Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

After multiple appeals to the court and extensive trial and other proceedings, plaintiffs' Title VII class action for employment discrimination against Lufkin Industries, Inc. (Lufkin) culminated in a favorable multimillion dollar judgment and injunctive relief. Both parties subsequently challenged the district court's attorneys' fee award and Lufkin's complaint that back pay damages were erroneously authorized in an earlier appeal. The court affirmed as to the back pay damages but vacated and remanded as to the attorneys' fees. In particular, given the unrebutted evidence in the record that it was necessary for plaintiffs to retain counsel from outside the Eastern District of Texas, the district court abused its discretion in failing to use the rate counsel charged in their home district as the starting point in the lodestar calculation.

Respondent Municipal Court Judge Sheryl Polk McKinney's sister, who was the Clerk of the Town of Varnville, was arrested and charged with embezzlement of public funds, forgery, and misconduct in office.  Respondent's sister was accused of issuing checks in Respondent's name, forging respondent's name to the checks and converting the money for her personal use over an eight year period. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that by her misconduct, Respondent violated multiple Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 501, SCACR). The Court found Respondent’s misconduct warranted a suspension from judicial duties.  Respondent was suspended for thirty days. 

After prevailing in a suit for social security disability benefits, plaintiff asked for attorney's fees of $25,200 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A). The district judge awarded $6,625, cutting the hours from 112 or 116 to 53, adopting objections made by Social Security Administration lawyer, and the hourly rate from $225 to the rate specified in the statute $ 125. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the Social Security Act provides for awarding a "reasonable fee" for representation in the administrative proceeding and in a successful appeal, 42 U.S.C. 406(a)(1), but the EJA does not provide for "market rate" and creates a presumptive ceiling of $125. The district court did not consider the special circumstances and factors that may be considered under the Act.

A jury found defendant, a licensed attorney, responsible for trust fund recovery penalties imposed by the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.) 6672 for unpaid employment taxes owed by Iowa Trade Bindery, Inc. (ITB). Defendant appealed the district court's judgment and "all adverse rulings and orders in this case." The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's signed Form 2751 and an IRS officer's testimony about the form, or by instructing the jury with respect to the form and its effect. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law where the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that defendant's remaining claims were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

After an injury trial, plaintiff's attorney called jurors to ask about the award of damages and assignment of fault between the parties, apparently believing that there had been a clerical error on the verdict form. After a juror informed the magistrate judge, the judge concluded that the attorney had violated ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.5 by initiating post-verdict contact with a juror. The Third Circuit vacated, first holding that the attorney had standing to appeal. The judge abused his discretion and denied the attorney's due process rights by not following the disciplinary procedures outlined in Local Rule 83.2(b) of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and by failing to give sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to finding misconduct and imposing sanctions.

Theodore Abrams, a member of the Arizona bar, was appointed as a Tucson City Court Magistrate in 2002. In 2010, the Commission on Judicial Conduct brought formal disciplinary charges against Abrams based on allegations of sexual harassment. Abrams and the Commission entered into a stipulated resolution in which Abrams acknowledged that his conduct warranted removal to the bench and agreed to the imposition of a censure and to resign his judicial position and never again seek or hold judicial office. The Supreme Court granted sua sponte review of the Commission's recommendation that it approve the stipulated resolution. The Court (1) censured Abrams and permanently enjoined him from again serving as a judicial officer in Arizona, and (2) concluded that an appropriate sanction for Abrams' misconduct was a two-year suspension from the practice of law.

In 2003, wife filed domestic battery charges against husband; he was found not guilty and filed for dissolution. At a 2005 hearing on a motion to modify temporary child support, the judge stated that the parties had been before him in the domestic battery case. Neither lawyer objected. Nearly a year later, husband sought substitution of judge, asserting bias. Wife testified that she worked part-time at a fitness club where the judge was a member, but had only said "hello," twice, in passing; husband testified that wife had indicated that she was "taking care of" the judge and that the judge had disclosed that wife had approached him several times. The petition was denied for lack of proof of actual prejudice. The appellate court and highest court affirmed. The "actual prejudice" standard was properly applied; a proposed "appearance of impropriety" standard would encourage judge-shopping. A litigant is entitled to one automatic substitution if requested before trial or hearing begins and before the assigned judge has ruled on any substantial issue, 735 ILCS 5/2–1001(a)(2)(ii). After a substantive ruling, however, (a)(3) requires substitution only when cause exists. The statute does not define "cause," but recusal is required when the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.

Appellant Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital (the Hospital) was a defendant at trial in the underlying civil case.  On the morning of the trial, Appellants removed the case to federal court for the second time on the same grounds as the initial removal.  The federal district court judge again remanded the case to state court.  The state trial judge, imposed severe sanctions against the Appellants for the delay created by the second removal.  Appellants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that they should not have been sanctioned for the second removal because it was done in good faith. The Supreme Court agreed with both [the trial judge's] version of the facts and his conclusion that the second removal was not based on good grounds and was interposed solely for delay: "[w]hile Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety.  We find such is the case here." The Court affirmed the lower court's imposition of sanctions.

This case stemmed from appellee's legal representation of appellant in a criminal tax fraud case. Appellee subsequently filed a lawsuit against appellant for recovery of unpaid attorneys' fees and appellant counterclaimed for malpractice and later petitioned for arbitration before the District of Columbia Attorney/Client Arbitration Board (ACAB), an arm of the District of Columbia Bar. Appellant also moved the district court for a stay pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 3, the denial of which he appealed. At issue was whether appellant was "in default" of his right to arbitrate. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the stay where appellant failed to make a timely assertion of his right to arbitrate and his litigation activity, after he filed his initial answer and counterclaim, imposed substantial costs upon appellee and the district court.

PCG Trading filed a complaint for legal malpractice and related claims against Seyfarth Shaw and four individual attorneys associated or formerly associated with the firm. At issue was whether a motion filed by PCG Trading for admission of an attorney pro hac vice was properly denied by a judge in the Superior Court. The court held that the order denying the motion to admit Robert L. Garner pro hac vice was reversed, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.