Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Board on Judicial Standards charged Judge Gregory Galler with creating an appearance of impropriety during an omnibus hearing in a DWI case, asserting, among other claims, that Judge Galler ordered a criminal defense attorney to write a letter of apology for allegedly impugning the integrity of a police officer during the attorney's oral argument at the omnibus hearing. A hearing panel appointed by the chief justice (1) dismissed the complaint against Judge Galler, finding that the Board failed to prove the allegations by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) denied Judge Galler's motion for attorney fees and costs under Minn. R. Civ. P. 11. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel had the authority to dismiss the case after the Board rested, and the panel did not err in dismissing the complaint; and (2) the panel did not err when it denied Judge Galler's motion for attorney fees and costs. View "In re Judge Galler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former General Counsel of McAfee, alleged that McAfee maliciously prosecuted and defamed him in an attempt to deflect attention from large-scale backdating of stock options within the company. McAfee moved to strike plaintiff's claims pursuant to California's anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The district court denied the motion as to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims, but granted it as to his claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Both sides appealed. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that his claims have the requisite degree of merit to survive McAfee's anti-SLAPP motion: McAfee had probable cause to believe plaintiff was guilty of a crime and plaintiff's claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed in No. 10-15670 and reversed in 10-15561. View "Roberts v. McAfee, Inc." on Justia Law

While representing a criminal defendant on appeal, the Office of the State Public Defender was sanctioned by the court of appeals in a footnote after the court found that the appendix to the assistant state public defender's brief was deficient and the attorney's certification of the appendix was false in violation of Wis. Stat. 809.19(2)(a). The Public Defender objected to the summary procedure used by the court of appeals in finding a violation of Rule 809.19(2)(a) without giving notice to counsel and without giving counsel an opportunity to be heard in writing. On review, the Supreme Court suggested that hereafter when the court of appeals considers imposing a sanction in such a situation, an order to show cause should be issued directing counsel to explain why a violation of Rule 809.12(2)(a) and (b) should not be found and why the attorney should not pay a stated amount of money to the clerk of the court as a sanction. Remanded with instructions to modify the footnote. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Judge Teresa Brown Dearman for violating Canons 1 (charging judges to establish, maintain, and enforce high standards of conduct to uphold the integrity of the judiciary), 2A (charging judges to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), 2B (charging judges to avoid lending the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of others), and 3B(2) (charging judges to be faithful to the law and not to be swayed by partisan interests), when she initiated a telephone call to a circuit court judge in Florida. The Commission averred that Judge Dearman reached the voice mailbox of the Florida judge's judicial assistant, identified herself as a judge in Mississippi, and recommended that bond be set for a longtime friend and criminal defendant. It further averred that Judge Dearman personally guaranteed the defendant’s appearance if bond was granted. The Commission recommended that Judge Dearman be publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay $100 in costs, but the Supreme Court found the recommendation insufficient. The Court ordered that Judge Dearman be suspended from office for thirty days without pay in addition to a public reprimand and costs of $100. View "Mississippi Comm'm on Judicial Performance v. Dearman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs objected to paying an extra fee for an expedited transcript of a deposition noticed by defendant. Plaintiffs won an appeal establishing that trial courts have the authority to determine the reasonableness of fees charged by deposition reports to nonnoticing parties. On remand, the trial court found that the fee charged to plaintiffs was unreasonable, but denied their motion for an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Relying on Adoption of Joshua S., that court concluded that plaintiffs had acted in their own interest and only incidentally conferred a benefit on other litigants. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court concluded, however, that Joshua S had no application here where deposition reporters were officers of the court, regulated by statute, who perform a public service of considerable importance to litigants and members of the public. The reporting service here did not merely seek to vindicate its private rights. It defended its institutional interest in controlling the fees it charged and sought to shield itself from judicial review of its conduct as a ministerial officer of the court. Moreover, it was found to have charged plaintiffs an unreasonable fee. Therefore, the courts erred by concluding that the service did nothing adverse to the public interest and that plaintiffs' appeal did not involve an important right affecting the public interest. Because neither the Court of Appeal nor the trial court considered whether plaintiffs satisfied the other elements required for a fee award under section 1021.5, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Serrano, et al. v. Stefan Merli Plastering" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury issued a subpoena to a law office, commanding production of documents relating to a real estate transaction. The attorney obtained the client's consent and complied. The client changed his mind, notified USAO that the documents were privileged, and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court found that the documents were not privileged. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in conducting an in camera review; the client's generalized assertion of privilege did not establish that privilege attached to any particular document. The documents would have been disclosed at closing and the attorney essentially acted as a scrivener and disburser of funds. The request for production did not implicate the privilege against self-incriminating testimony. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mr. S.)" on Justia Law

This action arose from a complaint filed in 2006 with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance against a then Mississippi Supreme Court Justice. The justice was ultimately acquitted of various criminal charges and his wife plead guilty to tax evasion. After the cessation of the criminal prosecution, the prosecuting U.S. Attorney, relative to plaintiff, filed a complaint with the Commission. Accordingly to the justice and his wife, the U.S. Attorney unlawfully attached their tax and other financial records obtained during the criminal investigation to the complaint. Plaintiff served as a member of the Commission and participated in the Commission's investigation of the justice. Although the Commission dismissed the complaint, counsel to the justice and his wife sent plaintiff two letters threatening legal action based on his role in the investigation. Plaintiff responded by filing a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of immunity from suit for conduct arising out of his duties with the Commission. The justice's wife subsequently filed counterclaims against plaintiff, asserting various federal and state law causes of action arising, in relevant part, from plaintiff's alleged disclosure of the Commission's confidential investigation. The court held that the judgment of the district court, insofar as it denied immunity to plaintiff for his filing of the declaratory relief action, was reversed, and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Lampton v. Diaz, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) regarding Justice of the Peace Tina Revette LaGrange's failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX. The Commission found that Justice of the Peace LaGrange failed to file her 2009 personal financial disclosure statement timely, thereby subjecting her to a monetary penalty. The Commission determined Justice of the Peace LaGrange acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule and recommended that she be ordered to pay a penalty and reimburse the Commission for costs. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Commission filed an amended recommendation, recommending penalties be limited to $200.00, with no request for reimbursement of costs. After review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the Commission’s finding that Justice of the Peace LaGrange acted willfully and knowingly in failing to file the financial disclosure statement. Justice of the Peace LaGrange was thereafter ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Tina LaGrange" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) regarding Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet’s failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX. The Commission found that Justice of the Peace Threet failed to file his 2009 personal financial disclosure statement timely, thereby subjecting him to a monetary penalty. The Commission determined Justice of the Peace Threet acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule and recommended that he be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Commission filed an amended recommendation, recommending penalties be limited to $200.00, with no request for reimbursement of costs. After review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the Commission’s finding that Justice of the Peace Threet acted willfully and knowingly in failing to file the financial disclosure statement. Justice of the Peace Threet was thereafter ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $300.00.

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) regarding Justice of the Peace Stacie P. Myers’ failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX. The Commission found that Justice of the Peace Myers failed to file her 2009 personal financial disclosure statement timely, thereby subjecting her to a monetary penalty. The Commission determined Justice of the Peace Myers acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule and recommended that she be ordered to pay the penalty and reimburse the Commission for costs. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Commission filed an amended recommendation, recommending penalties be limited to $200.00, with no request for reimbursement of costs. After review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the Commission’s finding that Justice of the Peace Myers acted willfully and knowingly in failing to file the financial disclosure statement. Justice of the Peace Myers was thereafter ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00.