Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Nell Y. Cowart, justice court judge for the Southeast District, Pearl River County, Mississippi, alleging judicial misconduct. After conducting an independent inquiry of the record and giving careful consideration to the findings of fact and recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court adopted the agreed-upon sanctions. Judge Cowart admitted she made a phone call in an attempt to help release a criminal defendant from jail. Judge Cowart stated that the defendant in question was not a criminal, and "would not spend another night in jail." While an officer was testifying concerning the allegations against the defendant, Judge Cowart became emotional and tearful. After Judge Cowart set bond at $5,000, the defendant was removed from the courtroom, and Judge Cowart apologized to the officers for her emotional display of sympathy toward the defendant. On the basis of these actions the Commission filed a formal complaint against Judge Cowart.

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint and charged Steve Little with judicial misconduct. The Commission filed its Finding of Facts and Recommendations with this Court stating that Steve Little should be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office for ninety days without pay, and assessed the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $100. After thorough review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commission's findings and recommendations, and denied the Joint Motion for Approval of Recommendations. The Court found that as a justice court judge, Little individually and in concert with others, allowed certain misdemeanor charges to be remanded, nonadjudicated and "retired to the files." Specifically, Little allowed the "de facto nonadjudication" of sixteen charges of driving under the influence (DUI) over the course of two years, allegedly in violation of Mississippi Code. The Commission found by clear and convincing evidence that, by engaging in this conduct, Little had violated Canons 2A, 3B(2) and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, Little's conduct is said to constitute willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, which brings the judicial office into disrepute.

After receiving complaints about the alleged misconduct of Catoosa County Magistrate Court Judge Anthony Peters, the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) initiated an investigation and subsequently filed formal charges to have Judge Peters permanently removed from his position as a judge and barred from ever holding or seeking elected or appointed judicial office in the State of Georgia. The court agreed with the recommendation of the JQC where Judge Peters, among other things, obtained and consumed marijuana at least once a week from March to May of 2010; inappropriately used his judicial office to advance the personal interests of a family member; pointed a firearm at himself and indicated to another Magistrate Judge that he was not afraid to die; appeared on a local cable television show, made derogatory remarks about the Chief Magistrate Judge, publicly disclosed that he had filed a complaint against the Chief Magistrate Judge, and displayed a photograph of an individual and identified the individual by name as a confidential informant; made a phone call to a local cable television show after initially trying to disguise his voice with multiple foreign accents and made certain comments; and refused to work certain hours.

In 2004, Plaintiff sued Defendant, a doctor, alleging negligence. Attorney Scott Mann represented Plaintiff, and an attorney from Bretz Law Offices allegedly agreed to assist as co-counsel. The district court judge granted Defendant's motion to disqualify the Bretz firm and Mann from continued representation of Plaintiff because an associate at Defendant's attorney's firm had left there and gone to work for the Bretz firm. In 2009, Mann entered his appearance for Plaintiff in district court. The district judge granted Defendant's motion to disqualify Mann. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district judge abused his discretion in extending the 2004 imputed disqualification of the Bretz firm to Mann because (a) there was no substantial competent evidence to support the legal conclusion that Mann must also be subject to imputed disqualification, and (b) the district judge failed to conduct an appropriate legal analysis of whether Mann was part of the Bretz firm; (2) the district judge's imputed disqualification of the Bretz firm in 2004 exerted no preclusive effect in the 2009 dispute over Mann's status; and (3) Mann was not subject to disqualification in 2009 because he was not likely to be a necessary witness on causation.

Richard Haig, a loan officer who was not an attorney, prepared pleadings that his customers filed in two foreclosure cases before the court of common pleas. Relator, the county bar association, charged that Haig committed the unauthorized practice of law and recommended injunctive relief. The Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law concluded that Haig's actions voilated Ohio's licensure requirements. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Haig engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The Court enjoined Haig from any future conduct constituting the authorized practice of law, including the preparation of legal documents for others, but did not impose a civil penalty in light of Haig's cooperation with the investigation of his misconduct and his apparent lack of awareness that his conduct was improper.

