Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

UC Davis students Doe and Roe were having consensual sex in Doe’s room, when Doe made a one-second video recording of his own face. Roe asked Doe to delete it, which he did. Months later, she made a formal complaint. Doe initially lied to the investigator but ultimately admitted to taking the recording. UC Davis imposed a one-year suspension for violations of its Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment Policy and a policy that generally bars nonconsensual recordings that violate another person’s privacy. The trial court found UC Davis’s Title IX procedure “consistent with due process standards” but found the suspension “objectively excessive and punitive,” stating that the college must do more to explain its Title IX discipline. UC Davis then imposed a shorter suspension.Doe unsuccessfully sought $142,387.48 attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5 and $7,500 under Government Code 800. The court of appeal held that Doe was not entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5 because the litigation did not confer a significant benefit “on the general public or a large class of persons.” However, section 800 authorizes an award of up to $7,500 if the challenged administrative determination “was the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct.” All aspects of an administrative proceeding need not be arbitrary or capricious to justify section 800 fees. The court remanded for consideration of whether UC Davis engaged in sufficient arbitrary or capricious conduct to warrant an award. View "Doe v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

The matter underlying this mandamus proceeding was a legal malpractice action brought by Plaintiff-relator Thomas Hill against his former attorney, defendant Ronald Johnson, who had represented Hill in a marriage dissolution proceeding. Hill alleged that, at the conclusion of his dissolution proceeding, Johnson signed a stipulated supplemental judgment on his behalf without his knowledge or permission. According to Hill, the stipulated supplemental judgment provided Hill’s ex-wife certain proceeds out of his pension plan that exceeded the amount to which he had previously agreed. Hill alleged that, months later, when he learned that the stipulated supplemental judgment included the disputed pension proceeds, he asked Johnson to correct it. When that was not done to Hill’s satisfaction, he hired new trial counsel, Fowler, to repair Johnson’s alleged error. Fowler moved the trial court to invalidate the supplemental judgment. The trial court denied that motion. Hill then hired appellate counsel, Daniels, to repair Johnson’s alleged error by challenging the trial court’s order on appeal. In response to Hill’s complaint, Johnson issued Hill discovery requests seeking the production of documents. Those requests sought, among other things, the complete files of Fowler and Daniels related to their representations of Hill in the dissolution matter as well as documents related to any other attorney whom Hill had contacted to represent him in the dissolution proceeding, regardless of whether Hill had retained the contacted attorney. The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was to define one boundary to the breach-of-duty exception to attorney-client privilege. Based on the text, context, and legislative history of OEC 503(4)(c), the Court concluded the breach-of-duty exception applied only to communications between the parties directly involved in the alleged breach. The trial court therefore erred when it applied the breach-of-duty exception to communications beyond that scope. View "Hill v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the charges against Petitioner, a Justice of the Whitehall Town Court and Whitehall Village Court, Washington County, were sustained by the evidence and that the sanction of removal from office for his acts of misconduct was appropriate.The State Commission on Judicial Misconduct served Petitioner with formal written complaints charging him with with judicial misconduct for brandishing a loaded firearm at a litigant during a case and engaging in improper fundraising. The Court of Appeals upheld the sanction of removal, holding (1) the investigation was procedurally proper; (2) there was no reason to set aside the Commission's finding of racial bias; and (3) the record supported the conclusion that Petitioner's misconduct transcended poor judgment and warranted removal. View "In re Putorti" on Justia Law

Since 2006, disbarred California attorney Karnazes has filed 31 appeals, representing herself in all but one. She achieved partial success in two appeals and lost 23. Six appeals remain pending. Since July 2016, Karnazes has — while self-represented — maintained nine appeals that have been determined adversely to her and that are now final.“In light of her persistent pattern of filing meritless appeals,” the court of appeal issued an order to show cause (OSC) why she should not be declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1)(i). After requesting and receiving additional time, she filed a written response. Another party drew the court’s attention to final adverse determinations in appeals Karnazes filed, while self-represented, in other California appellate districts. After a hearing, the court concluded Karnazes is a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts without obtaining permission from the presiding judge or justice where the litigation is proposed to be filed. View "Karnazes v. The Lauriedale Homeowners Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant both members of the State Bar, represent opposing parties in a dissolution/annulment proceeding pending in Los Angeles Superior Court. Following an incident at Plaintiff’s office relating to the canceled deposition of Defendant’s client, Plaintiff obtained a three-year civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 protecting her, as well as her paralegal and office receptionist, from further harassment by Defendant.   On appeal Defendant argued, in part, that all of the conduct upon which the trial court based its findings of harassment was constitutionally protected activity and there was insufficient evidence his actions, to the extent not constitutionally protected, were directed at Plaintiff, caused Plaintiff substantial emotional distress, or would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress as required to support issuance of the restraining order. Defendant also argued that the court erred in including in the order members of Plaintiff’s office staff as protected individuals.   The Second Appellate District reversed and directed the trial court to enter a new order denying Plaintiff’s request for a restraining order. The court explained that Defendant’s Emails regarding his client’s deposition constituted constitutionally protected activity. The court explained that because the emails were constitutionally protected, it was an error for the trial court to conclude they were properly considered part of a course of conduct of harassment. Further, the court found that the evidence of Defendant’s nonprotected conduct did not support the court’s findings of a willful or knowing course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person and did cause Plaintiff substantial emotional distress. View "Hansen v. Volkov" on Justia Law

