Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Celeste Puppolo, executor of the Estate of Eva Puppolo, appealed a jury verdict in favor of Defendant Donovan & O'Connor, LLC stemming from a legal malpractice action. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in denying a motion to withdraw her counsel, that she was denied a fair trial when the court allowed Defendant’s attorney to testify to the merits of the underlying medical malpractice action, and that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony that exceeded the scope of the defendant’s expert disclosure. Plaintiff's was unpersuaded by the results of investigations into the death of her aunt Eva, and consulted with Defendant about bringing a wrongful death and survivorship claim against the aunt's nursing home and attending physicians. In light of the autopsy report, and the conclusions of the police, Defendant declined to take the case. Defendant told Plaintiff that the limitations period for the survival action began to accrue when she was appointed executor of the estate. Defendant conceded that this statement was incorrect and that the limitations period had actually begun to accrue two months earlier, when the original executor was appointed. Defendant also conceded that it failed to specifically notify Plaintiff of the two year limitations period for the wrongful death action. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the home and physicians through another attorney. Both claims were dismissed on summary judgment as time-barred. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendant, claiming that her reliance on its legal advice deprived her of the opportunity to pursue the wrongful death and survivorship claims for her aunt's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decisions in Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the jury verdict against Plaintiff. View "Puppolo v. Donovan & O'Connor, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer for unpaid overtime and back wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., its implementing regulations, and Florida law for unpaid overtime and back wages. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the grant of summary judgment to the employer on plaintiff's FLSA claim and dismissal of his state law claim without prejudice, contending that material issues of fact precluded judgment and, alternatively, that, had the district court not limited his discovery as it did, he would have uncovered evidence that would have created material issues of fact. Plaintiff also appealed the district court's sanctions order against his attorney. Having found no error in the district court's discovery decisions, imposition of sanctions, or its order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc." on Justia Law

The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards filed a formal complaint against Judge Patricia Karasov, judge of a district court, alleging violations of the Rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Minnesota Constitution. A three-member panel appointed by the Supreme Court (1) found that Judge Karasov failed to reside within her judicial district during her continuance in office and failed to cooperate and be candid and honest with respect to the Board's investigation of her residency status, and (2) recommended that Judge Karasov be censured and suspended from judicial office for ninety days without pay. Both Judge Karasov and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the Board proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Karasov committed judicial misconduct by clear and convincing evidence; (2) Judge Karasov's claim that she was denied due process of law by irregularities in the proceedings lacked merit; and (3) the appropriate judicial discipline was censure and suspension from judicial duties for six months without pay. View "In re Conduct of Judge Karasov" on Justia Law

On Monday afternoon, a sentencing hearing scheduled for Wednesday afternoon was rescheduled to Wednesday morning. The court sent electronic notice; prior notices and filings had been electronic. The attorney failed to appear and, on the same day, the court imposed a fine of $1,500. The First Circuit reduced the fine to $500, noting that the attorney was unwise in his criticism of the lower court when he requested reconsideration and rejecting the attorney's characterization of the fine as criminal contempt. The court noted that it would be better policy to hear from the attorney before imposing the sanction. View "United States v. Romero-Lopez" on Justia Law

