Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Gregory Haynes was the counsel for the plaintiff in the underlying action. The district court (1) determined that Haynes continued pursuit of plaintiff's claims after it was clear the claims were frivolous and in bad faith, and (2) determined that the defendants had incurred excess costs and fees of over $360,000 due to Haynes' misconduct. The court imposed sanctions on Haynes in this amount pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927, declining to consider Haynes's assertion that he could not possibly pay such an award. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) a district court may reduce a section 1927 sanctions award in light of an attorney's inability to pay; and (2) because the district court appeared to believe it was without discretion to reduce the sanctions award on this ground and accordingly failed to consider whether to exercise that discretion, the case was remanded. View "Haynes v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

CFG produced to defendants 5,000 pages of pleadings and court filings from an action pending in Maryland and later produced 238,000 pages worth of its own documents that it had already produced in the Maryland action. CFG produced all of the documents as Highly Confidential, so that only four of the attorneys representing defendants could review the documents. Defendants moved to vacate the designation. The court determined that defense attorneys may review the documents if they certify that during the pendency of this case they will neither be involved in the New York Litigation, nor represent any client in a matter involving the purchase or sale (including financing) of any nursing home or adult assisted living center. The Court declined to de-designate any of the documents as Highly Confidential; CFG, through its counsel, is to review, within 30 days of the date of this letter opinion, all of the Discovery Documents that refer to Beverly, and determine whether those documents are entitled to be designated Highly Confidential. View "Grunstein v. Silva" on Justia Law

Evan Stone, counsel for Plaintiff, appealed sanctions imposed on him. The underlying case involved Plaintiff's lawsuit alleging copyright infringement against 670 persons who allegedly unlawfully downloaded Plaintiff's film using an online file-sharing program. After the case had been dismissed, Defendants, through attorneys ad litem, moved for sanctions based on Stone's misconduct in violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 45 by issuing subpoenas to Defendants' ISPs. The district court granted the sanctions motion, finding that Stone had issued subpoenas in violation of court order, thereby grossly abusing his subpoena power. The Does, through the attorneys ad litem, then moved the court to impose further sanctions based on Stone's failure to comply with the first sanctions order. The court granted the motion for additional sanctions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sanctions imposed by the district court, holding (1) all the issues Stone raised on appeal had been waived; and (2) no miscarriage of justice would result from the sanctions imposed. View "Mick Haig Prods. E.K. v. Does 1-670" on Justia Law

LG took a license from Wi-LAN’s predecessor for a patent concerning V-chip technology for ratings-based blocking of television programs. LG subsequently claimed that it owed no royalties because its televisions did not practice Wi-LAN’s technology. Wi-LAN forwarded to LG a letter written by outside counsel (Townsend), naming Wi-LAN’s general counsel and vice president, as addressee. It was marked “CONFIDENTIAL” and contained analysis of Wi-LAN’s patent rights as applied to LG’s technology, opining that LG was practicing Wi-LAN’s technology and owed royalties. Wi-LAN’s disclosure of the letter was an intentional effort to convince LG to revise its position and pay royalties. Wi-LAN later sued for patent infringement, identifying Townsend as litigation counsel. LG served a subpoena on Townsend for documents and testimony relating to the subject matter of the letter, claiming that any privilege was absolutely waived by voluntary disclosure of the letter. Townsend unsuccessfully argued that any waiver should be limited to the letter. The district court found Townsend in contempt, and entered sanctions in the amount of LG’s costs and fees. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court erred by rejecting considerations of fairness: whether LG would be unfairly prejudiced by assertion of privilege beyond the four corners of the letter. View "Wi-LAN, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Knowles, alleging misconduct relating to her representation of a client in immigration and civil matters. Specifically, the Bar cited Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.3 (diligence), 4-1.6 (confidentiality of information), 4-3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). In a motion to withdraw as attorney of record, Knowles had made disparaging statements about the client; she then told the client that she would continue the representation only if the client paid an additional $1,500. When the client decided to retain new counsel, Knowles made additional claims, including telling the Department of Homeland Security that she had reason to believe her client would lie to the Immigration Court. Knowles disclosed confidential paperwork pertaining to the client’s political asylum case; failed to appear at mediation in the client’s injury case, and failed to advise her client that a final judgment had been entered. A referee recommended that Knowles be suspended from the practice of law for 90days and attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School and a professionalism workshop. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that a one-year suspension was the appropriate sanction. View "Florida Bar v. Knowles" on Justia Law

Judge Nelson was observed driving a vehicle erratically, weaving between lanes, striking a guardrail several times, and ultimately crashing on a bridge. After initially identifying herself as a judge to the police officer at the scene, she explained to the officer that she lost control of the vehicle because she was talking on her cellular phone. However, the officer smelled alcohol on her breath, and noticed that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Her clothes were in disarray. At first, Judge Nelson was unable to tell the officer where she was coming from or where she was going, but she later recalled that she may have been at a restaurant. She refused to exit the vehicle and refused to submit to field sobriety exercises. Judge Nelson was taken to the county jail where she refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. The Notice of Formal Charges stated that these acts, if they occurred as alleged, were in violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Florida Supreme Court recommended a sanction of public reprimand. View "Inquiry Concerning A Judge" on Justia Law

