Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellants, a group of heirs who were entitled to receive the net proceeds of a judicial sale of four tracts of land, sued Appellees, a former master commissioner of the circuit court, a circuit court judge, and the administrative office of the courts, pursuant to the Kentucky Board of Claims Act, after the former master commissioner failed to disburse the proceeds of the sale. The Board of Claims (Board) entered a final order dismissing Appellants' claims for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claim involving judicial officers or court employes may proceed at the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judge's continued use of the master commissioner, without reappointment, to perform significant functions in actions in the circuit court without a bond and without surety approved by the judge as statutorily mandated, was grounds for a claim in the Board of Claims based upon alleged negligence in the performance of a ministerial duty by an officer of the state. Remanded to the Board for a determination of whether Appellants suffered damages as a proximate cause of the alleged negligence.

Plaintiff filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging arrest without probably cause and assault. The judge allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis. After plaintiff delayed in responding to a draft pretrial order, the judge imposed a sanction of $9,055 against the plaintiff and an attorney who had agreed to represent him. Plaintiff was unable to pay and the judge rejected his offer of $25 per month. When plaintiff did not pay within the 30 day period set by the court, it dismissed his suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the fine was actually paid by the attorney after plaintiff complained to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The attorney admitted being unfamiliar with the federal rules and that he had never before filed a pretrial order.

The Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a complaint against an attorney, claiming that he converted third-party funds; failed to hold property of a third person separate from his own; failed to promptly deliver to the third person funds to which the person was entitled; engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; engaged in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice; and engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute. The Hearing Board found that he had converted funds and violated three rules, but found that the Administrator did not prove conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation, and recommended suspension for three months and mandatory attendance at a seminar on professionalism and office management. The Review Board affirmed, but recommended a six-month suspension. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Hearing Board. The attorney, apparently unaware of proper procedures for handling funds, admitted wrongdoing, expressed remorse, and cooperated. He had not been previously disciplined and offered several witnesses who testified to his excellent reputation for honesty. He spends large amounts of time providing pro bono services and made full restitution.

Plaintiff joined a suit alleging violations of state and federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, laws against defendants. EMI Resorts and DMK appealed the district court's entry of an agreed order appointing a receiver-like "monitor" to oversee defendants' financial and business assets. The court held that because defendants failed to demonstrate facts sufficient to nullify their consent to the district court's appointment of the "monitor" and to its waiver of jurisdictional objections, the court declined to vacate the district court's order.

Defendant, a Maryland attorney, was convicted of offenses related to a scheme to launder proceeds that he obtained from a client. On appeal, defendant challenged several counts of conviction for money laundering, as well as his obstruction of justice conviction, and the denial of his motion to sever the failure-to-file counts. The court affirmed the convictions for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, and affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to sever. The court reversed, however, defendant's conviction on the obstruction-of-justice charge for insufficient evidence. Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing.

This case arose when plaintiffs commenced an action in the Superior Court, alleging fraud, violation of G.L.c. 93A, and other claims arising from their purchase of a house which, they alleged, contained numerous undisclosed latent defects that rendered the house uninhabitable. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a "Notice of Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct," alleging that the judge was in violation of the Code in several respects. Plaintiffs requested that the single justice remove the judge from the case and the single justice denied relief on the ground that plaintiffs had adequate alternative remedies. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion by denying extraordinary general superintendence relief and affirmed the judgment.

The owner of an outdoor amphitheater in a rural area claimed that the sheriff forced him to hire off-duty deputies as a private security force for events and threatened to close the road leading to his property if he did not comply. After giving plaintiff's attorney three tries at producing a complaint that complied with Rules 8 and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that each iteration of the complaint was generally incomprehensible and riddled with errors, making it impossible for the defendants to know what wrongs they were accused of committing. The Seventh Circuit ordered plaintiff's attorney to show cause why he should not be suspended from the bar of the court or otherwise disciplined under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and directed that a copy be sent to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

This case arose when the SEC instituted an enforcement action against several companies, which, among other things, led to the court appointment of a receiver. Debtor was an attorney who represented some of the defendants in this enforcement action. At issue was whether the exception to discharge in 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(19) applied when the debtor himself was not culpable for the securities violation that caused the debt. The bankruptcy court held that the debt was subject to discharge; the district court disagreed and held that the debt was excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. The court held that section 523(a)(19) prevented the discharge of debts for securities-related wrongdoings only in cases where the debtor was responsible for that wrongdoing and debtors who could have received funds derived from a securities violation remained entitled to a complete discharge of any resulting disgorgement order. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff Lorraine Tessier appealed a superior court order that granted Defendants' Regina Rockefeller and Nixon Peabody, LLP's motion to dismiss. The plaintiff is the wife of Thomas Tessier, an attorney who practiced at the law firm of Christy & Tessier in Manchester. Dr. Frederick Jakobiec hired Attorney Tessier to handle certain estate matters on his behalf. Attorney Rockefeller, an attorney employed by Nixon Peabody, and acting on behalf of Dr. Jakobiec, accused Attorney Tessier of misusing and converting substantial assets of the Jakobiec family to his own use. Plaintiff alleged that Attorney Rockefeller met with Attorney Tessier on numerous occasions and threatened him demanding an immediate return of the misappropriated assets. Attorney Rockefeller stated to Attorney Tessier that if he repaid the money no further action would be taken against him. Plaintiff alleged that over the next two years, Defendants "stripped" her and her husband of their individual and joint interests in all of their tangible assets. And despite a settlement agreement, and without notice to her or her husband, Defendants reported Attorney Tessier’s actions the attorney discipline office, and others. In addition, Dr. Jakobiec hired an attorney to bring suit against Attorney Tessier and to foreclose on the mortgage that was the subject of the settlement agreement. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered severe emotional and physical distress requiring hospitalization. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed part of the trial court's decision, and affirmed part. The Court found there was sufficient facts pled to support multiple causes of action Plaintiff brought in her original lawsuit. The Court found that the trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiff's allegations of abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant, a state court judge and former criminal defense attorney, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud and one count of making false statements, stemming from defendant's use of his position as a state judge to obtain money and sexual favors in exchange for assisting a criminal defendant. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction and his 60-month concurrent sentences. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial; based on the record, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same absent any error in the jury instructions and the indictment; and defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenged failed. The court also held that the district court properly applied the specific offense characteristic; the second uncharged bribe could be used to increase the offense level for defendant's bribery conviction; and any monies rendered for legitimate legal services could not be subtracted from the loss value under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2) because defendant and his colleague provided these services after the offense was detected. Therefore, none of defendant's several challenges required a new trial, reversal of conviction, or resentencing.