Ross Systems contracted with advanced Environmental Recycling Technologies (AERT) to provide a new software system to manage business functions. AERT filed suit against Ross, alleging deceit, deceptive trade practices, and breach of contract. Ross counterclaimed for breach of contract. During the discovery process, AERT filed a motion for sanctions based on Ross's alleged failure to comply with a circuit court order to provide complete responses to AERT's requests for admission, interrogatories, and production of documents. During a hearing on the motion for sanctions, the circuit court struck Ross's answer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction because the sanction was imposed only after the court considered all of the circumstances surrounding Ross's conduct, including the failure to obey the court's order. View "Ross Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Recycling Techs., Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Darrell Kasberg farmed piece of property leased from the Wheelers. The Wheelers agreed to loan Plaintiff money, using farmland he owned as collateral. When disagreements arose, the Wheelers threatened to evict Plaintiff from both his land and the leased land. On the day of the eviction trial, Plaintiff told his lawyer from Defendant firm Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP that he would be willing to give up his right to repurchase the leased farmland if the Wheelers would remove a crop lien placed on the land in time for him to meet a planting deadline. Plaintiff's lawyer met with the Wheelers' lawyer and they negotiated an oral settlement agreement. Plaintiff was not present at that meeting. The agreement required (amongst other things) that Plaintiff relinquish any interest or claim of interest in, and surrender possession of his collateral farmland. In exchange, the Wheelers agreed to dismiss their breach of contract action and to remove the lien. Plaintiff would later learn and inform his lawyer that the Wheelers had not removed the lien. This resulted in Plaintiff missing the planting deadline, and he lost an opportunity to receive both money from the sale of the crop and related government subsidies. Plaintiff wished to file an suit against the Wheelers for their handling of the crop lien, and approached his lawyer to handle the case. Though his lawyer lead Plaintiff to believe he would be successful in pursuit of the Wheelers, the lawyer had in reality given bad advice with regard to the statute of limitations that governed Plaintiff's suit. Plaintiff then initiated suit against his former lawyer and Defendant firm, alleging legal malpractice in handling the Wheeler lien dispute. The trial court decided that the facts did not present a genuine issue as to whether Plaintiff knew or should have known before he filed his action, that Defendant had negligently negotiated the oral settlement agreement. The court concluded that Plaintiff's action was thus time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff proffered evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that he did not have actual knowledge that his attorney's acts or omissions were a cause of his damages. As such, the Court reversed the trial court's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP" on Justia Law

The Board on Judicial Standards charged Judge Gregory Galler with creating an appearance of impropriety during an omnibus hearing in a DWI case, asserting, among other claims, that Judge Galler ordered a criminal defense attorney to write a letter of apology for allegedly impugning the integrity of a police officer during the attorney's oral argument at the omnibus hearing. A hearing panel appointed by the chief justice (1) dismissed the complaint against Judge Galler, finding that the Board failed to prove the allegations by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) denied Judge Galler's motion for attorney fees and costs under Minn. R. Civ. P. 11. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel had the authority to dismiss the case after the Board rested, and the panel did not err in dismissing the complaint; and (2) the panel did not err when it denied Judge Galler's motion for attorney fees and costs. View "In re Judge Galler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former General Counsel of McAfee, alleged that McAfee maliciously prosecuted and defamed him in an attempt to deflect attention from large-scale backdating of stock options within the company. McAfee moved to strike plaintiff's claims pursuant to California's anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The district court denied the motion as to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims, but granted it as to his claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Both sides appealed. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that his claims have the requisite degree of merit to survive McAfee's anti-SLAPP motion: McAfee had probable cause to believe plaintiff was guilty of a crime and plaintiff's claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed in No. 10-15670 and reversed in 10-15561. View "Roberts v. McAfee, Inc." on Justia Law

While representing a criminal defendant on appeal, the Office of the State Public Defender was sanctioned by the court of appeals in a footnote after the court found that the appendix to the assistant state public defender's brief was deficient and the attorney's certification of the appendix was false in violation of Wis. Stat. 809.19(2)(a). The Public Defender objected to the summary procedure used by the court of appeals in finding a violation of Rule 809.19(2)(a) without giving notice to counsel and without giving counsel an opportunity to be heard in writing. On review, the Supreme Court suggested that hereafter when the court of appeals considers imposing a sanction in such a situation, an order to show cause should be issued directing counsel to explain why a violation of Rule 809.12(2)(a) and (b) should not be found and why the attorney should not pay a stated amount of money to the clerk of the court as a sanction. Remanded with instructions to modify the footnote. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Judge Teresa Brown Dearman for violating Canons 1 (charging judges to establish, maintain, and enforce high standards of conduct to uphold the integrity of the judiciary), 2A (charging judges to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), 2B (charging judges to avoid lending the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of others), and 3B(2) (charging judges to be faithful to the law and not to be swayed by partisan interests), when she initiated a telephone call to a circuit court judge in Florida. The Commission averred that Judge Dearman reached the voice mailbox of the Florida judge's judicial assistant, identified herself as a judge in Mississippi, and recommended that bond be set for a longtime friend and criminal defendant. It further averred that Judge Dearman personally guaranteed the defendant’s appearance if bond was granted. The Commission recommended that Judge Dearman be publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay $100 in costs, but the Supreme Court found the recommendation insufficient. The Court ordered that Judge Dearman be suspended from office for thirty days without pay in addition to a public reprimand and costs of $100. View "Mississippi Comm'm on Judicial Performance v. Dearman" on Justia Law