Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A, appealed from various orders of the district court, asking the district court to reimburse her for various extrajudicial activities undertaken "to delay and prevent" the execution of a Missouri convicted murderer. The court held that the CJA did not confer jurisdiction on a circuit chief judge to review a district court's reduction of a CJA voucher and therefore, petitioner's request for such review was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and at least fifty grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841), and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (18 U.S.C. 924), defendant retained private counsel. After receiving notice of a potential conflict of interests based on the possibility that the attorney could be called as a witness with respect to how he received payment, the court disqualified the attorney and appointed counsel. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the cocaine offenses and to 60 months for the firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Sixth Amendment claim. The disqualification of counsel was not plain error. The prosecutor's closing argument did not amount to an impermissible "once a drug dealer always a drug dealer" statement, but simply questioned the defendant's credibility and character.

The former (2001-2006) Assistant Secretary of State for Protocol Affairs at the Puerto Rico State Department sued the Secretary of State under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the official fired him due to his political affiliation. The district court dismissed, holding that plaintiff could be terminated without cause because he held a trust position for which party affiliation was an appropriate qualification, and fined plaintiff's attorneys $1000 each, concluding that the pleadings and responses that they submitted violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). The First Circuit affirmed; plaintiff's position was not federally protected against political discrimination. The pleadings at issue consisted, in large part, of speculation and conclusory allegations lacking evidentiary support.

Plaintiff filed several suits against healthcare groups on behalf of the United States, claiming violation of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b). No court has ever found that the MSP is a qui tam statute, permitting private attorneys general to sue on behalf of the United States. The Sixth Circuit found plaintiff was on notice of the frivolous nature of his filings from their inception in the Tennessee district courts and remanded for a show-cause hearing on why sanctions should not issue. The district court awarded sanctions to two defendants in amounts of $131,158.50 and $145,431.19. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but denied an award for the appeal.

The estate sued the church for wrongful death, alleging that its members deprived decedent of his psychiatric medication, and that while in a mentally deteriorated state caused by the abrupt denial of his prescription, he shot and killed himself. A state court judge ordered the estate's attorney to withdraw, based on settlement of prior state litigation against the church that allegedly prohibited the attorney from participating in any adversarial proceeding against the church. After a state appeals court affirmed, the attorney moved to void the settlement. The motion was denied. Faced with contempt in state court, the attorney filed an involuntary motion to withdraw. A petition to the state supreme court remains pending. The federal district court denied the motion and ultimately enjoined the trial court from imposing sanctions, pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a). The Eleventh Circuit vacated, holding that, although the court was understandably concerned about the estate's ability to retain counsel, the injunction was not "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C. 2283, and was issued in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act.

In a suit under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 106, described by the court as the equivalent of hand-to-hand combat, the plaintiff settled with some defendants for $30,000. After trial plaintiff obtained injunctive relief and statutory damages in the amount of $40,000 against others, offset by the $30,000 settlement. The court awarded $98,745 in attorney fees; a motion for costs, initially denied, remained pending. The First Circuit affirmed, first noting that the district court had cured a jurisdictional defect by awarding $3,413.05 in costs. The district court correctly applied the lodestar method. Although the fees exceed the award, the violation was willful and the injunctive relief may be worth more that the award of damages. While a rejected Rule 68 offer, not improved upon at trial, obligates the plaintiff to pay the defense costs incurred subsequent to the rejection the offer plaintiff made before trial was not a Rule 68 offer.

The company sought an extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from a decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands (48 U.S.C. 1613), on the ground that new counsel cannot meet the current deadline due to other professional commitments. Third Circuit rules provide that extension of the 60-day period in which to file a certiorari petition may be granted "for good cause shown." The court concluded that the stated reason did not amount to good cause, but granted the extension because the court had not previously addressed standards applicable to the required showing. An applicant for extension must show unforeseen or uncontrollable events, such as a death in the family, illness, or active engagement at trial.

The willful judicial misconduct at issue in this case arose by Judge Robert Schwartz's untimely recusal after initiating a romantic relationship with an assistant public defender that had cases pending before him and making dishonest statements from the bench concerning his reasons for recusing. In the spring of 2009, a female assistant public defender regularly appeared in his courtroom. Although Judge Schwartz doubted that a romantic relationship would develop given the difference in their ages, he was open to the possibility. At some point during a lunch with the assistant public defender, Judge Schwartz gave the assistant public defender a gift of a pair of purple latex gloves and a book written by an author with the same name as Judge Schwartz entitled "The One Hour Orgasm." The gift was intended by Judge Schwartz and understood by the assistant public defender to be a self-deprecating joke because the author and Judge Schwartz shared the same name. Before he became a judge, Judge Schwartz had given this book to others, whose common reaction was to burst out laughing. When the assistant public defender returned to work, she showed her supervisor the joke gift. After Judge Schwartz announced that he would recuse in two of the assistant public defender's cases, he provided dishonest reasons for his recusal and entered rulings in those cases. There was no evidence of any adverse impact on these cases from the recusals. Both cases were resolved in a timely manner. The relationship with the assistant public defender ended, and following a trial in August 2009, Judge Schwartz took voluntary medical leave while the Ethics Commission obtained an independent medical examination of his condition. The Commission found that although his reasons for recusal were not credible, Judge Schwartz had been forthcoming and candid with the Commission, apologized for his conduct, and expressed a desire and willingness to learn from his mistakes. Based on these facts, the Commission concluded that Judge Schwartz violated ethics rules. The Judge challenged the Commission's findings to the Supreme Court. The Court adopted the Commission's recommendation that Judge Schwartz receive a formal reprimand. The Court also adopted the recommendations that he take appropriate leave during any future transitions in medical treatment, and that he receive training on the nature of sexual harassment. The Court rejected the Commission's recommendations that Judge Schwartz be suspended without pay and, instead, ordered him to pay a $6,000 fine.

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) recommended that Judge Reginald Badeaux, III be publicly censured and ordered to reimburse the Commission for costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of his case. This matter stems from a 2006 divorce petition. Mary Sinclair sought to divorce her husband Cayman Sinclair. The case was randomly allotted to Judge Badeaux, who was a personal friend of the parties. Nevertheless, Judge Badeaux did not recuse himself from hearing the case. Moreover, during the sixteen months Judge Badeaux presided over the Sinclair case, he continued to socialize with Mr. Sinclair. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s findings and ordered that Judge Badeaux be publicly censured for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, he was ordered to reimburse the Commission for costs.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Charles Flaherty failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Flaherty to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Flaherty be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Flaherty to pay a penalty.