuit were not complex, novel, or difficult. The court thus reduced the requested amount by fifty percent and ordered the Temple’s counsel to pay the City $16,943.40 under Rule 11(c). Kezhaya appealed the sanctions order. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (i) imposing sanctions, (ii) failing to consider non-monetary sanctions, and (iii) granting an arbitrary amount of sanctions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the circumstances, it disagreed with Kezhaya’s contention about the righteousness of a second lawsuit. For the claims dismissed “without prejudice” in the first lawsuit, Kezhaya and the Temple made a strategic choice to seek leave to amend the complaint to correct the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order. Further, the court found that even if the City’s insurance carrier ultimately paid the fees, the fees were “incurred” for the motion and could be awarded under Rule 11(c)(2). View "Matthew Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the underlying complaint filed by Port of Louisville for defamation and professional malfeasance, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with R. Wayne Stratton, CPA and Jones, Nale & Mattingly PLC (collectively, Stratton), and therefore, Stratton did not owe the Port of Louisville any duty.Louisville and Jefferson County Riverport Authority filed a lawsuit seeking to terminate Port of Louisville's lease based on allegations that Port of Louisville breached the parties' lease The action was stayed while the claims were referred to an arbitrator, who found that Port of Louisville had not breached the lease. Based on what occurred during the arbitration the Port of Louisville brought a complaint against Stratton for defamation and professional malfeasance. The trial court granted Stratton's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with Stratton that would cause Stratton to owe it a duty. View "New Albany Main Street Properties, LLC v. R. Wayne Stratton, CPA" on Justia Law

In this professional malpractice action, the Supreme Court overruled Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1994), and its progeny insofar as they hold that, for a non-litigation legal malpractice claim, a claimant's damages are not irrevocable and non-speculative until the claimant knows the exact dollar amount of damages he or she incurred because of the malpractice, holding that Broadbent was wrongly decided.Plaintiff filed the underlying professional malpractice claim against Defendants for negligently providing her poor legal advice regarding a business she co-owned. The trial judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff's legal harm did not become "irrevocable and non-speculative" sufficient to trigger Ky. Rev. Code 413.245 until July 2017, and therefore, Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on slightly different grounds, holding (1) because Broadbent has led to inconsistencies in jurisprudence regarding when damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative for a professional malpractice claim, Broadbent and its progeny are overruled; and (2) for a non-litigation legal malpractice claim, a claimant's damages are considered irrevocable and non-speculative when the claimant is reasonably certain that damages will indeed flow from the defendant's negligent act. View "Wolfe v. Kimmel" on Justia Law

Doe, a University of Michigan student, was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University’s investigation had concluded, he sued. alleging that the University’s disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction preventing the disciplinary process from proceeding. The Sixth Circuit remanded for reconsideration in light of “Baum,” in which it held that the University’s disciplinary procedures violated due process and in light of the University’s new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision.The district court granted in part and denied in part the University’s motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal was heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate. The Sixth Circuit determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the summary judgment order. Doe then sought attorney fees, which the district court granted.The University appealed again. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due process claim seeking the release of his transcript. View "Doe v. University of Michigan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on their legal-malpractice and Vermont Consumer Protection Act (VCPA) claims. Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC (MBP) owned property abutting Lake Champlain in Colchester, Vermont, and leased the property to Malletts Bay Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Under the lease, the Association had the obligation to keep the property in good condition. In 2011, following major erosion damage on a portion of the embankment on the lakefront, MBP’s manager notified the Association it was in default for failing to maintain the property and gave the Association forty-five days to make specified, substantial repairs. After the Association failed to make the repairs, MBP filed a complaint against the Association seeking damages and to void the lease for the Association’s violation of its terms. The Association retained defendant Heilmann, Ekman, Cooley & Gagnon, Inc. In the following months, the Association took steps to address MBP’s complaints. However, following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the Association breached the lease and was in default but declined to grant MBP’s request for lease forfeiture. Instead, it awarded MBP damages for remediation and attorney’s fees and costs. Both parties appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the Association breached the lease and that MBP was entitled to termination of the lease. Ultimately, the lease was terminated, and the Association’s members were evicted. Members then sued the Association, alleging that it was negligent in its administration of the provisions of the lease requiring it to keep the property in good condition. Members and the Association settled in 2018. As part of the settlement, the Association assigned members its right to sue defendant for legal malpractice. The Association and members filed a complaint against defendant in the instant case in December 2019, alleging legal malpractice and a violation of the VCPA. The crux of their legal-malpractice claim is a lost opportunity to settle. They proposed that, had defendant tried to settle, the Association and MBP would have likely agreed to terms involving repairs and payment of MBP’s attorney’s fees thus avoiding lease termination and eviction of the Association’s members. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded summary judgment was appropriate on the legal-malpractice claim but not on the VCPA claim, and thus reversed and remanded. View "Mansfield, et al. v. Heilmann, Ekman, Cooley & Gagnon, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, under the Nevada Constitution, both the governor and the Chief Justice may designate temporary substitutes for disqualified justices on the Supreme Court, thus rejecting Appellant's argument that only the governor has authority to temporarily replace a disqualified justice on the Supreme Court.At issue was Nev. Const. art. VI, 19(1)(c), under which the Chief Justice "may assigned [the recalled senior justice or judge] to appropriate temporary duty within the court system." In the forty-five years since the effective date of the amendment, article 6 section 19(1)(c), successive chief justices had assigned senior justices to temporary duty when a Supreme Court sitting justice is disqualified. In this action, Appellant objected to the chief justice's orders assigning senior justices to participate in disqualified justices' places, arguing that replacement justices must be designated in accordance with Nev. Const. art. VI, 4(2), thus authorizing the governor to designate court of appeals or district judges to sit in the place of the disqualified Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court overruled Appellant's objection, holding that the senior justice assignments in this case were constitutionally permissible. View "Valley Health System, LLC v. Murray" on Justia Law

