Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In a suit under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 106, described by the court as the equivalent of hand-to-hand combat, the plaintiff settled with some defendants for $30,000. After trial plaintiff obtained injunctive relief and statutory damages in the amount of $40,000 against others, offset by the $30,000 settlement. The court awarded $98,745 in attorney fees; a motion for costs, initially denied, remained pending. The First Circuit affirmed, first noting that the district court had cured a jurisdictional defect by awarding $3,413.05 in costs. The district court correctly applied the lodestar method. Although the fees exceed the award, the violation was willful and the injunctive relief may be worth more that the award of damages. While a rejected Rule 68 offer, not improved upon at trial, obligates the plaintiff to pay the defense costs incurred subsequent to the rejection the offer plaintiff made before trial was not a Rule 68 offer.

The company sought an extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from a decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands (48 U.S.C. 1613), on the ground that new counsel cannot meet the current deadline due to other professional commitments. Third Circuit rules provide that extension of the 60-day period in which to file a certiorari petition may be granted "for good cause shown." The court concluded that the stated reason did not amount to good cause, but granted the extension because the court had not previously addressed standards applicable to the required showing. An applicant for extension must show unforeseen or uncontrollable events, such as a death in the family, illness, or active engagement at trial.

The willful judicial misconduct at issue in this case arose by Judge Robert Schwartz's untimely recusal after initiating a romantic relationship with an assistant public defender that had cases pending before him and making dishonest statements from the bench concerning his reasons for recusing. In the spring of 2009, a female assistant public defender regularly appeared in his courtroom. Although Judge Schwartz doubted that a romantic relationship would develop given the difference in their ages, he was open to the possibility. At some point during a lunch with the assistant public defender, Judge Schwartz gave the assistant public defender a gift of a pair of purple latex gloves and a book written by an author with the same name as Judge Schwartz entitled "The One Hour Orgasm." The gift was intended by Judge Schwartz and understood by the assistant public defender to be a self-deprecating joke because the author and Judge Schwartz shared the same name. Before he became a judge, Judge Schwartz had given this book to others, whose common reaction was to burst out laughing. When the assistant public defender returned to work, she showed her supervisor the joke gift. After Judge Schwartz announced that he would recuse in two of the assistant public defender's cases, he provided dishonest reasons for his recusal and entered rulings in those cases. There was no evidence of any adverse impact on these cases from the recusals. Both cases were resolved in a timely manner. The relationship with the assistant public defender ended, and following a trial in August 2009, Judge Schwartz took voluntary medical leave while the Ethics Commission obtained an independent medical examination of his condition. The Commission found that although his reasons for recusal were not credible, Judge Schwartz had been forthcoming and candid with the Commission, apologized for his conduct, and expressed a desire and willingness to learn from his mistakes. Based on these facts, the Commission concluded that Judge Schwartz violated ethics rules. The Judge challenged the Commission's findings to the Supreme Court. The Court adopted the Commission's recommendation that Judge Schwartz receive a formal reprimand. The Court also adopted the recommendations that he take appropriate leave during any future transitions in medical treatment, and that he receive training on the nature of sexual harassment. The Court rejected the Commission's recommendations that Judge Schwartz be suspended without pay and, instead, ordered him to pay a $6,000 fine.

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) recommended that Judge Reginald Badeaux, III be publicly censured and ordered to reimburse the Commission for costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of his case. This matter stems from a 2006 divorce petition. Mary Sinclair sought to divorce her husband Cayman Sinclair. The case was randomly allotted to Judge Badeaux, who was a personal friend of the parties. Nevertheless, Judge Badeaux did not recuse himself from hearing the case. Moreover, during the sixteen months Judge Badeaux presided over the Sinclair case, he continued to socialize with Mr. Sinclair. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s findings and ordered that Judge Badeaux be publicly censured for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, he was ordered to reimburse the Commission for costs.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Charles Flaherty failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Flaherty to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Flaherty be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Flaherty to pay a penalty.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Kevin Hoffman failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Hoffman to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Hoffman be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Hoffman to pay a penalty.

The Judiciary Commission (Commission) found that Justice of the Peace Randy Thomas, Jr. failed to file his 2009 financial disclosure statement in a timely manner. The Commission deemed Justice of the Peace Thomas to have acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the rule. Thus, the Commission recommended that Justice of the Peace Thomas be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record evidence supported the Commission's determination that the Justice of the Peace failed to comply with the reporting rule, but not that his failure was willful and knowing. After considering the facts and the applicable law, the Court ordered Justice of the Peace Thomas to pay a penalty.

After Barbara Magin purchased property in the Solitude subdivision, the Solitude site committee informed her that pre-existing fences and a barn were in violation of the subdivision covenants. Solitude filed a complaint against Magin, alleging violations of the covenants and seeking to recover attorney fees. Attorney Glenn Ford, who practiced in the same firm as the first attorney Magin hired before retaining other counsel, acted as Solitude's counsel. No written waiver of conflict was executed. Magin filed a motion to disqualify Ford from acting as Solitude's counsel due to conflict of interest. The motion was dismissed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Solitude. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Solitude's counsel had a conflict of interest, but the district court did not err by refusing to disqualify the firm because Magin's motion to disqualify was untimely; (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Solitude; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by ordering Magin to pay the attorney fees generated by her former firm because it failed to segregate the non-recoverable fees associated with clearing the conflict.

Plaintiff first sued tennis star Connors in 1997; the suit settled with payment of $10.5 million by Connors and an agreement that provided mutual promises of indemnification. In 2010, plaintiff's former law partner sued plaintiff, claiming fraud and concealment with respect to the money from Connors. Plaintiff sought indemnification. The district court dismissed, holding that the indemnity provision created an infinitely repeating loop of liability and failed by its terms; Illinois public policy generally prohibits contractual indemnification for intentional misconduct; and the indemnity provision was not specific enough to exempt it from the general rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the indemnity provision does not apply to this matter, and, if it did, would be unenforceable under Illinois public policy.

After a violation report was filed against defendant Ramondo Howard alleging defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, defendant filed a pro se motion indicating that he wished to release his attorney and wanted new counsel to be appointed, confirming on the record he had filed a complaint against his attorney with the court's disciplinary board. The hearing justice excused defendant's attorney. Defendant then filed motions to recuse and change venues, both of which the hearing justice denied. At the violation hearing, the hearing justice found defendant to be a violator of the terms and conditions of his probation. Before the hearing began, however, the hearing justice expressed his belief that defendant needed to be "warehoused" and was "beyond rehabilitation." Defendant appealed, arguing the hearing justice erred by failing to recuse himself from the case because the justice lacked the objectivity and impartiality to fairly hear and render judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the hearing justice chose to express his opinions prior to the commencement of the violation hearing, the justice displayed a clear inability to render fair judgment and erred by declining to recuse under the circumstances. Remanded.