Delhall, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, unlawful use of a firearm, unlawful discharge of the firearm resulting in death or serious bodily harm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the jury trial the State presented evidence that Delhall murdered the victim because he was, at that time, the only known eyewitness to the murder of another individual (Bennett) with which Delhall’s brother was charged. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court entered an order sentencing Delhall to death. The Florida Supreme Court vacated the sentence, stating that the prosecutor, “by her overzealous and unfair advocacy, appeared to be committed to winning a death recommendation rather than simply seeking justice.” Her improper advocacy continued even after an objection was sustained. In one instance, the judge was forced to step in and specifically admonish her to stop it. Cumulative errors fundamentally tainted the guilt phase, which was especially significant in view of the fact that the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four, a recommendation that was far from unanimous. View "Delhall v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against a law firm and its attorneys for their role in executing civil discovery orders. The orders authorized entry into Plaintiffs' home to seize electronic files from Plaintiffs' computer and other electronic devices. Plaintiffs raised several causes of action based largely on the theory that the execution of the civil discovery orders constituted an illegal warrantless search. The district court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) the judicial proceedings privilege extends to attorneys' conduct in representing their clients; and (2) as applied in this case, the privilege barred all of Plaintiffs' claims. View "Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless" on Justia Law

Pro se Defendant Mary Y. Seguin challenged a Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Jessup & Conroy, P.C. (the law firm), on her counterclaim in this collection action. In late 2001, Seguin retained the law firm to represent her in two Rhode Island Family Court matters, a divorce action involving her former husband, Marc Seguin, and a paternity action involving her former boss at a prior place of employment. The law firm entered its appearance in both cases. Soon thereafter, Defendant received a large cash settlement from her former employer. Mr. Seguin successfully entreated a Family Court justice to impound the settlement as a marital asset and to place the funds in an escrow account with the children's guardian ad litem. Over the next year, litigation ensued in both Family Court matters; ultimately, the law firm withdrew as counsel for Defendant in the two cases, citing Defendant's repeated requests that the law firm file baseless motions, as well as her refusal to pay over $30,000 in legal fees for services rendered. Defendant and her former husband signed an addendum to their property-settlement agreement, which stipulated that any funds held in escrow were to be deposited in equal shares into irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of the minor daughter fathered by Mr. Seguin. That August, both Seguin and Mr. Seguin requested, via correspondence to the law firm, that the law firm release all escrowed funds to them personally. However, the law firm declined to honor that request based on the addendum's provision that the escrow funds be deposited into irrevocable trusts. After a repeated request from Defendant and her former husband coupled with the imposition of a Family Court sanction upon Defendant in the paternity action, the law firm filed a motion for instructions in the divorce action, seeking guidance from the Family Court in regard to distribution of the escrow funds at issue. A Family Court justice ordered the law firm to provide an accounting of the funds and to deposit them into irrevocable trusts as set forth in the addendum. The law firm complied by providing an accounting of the funds and deposited the money into two trust accounts. Subsequently, the law firm filed a complaint against Defendant seeking to recover unpaid legal fees. In response, Defendant filed an answer, as well as a counterclaim, setting forth fifteen counts against the law firm, including: (1) false advertising; (2) deceptive trade practices; (3) fraud; (4) wire fraud; (5) mail fraud; (6) RICO violations; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) breach of fiduciary duty by trustee; (9) breach of trust; (10) grand theft; (11) tampering with/altering legal records; (12) legal malpractice; (13) negligence; (14) breach of contract; and (15) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After hearing from both parties, the motion justice concluded that Defendant had failed to meet her burden in opposing Plaintiff's motion. Defendant appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Defendant indeed failed to meet her burden to defeat Plaintiff's motion. View "Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a binding arbitration clause in an attorney-client retainer agreement and whether that clause was enforceable where the client filed suit for legal malpractice. This case presented two important countervailing public policies: Louisiana and federal law explicitly favor the enforcement of arbitration clauses in written contracts; by the same token, Louisiana law also imposes a fiduciary duty "of the highest order" requiring attorneys to act with "the utmost fidelity and forthrightness" in their dealings with clients, and any contractual clause which may limit the client's rights against the attorney is subject to close scrutiny. After its careful study, the Supreme Court held there is no per se rule against arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements, provided the clause is fair and reasonable to the client. However, the attorneys' fiduciary obligation to the client encompasses ethical duties of loyalty and candor, which in turn require attorneys to fully disclose the scope and the terms of the arbitration clause. An attorney must clearly explain the precise types of disputes the arbitration clause is meant to cover and must set forth, in plain language, those legal rights the parties will give up by agreeing to arbitration. In this case, the Defendants did not make the necessary disclosures, thus, the arbitration clause was unenforceable. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "Hodges v. Reasonover" on Justia Law