The Hearing Panel of the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) recommended that Gerald Johnson be removed from office for violating Rules 1.1, 1.2 (A), and 1.2 (B) of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”). Johnson, however, submitted his resignation to Governor Kemp shortly after the Hearing Panel filed its Report and Recommendation. Removal from office was the only sanction the JQC seeks, and the Georgia Supreme Court could not remove a former judge from an office he no longer holds. Accordingly, this matter was dismissed. View "Inquiry concerning Judge Gerald Johnson" on Justia Law

Georgia Court of Appeals Judge Christian Coomer was charged with patterns of behavior regarding his use of campaign funds and his dealings with a legal client that allegedly undermined public confidence. The Hearing Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) found that he indeed committed those acts, that he did so in bad faith, that those acts violated the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, and that the violations warranted his removal. The Georgia Supreme Court found that enough of the Hearing Panel’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence that, notwithstanding alternative ways that the evidence could have been viewed, the Court deferred to the Hearing Panel’s findings regarding Judge Coomer’s actions and the bad faith in which the Hearing Panel found those actions to have been taken. The Court concluded the appropriate sanction was to remove Judge Coomer from the bench. View "Inquiry concerning Judge Christian Coomer" on Justia Law

After several instances of inappropriate behavior and twice failing to show up for a client’s sentencing hearing, mostly due to a problem with substance abuse, attorney Plaintiff was referred by a presiding judge to a three-judge disciplinary panel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Following an investigation and hearing, the panel sanctioned Plaintiff by suspending him from practicing before that court for 12 months, with the option to reapply upon proof of sobriety during the period of suspension. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that a three-judge panel could not sanction him because the rules say only that “[a] presiding judge” may take disciplinary action. He also says the 12-month suspension is excessive.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court explained that the district court did try a less severe option. An informal panel of judges privately reprimanded him in June 2020. That lesser sanction did not work. The court was thus justified in imposing a harsher sanction like the suspension. Moreover, the sanction here is appropriately tailored to Plaintiff’s unique situation: his inability to practice law stemmed from his alcohol abuse, so the court ordered him not to practice until he is able to demonstrate sustained sobriety for one year. Further, the court wrote that the district court here considered that a lesser, non-suspension sanction had not deterred Plaintiff from reverting to his old ways. The panel also considered that Plaintiff’s conduct had persisted for some time and that he was not remorseful for his conduct. View "In re Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law

Lee’s contract with Cardiff segregated the $231,500 price between the construction of a pool and spa ($88,400) and the construction of a pavilion, an outdoor kitchen, an outdoor fireplace, pavers, and other landscaping items ($143,000). Disputes arose and Cardiff left the project. Lee sued. The court largely rejected Lee’s claims pertaining to the pool construction, agreed with some of her claims pertaining to the pavilion and other landscaping items, and agreed that Cardiff had violated state contracting laws by hiring workers who were not licensed contractors and treating them as independent contractors for purposes of worker’s compensation. Based on that claim, the court ordered disgorgement plus interest ($238,470). It awarded contract and tort damages of $236,634, allocating $35,000 to deficiencies with the pool.The contract did not have an attorney fees clause. The court declined to award discretionary fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1029.8, ruling Cardiff had not knowingly violated the state contractor licensing law and disgorgement was a sufficient penalty for that violation. The court ruled that because Lee was “unsuccessful on the vast majority of [her] swimming pool claims,” there was no prevailing party under Business and Professions Code 7168, which pertains to swimming pool construction contracts.The court of appeal affirmed with respect to section 7168. None of the non-swimming pool projects can reasonably be categorized as part of “a contract for swimming pool construction.” View "Lee v. Cardiff" on Justia Law