Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

JLB Corporation, a mortgage brokering service, entered into an agreement with Bonnie Hargis to refinance her home. JLB then prepared Hargis's loan application and other financial disclosure documents. JLB alleged it played no role in drawing the note or deed of trust, which were prepared by third parties, and it did not charge for their preparation. Hargis, however, filed a three-count petition against JLB, alleging, inter alia, that JLB engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of JLB on all counts. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment to JLB as to the first two counts relating to the unauthorized practice of law where the record showed that JLB assisted Hargis only in preparing financial documents and did not show that JLB procured or assisted in the drawing of Hargis' note, deed of trust, or other legal documents; and (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment to JLB on the third count alleging unjust enrichment, as JLB's summary judgment motion failed to negate any element of Hargis' unjust enrichment claim. Remanded. View "Hargis v. JLB Corp." on Justia Law

Respondent, a judge of the city court, dismissed the traffic infraction cases of all litigants who attended traffic school and paid the applicable fee. Respondent also entered default judgment, imposed fines and court costs, and ordered the suspension of driver's licenses of all litigants who selected traffic school but failed to complete the class. Respondent, however, had no authority to discharge traffic infraction cases without a specific request from the prosecuting attorney or to divert litigants' cases through a de facto deferral program not authorized by the county prosecutor. The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications then brought a judicial disciplinary action against Respondent. Respondent and the Commission agreed that by referring traffic infraction litigants to the traffic school and then dismissing their cases upon their completion of the program without any dismissal request from the prosecutor, Respondent abused his judicial authority, committed conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct's provisions that required him to comply with the law. As a sanction for this misconduct, the Supreme Court suspended Respondent from office without pay for a period of sixty days. View "In re Judge Harkin " on Justia Law

Brian Fitzgerald appealed for a second time the district court's award to him of $33,333 in quantum meruit - for his services in a medical malpractice case appellee had settled on behalf of Wende Nostro, a client Fitzgerald had referred to appellee - based on the unjust enrichment he conferred on appellee. The court held that the initial measure of Fitzgerald's quantum meruit award was one-third of appellee's $500,000 recovery from the Nostro settlement, or $166,666. The court further held that the $166,666 amount should be reduced to the extent Fitzgerald decreased the overall value to appellee of the Nostro case. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions that the district court enter a final quantum meruit award of $100,000 for Fitzgerald. View "Crockett & Myers, Ltd., et al. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LL, et al." on Justia Law

This case was before the court on a petition to review the opinion and order of the Commission permanently denying petitioner, an attorney admitted to practice in New York state, the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission, pursuant to rule 102(3)(1)(ii) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, and Section 4C of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Act), 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. On appeal, petitioner contended that the procedure employed by the Commission was unconstitutional. The court held that the Commission acted within its authority in sanctioning him; petitioner was on notice of his duty to comply with the New York Bar disciplinary rules and the standard of conduct proscribed by Rule 102(3)(1)(ii) and Section 4C of the Act; there was substantial evidence for the Commission's finding that petitioner engaged in intentional improper professional conduct; and the Commission did not abuse its discretion in its choice of sanctioning petitioner. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied. View "Altman v. SEC" on Justia Law

Tunica County Circuit Court Judge Albert B. Smith III acknowledged that he abused his contempt powers and exhibited poor courtroom demeanor in several cases before him from 2006 to 2009. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommended the punishment of: a public reprimand, a $1,000 fine, and an assessment of costs totaling $100. Finding that We find that Judge Smith violated Canons 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and, therefore, committed willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute, the Supreme Court accepted the Commission’s recommendation. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Smith" on Justia Law

The law firm successfully represented plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation suit against her employer. The jury awarded $65,000 in damage. The attorneys then sought attorneys' fees of 131,665.88. The district court awarded $70,000. The Seventh Circuit vacated, acknowledging concerns about excessive fees. The district court looked to impermissible considerations in calculating the award; most significantly, it reduced the statutory award based on the existence of an agreement, which specifies that the agreed contingent fee will not apply to the statutory award of fees(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k)). The court should have provided plaintiff with an opportunity to respond before applying the Consumer Price Index and the Laffey Matrix (a chart of hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals in the Washington, D.C. area, prepared by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to be used in fee-shifting cases), and should have provided a clear explanation as to how it arrived at the hourly rate of $400. The district court also erred in reversing its award of fees to outside counsel. View "Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr." on Justia Law

This case arose from an investigation by the Board of Overseers of the Bar in into the actions of six law firm attorneys who were involved in the discovery and reporting of the misconduct of a former partner in the law firm. The Board, acting through bar counsel, appealed from a prehearing discovery order entered by a single justice of the Supreme Court granting the six attorneys' motion to quash a subpoena and also appealed from a judgment entered by a single justice determining that none of the six attorneys violated the Maine Bar Rules in responding to the former partner's misconduct. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order granting the motion to quash the subpoena, but (2) vacated the judgment finding no violation of the Maine Bar Rules because the six attorneys, who were partners in the firm who were acting as the firm's executive committee and were the only lawyers within the firm who knew of Duncan's actions, violated Me. Bar R. 3.13(a)(1), which requires law firm partners to make efforts to enact procedures that will deter unethical behavior. View "Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Warren" on Justia Law

The issue before the court was whether Defendant John Rogers was "exonerated" when his conviction was reversed and his case remanded for trial, or on the day his indictment was dismissed. Defendant sued the Cape May Public Defender's office for malpractice. The date the case was reversed would subject Defendant's claim to a one-year time bar, but a dismissal would not. One year later, his attorney filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim, which was denied. The trial judge determined that Defendant's claim accrued in 2007, and because he filed his notice more than one year later, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the late notice must be filed within one year after accrual of a claim; "exoneration" (and therefore accrual) occurred in 2007. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was not "exonerated" until the indictment was dismissed with prejudice in 2008. His claim was thus not barred by the one year filing limitation. Nevertheless, because the claim was filed ten days beyond the ninety-day limit, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the "extraordinary circumstances" as defined by the governing statute was satisfied. View "Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court received a report from the Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability recommending that Probate Judge Lyman Holmes be sanctioned for certain violations of the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(8), which requires that judges dispose of all judicial matters promptly. Judge Holmes conceded a pattern of unacceptable delays in managing and resolving at least five cases entrusted to him, the most egregious of which involved a delay of nearly five years in the resolution of a matter involving family contact with a child. The Supreme Court concluded that the pattern of delays constituted of violation of Canon 3(B)(8) and ordered that Judge Holmes be sanctioned for the violations. View "In re Holmes" on Justia Law