Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Debtor had unsecured liabilities of almost $15,000 and anticipated disposable income of about $100 per month. He visited an attorney, who indicated that he would not file a Chapter 7 proceeding until the debtor paid the anticipated legal fee ($2,300). If debtor chose the Chapter 13 alternative, he could pay over time as part of the Chapter 13 plan. The attorney estimated that fees associated with a Chapter 13 proceeding would total $4,100. Not having fees for a Chapter 7 filing, the debtor opted for Chapter 13 and paid $500 on account. The attorney submitted a “fee only” Chapter 13 plan that called for payment of $100 per month for 36 months to the bankruptcy estate. Of the total $3,600, only about $300 would be available to general creditors. The bankruptcy court rejected the plan as not submitted in good faith. The debtor opted to convert to Chapter 7; the attorney moved for an award of $2,872. The bankruptcy court awarded $299, which required him to disgorge more than $200. The district court affirmed. Noting a division in the circuits, the First Circuit reversed, holding that fee-only plans are not per se in bad faith.View "Berliner v. Pappalardo" on Justia Law

Debtors engaged the attorney to represent them in bankruptcy proceedings. They owed more than $115,000 in unsecured debt with no realistic prospect of payment. In a retainer agreement, he estimated that legal fees plus court costs would total around $4,000. Debtors paid $3,684 on account. Their Chapter 13 plan, 11 U.S.C. 1321-1322, was approved by the bankruptcy court and the lawyer filed an application requesting an additional $8,173.36 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The trustee objected. The bankruptcy court set the total fee and expense figure at $3,684, finding that the case was relatively uncomplicated. The district court and First Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the attorney billed an excessive number of hours. View "Sullivan v. Pappalardo" on Justia Law

The parties disputed the amount that defendant, Fitracks, must advance to Noam Danenberg in connection with his defense of claims asserted against him by Aetrix, Fitracks' parent, in litigation pending before the district court (Underlying Action). They also disputed the amount that Fitracks must pay Danenberg as indemnification for this proceeding. Judgment was entered in favor of Danenberg for advancements in the amount of $292,019.91 and indemnification in the amount of $276,332.13. Interest on these amounts, compounded quarterly, shall accrue at the legal rate beginning February 27, 2012 through the date of payment. Going forward, unless modified by stipulation, the parties shall follow the procedures set forth in this opinion. View "Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action in federal court alleging that M&K violated multiple provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692d-f, by making false statements and misrepresentations in a memorandum filed in the state court action in support of Discover's motion for summary judgment. The complaint also asserted state law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and the recovery of treble damages for attorney deceit under Minn. Stat. 481.071. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing these claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the FDCPA claims on the merits where it was not false or misleading to submit a client affidavit and legal memorandum arguing M&K's legal position that plaintiff was liable for the unpaid account balance at issue. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's state law claims where plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence of intentional fraud and deceit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., et al." on Justia Law

The State brought a consumer-protection action against Bennett & DeLoney, a Utah law firm, and the owners and principals thereof to redress and restrain alleged violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA). The thrust of the complaint alleged that Bennett & DeLoney violated the ADTPA by attempting to collect penalties on dishonored checks greater than those amounts permitted by Ark. Code Ann. 4-60-103. The circuit court (1) granted partial summary judgment for the State, finding that the collection of amounts in excess of those set forth in section 4-60-103 violated the ADTPA; and (2) found that section 4-60-103 provided an exclusive remedy for recovery on dishonored checks and that the use of remedies set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 4-2-701, relating to a seller's incidental damages, was not permitted. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed, holding that the ADTPA has no application to the practice of law by attorneys, and the circuit court erred in concluding otherwise. View "Bennett & Deloney P.C. v. State" on Justia Law

In this suit for an alleged breach of a deposit agreement, the court reviewed the court of appeals' judgment in favor of an estate administrator, as well as the estate administrator's cross-petition concerning attorney's fees. When a party failed to preserve error in the trial court or waived an argument on appeal, an appellate court could not consider the unpreserved or waived issue. Because many of the arguments raised by the parties invoked issues of error preservation or waiver, the court declined to grant either party the relief it sought. View "FDIC v. Lenk" on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 1919, when a suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the court "may order the payment of just costs." This case required the court to parse the term "just" and consider what constituted "just costs." Here, the district court awarded costs to defendants on the ground that they were necessarily incurred in defending in the action. Because the district court implied a presumption of award of costs that was absent in the permissive statute, and because it equated incurred costs with "just costs," the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion under section 1919. View "Otay Land Co., et al. v. United Enterprises Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer. Employer's Insurer accepted liability for Employee's claim. Insurer contracted with third-party Adjuster to provide services for Employee's claim. Employee and Insurer disagreed over elements of the claim, and Attorney advised Insurer on various legal matters. The claim was eventually resolved. Employee then filed the present action for unfair claims settlement practices, naming Insurer and an employee of Adjuster as defendants. Employee served Employer with a subpoena requesting, inter alia, a letter Attorney wrote to Adjuster's employee concerning the underlying case. Employer and Insurer objected to the subpoena, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The court denied the motions. Insurer then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the district court correctly applied the law of attorney-client privilege but incorrectly analyzed the work product doctrine. However, because the court reached the proper conclusion, supervisory control was unnecessary. View "Am. Zurich Ins. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission recommended that Respondent John Totten, a district court judge, be censured for conduct in violation of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376(b). Respondent had suppressed the breath alcohol concentration test taken by a defendant charged with driving while impaired and careless and reckless driving without a motion to suppress and a hearing as required by law. The Supreme Court ordered that Respondent be censured for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and section 7A-376(b). View "In re Totten" on Justia Law

As a result of conduct inappropriate to her judicial office, including disposing of at least eighty-two cases in violation of the N.C. General Statutes, the Judicial Standards Commission entered a recommendation that the Supreme Court suspend Respondent Denise Hartsfield, a district court judge, without compensation for a suitable period of time. Respondent had moved traffic citations off their scheduled court dates and added them to traffic dockets that she presided over with the alleged understanding that Respondent would enter a favorable judgment in those matters. After weighing the severity of Respondent's conduct against her candor and her cooperation, the Court concluded that Respondent should be suspended without compensation from the performance of her judicial duties for seventy-five days. View "In re Hartsfield" on Justia Law