This case arose when respondent, a resident of New York, filed a petition for administration asserting that he was entitled to be appointed personal representative of the estate of the decedent because he was the decedent's stepson and was nominated as personal representative in the will. At issue was whether an objection to the qualifications of a personal representative of an estate was barred by the three-month filing deadline set forth in section 733.212(3), Florida Statutes, a provision of the Florida Probate Code, when the objection was not filed within the statutory time frame. The court held that section 733.212(3) barred an objection to the qualifications of a personal representative, including an objection that the personal representative was never qualified to serve, if the objection filed under this statute, except where fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct with regard to the qualifications was not apparent on the face of the petition or discovered within the statutory time frame. Accordingly, because fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct was not alleged in relation to the objection to the personal representative in this case, the court approved the decision of the First District Court. The court also held that, to the extent that the decision of the Third District Court in Angelus v. Pass involved allegations of fraud or misrepresentation not revealed in the petition for administration, the court approved the result in Angelus. However, the court disapproved Angelus to the extent that it held section 733.212(3) did not bar objections that a personal representative was never qualified to serve.

This case arose when plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer, claiming that his failure to pay her a referral fee was a breach of contract and violated the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, sections 148, 150. At issue was whether a 2008 amendment to the enforcement section of the Wage Act, providing for a mandatory award of treble damages to a prevailing employee, should be applied in an action brought by an employee against her employer for violation of the Wage Act before the amendment's effective date. The court held that the amendment should be read to apply only prospectively, to claims arising on or after the amendment's effective date of July 12, 2008. Therefore, because the Superior Court judge applied the amendment retrospectively, the court remanded for further proceedings.

This matter came before the court on a Petition for Partition of a five acre parcel of land. The property had been sold by a Trustee, the Trustee's Return had been accepted, and the proceeds of the sale had been placed in escrow. The property was owned in common by petitioner and her five co-tenants. Petitioner had filed a claim against the proceeds of the sale for her attorney's fees and to reimburse her for the cost of an appraisal of the property she ordered in connection with her partition request. The court held that there was no common benefit that had been accomplished for the co-tenants and therefore, the application of the "common benefit" exception to the American Rule was not warranted and each party must bear his own attorneys' fees. The court also held that the appraisal was obtained at the request of and for the benefit of petitioner, who wished to sell her interest. Therefore, the cost must be borne by petitioner.

The United States appealed an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, section 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519, and two attorneys, Sean Cronin and Andrea Hoffman, appeal public reprimands entered against them based on their work as Assistant United States Attorneys in an underlying criminal action marked by hard adversarial tactics. The court held that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions against the United States for a prosecution that was objectively reasonable, and the district court violated the constitutional right to due process of the two lead prosecutors, when it denied them notice of any charges of misconduct and an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the court vacated the award of attorney's fees and costs against the United States and the public reprimand of Cronin and Hoffman, but the court denied the request of Cronin and Hoffman that the court reassign the case to a different district judge at this stage.

Plaintiff was a secretary of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. during his service as a district judge until Porteous was impeached and the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit suspended Porteous's authority to employ staff, which resulted in plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff sued the Judicial Council and fifteen of its members seeking declaratory relief, reinstatement to her position, monetary relief, and attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's order insofar as it dismissed her claims against the members of the Judicial Council. The court held that plaintiff lacked prudential standing to bring her constitutional challenge to the Judicial Council's action. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the ultra vires exception applied to sovereign immunity where her claims for injunctive relief were moot in light of Porteous's removal from office; claims for back pay and retirement credits were barred by sovereign immunity; and plaintiff lacked the necessary injury-in-fact to pursue declaratory relief. The court also held that even if plaintiff had standing to seek declaratory relief, she had not pleaded a sufficient claim of ultra vires action by the Judicial Council to overcome the jurisdictional bar of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.