Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This action arose when the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) served a Notice of Formal Charges on Judge Singbush for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically, the charges stated, among other things, multiple allegations of tardiness or actions that caused scheduling inconveniences or inefficiencies, as well as actions in presiding over Jumbolair, Inc. v. Garemore. The court approved the stipulation and the JQC's Findings and Recommendation recommending that Judge Singbush receive a public reprimand, submit written weekly logs to special counsel of the JQC for one year after the publication of the opinion, and submit a signed letter of public apology to the JQC. View "Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 10-420 Re: William Singbush" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an attorney, submitted an affidavit of resignation pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, section 15, and his resignation was thereafter accepted as a disciplinary sanction. At issue was whether an attorney, whose resignation from the practice of law was accepted as a disciplinary sanction, could now work, either for pay or on a volunteer basis, as a mediator. The court concluded that, although mediation did not in all circumstances constitute the practice of law, an attorney who had resigned from the practice of law while the subject of disciplinary investigation, or who had been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, could be prohibited from serving as a mediator when to do so would be perceived by the public as an extension of the attorney's practice of law, or when the conduct of the mediation was so closely related to the practice of law as to constitute legal work. View "In the Matter of Bott" on Justia Law

Attorney Mehta was charged with converting escrow funds and lying to a state court. After a hearing, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended disbarment. While the recommendation was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a ruled to show cause why he should not be suspended, rejected Mehta's arguments, and suspended his license. Mehta sued the court and the IARDC under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the suspension violated his right to due process. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the meantime, Mehta was disbarred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, rejecting Mehta's argument that the suspension was not a final order that was subject to the doctrine. Illinois law provides that an interim suspension order is a final judgment in the Rule 774 proceeding in which it is issued. View "Mehta v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the attorney handling his father's estate, asserting diversity jurisdiction and alleging malpractice and constructive fraud. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the matter was not ripe because the estate was still open, no final distribution of the estate had yet taken place, and plaintiff could still assert his rights in probate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. View "Kennedy v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of attempted rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether plaintiff, suing his former criminal defense attorney in legal malpractice, could recover nonpecuniary damages. Plaintiff claimed several errors, including that his attorney failed to investigate or present evidence concerning an allegedly meritorious defense, failed to interview certain potential witnesses, and failed to cross-examine the victim regarding discrepancies in her testimony. The court found that such damages were not available in an action for attorney malpractice. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed. View "Dombrowski v Bulson" on Justia Law

A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on its claims of fraud and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendants where defendants' misrepresentations induced plaintiff to settle the asbestos exposure claims of two of plaintiff's employees whom defendants represented in a state-court lawsuit. On appeal, defendants contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and alternatively that the case called for Burford v. Sun Oil Co. abstention. Defendants also contended that the trial evidence established their statute-of-limitations and waiver defenses as a matter of law. The court held that defendants misconceived the legal authorities relevant to their jurisdiction, abstention, and waiver arguments. Regarding the statute of limitations issue, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found for plaintiff. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Guy, et al." on Justia Law

After losing on her Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim at the county court, Elizabeth Flood's trial counsel, Gary Merenstein, paid the fees of several appellate attorneys who represented Flood in an appeal to the district court and later to the Supreme Court because they were not willing to work on a contingency basis. Flood ultimately prevailed in her appeal, and the Supreme Court awarded attorneys' fees. On remand to the county court to determine Flood's entitlement to and the amount of the attorneys' fees, the opposing party, debt collector Mercantile Adjustment Bureau(MAB), argued that Flood was not entitled to receive attorneys' fees for her appellate counsel's work. MAB argued that the arrangement between Merenstein and Flood, wherein he agreed to pay her appellate attorneys' fees and expected to be reimbursed for these fees from any court award of attorneys' fees received by Flood, constituted unethical financial assistance of a client in violation of Rule 1.8(e) of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. The county court rejected MAB's argument and awarded Flood the requested attorneys' fees. MAB appealed to the district court, which affirmed the county court. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Merenstein did not violate Rule 1.8(e) by paying the fees of Flood's appellate counsel and therefore affirmed the district court's decision in part. However, the Court concluded that the district court erred in applying the Colorado Appellate Rules, which require an appellee to make her request for attorneys' fees in her answer brief, to an appeal to the district court from the county court. The Court reversed that part of the district court's ruling applying the Colorado Appellate Rules to deny Flood's request for attorneys' fees incurred in the current appeal. The case was remanded to the district court to return it to the county court for proceedings to determine whether Flood was entitled to appellate fees as the prevailing party in this appeal and, if so, the amount of Flood's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal—including the proceedings before the Supreme Court. View "Mercantile Adjustment Bureau v. Flood" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a contractual dispute between the city and its contractor and sub-contractor concerning the design and construction of an underground parking garage. At issue was whether the city's petition for a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to decide whether that court erred when it determined the trial judge did not err when, having been presented with a motion to recuse him, he denied the motion rather than referred it to another judge. The court held that, since the affidavits at issue raised a reasonable question about the trial judge's impartiality that required the assignment of the motion to recuse to another judge, the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial judge's denial of the motion to recuse for failure to meet the requirement of USCR 23.5. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Mayor & Alderman of the City of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., et al." on Justia Law

Officers, responding to an assault in progress, saw defendant, who voluntarily submitted to a pat down. A pistol was found in his coat pocket. Charged possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant insisted that the police had planted the gun. His lawyer believed that he could not argue that the firearm was the fruit of an unreasonable search. Following his conviction, defendant brought a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance in that his attorney did not move to suppress the firearm as the product of an unreasonable and did not explain to defendant that his testimony at a suppression hearing could not be used at trial as evidence of his guilt. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant’s insistence that the police planted the gun neither justified nor compelled counsel to refrain from challenging the search that produced the weapon. The court remanded for determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by that failure. View "Gardner v. United States" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Appellant Marlon Pratt was convicted of seventeen counts of theft by swindle and two counts of racketeering. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. This appeal followed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Pratt's theft-by-swindle convictions; but (2) the judge who presided over Pratt's trial was disqualified from doing so under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the judge was retained by the county attorney's office to be an expert witness in an unrelated case, while at the same time presiding over Pratt's trial, which would cause a reasonable examiner to question the judge's impartiality. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Pratt" on Justia Law