James Warrington, individually and as parent and legal natural guardian of his minor children J.P.W., Kingsley Elise Warrington, and Wesley Ann Warrington, appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his second complaint for impermissible claim splitting. Because the doctrine of claim splitting was inapplicable, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the second complaint, and remanded this case to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the second complaint and to proceed with litigation. View "Warrington v. Watkins & Eager, PLLC, et al." on Justia Law

A limited liability partnership and one of its partners retained a lawyer but limited the scope of representation to having the lawyer represent the partnership in a specific, ongoing case. After the partnership lost the case, the partner sued the lawyer for malpractice. In an amended complaint, the partnership was added as a plaintiff. The partner’s complaint was filed before the statute of limitations ran; the amendment was filed after. The trial court issued its judgment of dismissal, the partner filed a motion for reconsideration along with a proposed second amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion as untimely and without merit because the proffered second amended complaint did not “present any new allegations which could support the claim.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded as a matter of law that the partner has suffered no damage as a result of the attorney’s alleged malpractice to the LLP during the Wells Fargo litigation and that the partner’s malpractice claims were properly dismissed. Further, the court held that given that all damages for any malpractice claims were suffered by and belong to the LLP, there is no “reasonable possibility” that the partner can amend the complaint to state a viable malpractice claim. View "Engel v. Pech" on Justia Law

In 2003, Salem received a license to practice law in New York. He applied for but was denied a license to practice in Illinois, where he resides, but maintained an Illinois practice, from 2004-2019, by obtaining permission to appear pro hac vice. The Illinois Attorney Disciplinary and Registration Commission (IARDC) charged him with falsely representing that he was licensed in Illinois and successfully requested that the Illinois Supreme Court prohibit Illinois courts from allowing him to appear pro hac vice for 90 days. Salem filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Salem’s suit and ordered him to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court first rejected Salem’s argument that every Illinois district judge should be disqualified and the case transferred to Michigan. The court then held that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court cannot be collaterally attacked in civil litigation. The court noted that the defendant, the IARDC, did not deprive Salem of liberty or property and that there was a rational basis for the Supreme Court’s decision. The court described the litigation as frivolous and noted Salem’s history of “preposterous” behavior in federal court. View "Salem v. Illinois Attorney Registration and Discipinary Commission" on Justia Law

In 1999, Latham, McLean, and Vernooy formed Bliss to sell children’s clothing under the name “bella bliss.” In 2003, Shannon left Bliss and started Latham to sell her own children’s clothing under the name “little english.” Bliss’s logo is a lowercase “b” drawn out as if stitched in thread. Bliss has registered trademarks for this logo. Bliss has several designs that it claims as signature looks of the bella bliss brand that have “become famous and widely known and recognized as symbols of unique and high-quality garments.” There has been previous litigation between the parties.In 2020, Bliss filed federal claims for copyright, trademark, and trade dress infringement; false designation of origin and misappropriation of source; and unfair competition. The district court dismissed Bliss’s claims and granted Latham attorney’s fees for defending the copyright claim but found that Bliss filed its action in good faith and that the trademark and trade dress claims were not so “exceptionally meritless” that Latham merited a rare attorney’s fees award under 15 U.S.C. 1117. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Bliss stated claims for federal and state trademark infringement but has not stated a claim for trade dress infringement. The district court did not err in denying attorney’s fees to Latham for defending the trademark and trade dress infringement claims. View "Bliss Collection, LLC v. Latham Companies, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the parties consented to have their commercial dispute tried before a United States magistrate judge. But, allegedly unbeknownst to Defendant, the judge was longtime family friends with the lead trial lawyer for the plaintiff. Specifically, the lawyer had been a groomsman in the judge’s own wedding, and the judge officiated the wedding of the lawyer’s daughter three months before this lawsuit was filed. None of this information was disclosed to Defendant. After a twenty-day bench trial, the magistrate judge rendered judgment for the Plaintiff, awarding $124.5 million, including over $100 million in trebled damages. After the issuance of the judgment and award, Defendant learned about the undisclosed longstanding friendship and sought to have the magistrate-judge referral vacated. The district judge denied the request and denied discovery on the issue. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated. The court concluded that the facts asserted here, if true, raise serious doubts about the validity of Defendant’s constitutionally essential consent to have its case tried by this magistrate judge. Further, the court explained remand was necessary because the facts were not sufficiently developed for the court to decide whether Defendant’s consent was validly given or whether vacatur of the referral was otherwise warranted. Accordingly, the court remanded for an evidentiary inquiry. View "I F G Port Hold v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law