Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Knowles, alleging misconduct relating to her representation of a client in immigration and civil matters. Specifically, the Bar cited Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.3 (diligence), 4-1.6 (confidentiality of information), 4-3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 4-8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). In a motion to withdraw as attorney of record, Knowles had made disparaging statements about the client; she then told the client that she would continue the representation only if the client paid an additional $1,500. When the client decided to retain new counsel, Knowles made additional claims, including telling the Department of Homeland Security that she had reason to believe her client would lie to the Immigration Court. Knowles disclosed confidential paperwork pertaining to the client’s political asylum case; failed to appear at mediation in the client’s injury case, and failed to advise her client that a final judgment had been entered. A referee recommended that Knowles be suspended from the practice of law for 90days and attend the Florida Bar’s Ethics School and a professionalism workshop. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that a one-year suspension was the appropriate sanction. View "Florida Bar v. Knowles" on Justia Law

Judge Nelson was observed driving a vehicle erratically, weaving between lanes, striking a guardrail several times, and ultimately crashing on a bridge. After initially identifying herself as a judge to the police officer at the scene, she explained to the officer that she lost control of the vehicle because she was talking on her cellular phone. However, the officer smelled alcohol on her breath, and noticed that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Her clothes were in disarray. At first, Judge Nelson was unable to tell the officer where she was coming from or where she was going, but she later recalled that she may have been at a restaurant. She refused to exit the vehicle and refused to submit to field sobriety exercises. Judge Nelson was taken to the county jail where she refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. The Notice of Formal Charges stated that these acts, if they occurred as alleged, were in violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Florida Supreme Court recommended a sanction of public reprimand. View "Inquiry Concerning A Judge" on Justia Law

Delhall, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, unlawful use of a firearm, unlawful discharge of the firearm resulting in death or serious bodily harm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the jury trial the State presented evidence that Delhall murdered the victim because he was, at that time, the only known eyewitness to the murder of another individual (Bennett) with which Delhall’s brother was charged. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court entered an order sentencing Delhall to death. The Florida Supreme Court vacated the sentence, stating that the prosecutor, “by her overzealous and unfair advocacy, appeared to be committed to winning a death recommendation rather than simply seeking justice.” Her improper advocacy continued even after an objection was sustained. In one instance, the judge was forced to step in and specifically admonish her to stop it. Cumulative errors fundamentally tainted the guilt phase, which was especially significant in view of the fact that the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four, a recommendation that was far from unanimous. View "Delhall v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against a law firm and its attorneys for their role in executing civil discovery orders. The orders authorized entry into Plaintiffs' home to seize electronic files from Plaintiffs' computer and other electronic devices. Plaintiffs raised several causes of action based largely on the theory that the execution of the civil discovery orders constituted an illegal warrantless search. The district court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) the judicial proceedings privilege extends to attorneys' conduct in representing their clients; and (2) as applied in this case, the privilege barred all of Plaintiffs' claims. View "Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless" on Justia Law

Pro se Defendant Mary Y. Seguin challenged a Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Jessup & Conroy, P.C. (the law firm), on her counterclaim in this collection action. In late 2001, Seguin retained the law firm to represent her in two Rhode Island Family Court matters, a divorce action involving her former husband, Marc Seguin, and a paternity action involving her former boss at a prior place of employment. The law firm entered its appearance in both cases. Soon thereafter, Defendant received a large cash settlement from her former employer. Mr. Seguin successfully entreated a Family Court justice to impound the settlement as a marital asset and to place the funds in an escrow account with the children's guardian ad litem. Over the next year, litigation ensued in both Family Court matters; ultimately, the law firm withdrew as counsel for Defendant in the two cases, citing Defendant's repeated requests that the law firm file baseless motions, as well as her refusal to pay over $30,000 in legal fees for services rendered. Defendant and her former husband signed an addendum to their property-settlement agreement, which stipulated that any funds held in escrow were to be deposited in equal shares into irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of the minor daughter fathered by Mr. Seguin. That August, both Seguin and Mr. Seguin requested, via correspondence to the law firm, that the law firm release all escrowed funds to them personally. However, the law firm declined to honor that request based on the addendum's provision that the escrow funds be deposited into irrevocable trusts. After a repeated request from Defendant and her former husband coupled with the imposition of a Family Court sanction upon Defendant in the paternity action, the law firm filed a motion for instructions in the divorce action, seeking guidance from the Family Court in regard to distribution of the escrow funds at issue. A Family Court justice ordered the law firm to provide an accounting of the funds and to deposit them into irrevocable trusts as set forth in the addendum. The law firm complied by providing an accounting of the funds and deposited the money into two trust accounts. Subsequently, the law firm filed a complaint against Defendant seeking to recover unpaid legal fees. In response, Defendant filed an answer, as well as a counterclaim, setting forth fifteen counts against the law firm, including: (1) false advertising; (2) deceptive trade practices; (3) fraud; (4) wire fraud; (5) mail fraud; (6) RICO violations; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) breach of fiduciary duty by trustee; (9) breach of trust; (10) grand theft; (11) tampering with/altering legal records; (12) legal malpractice; (13) negligence; (14) breach of contract; and (15) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After hearing from both parties, the motion justice concluded that Defendant had failed to meet her burden in opposing Plaintiff's motion. Defendant appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Defendant indeed failed to meet her burden to defeat Plaintiff's motion. View "Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a binding arbitration clause in an attorney-client retainer agreement and whether that clause was enforceable where the client filed suit for legal malpractice. This case presented two important countervailing public policies: Louisiana and federal law explicitly favor the enforcement of arbitration clauses in written contracts; by the same token, Louisiana law also imposes a fiduciary duty "of the highest order" requiring attorneys to act with "the utmost fidelity and forthrightness" in their dealings with clients, and any contractual clause which may limit the client's rights against the attorney is subject to close scrutiny. After its careful study, the Supreme Court held there is no per se rule against arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements, provided the clause is fair and reasonable to the client. However, the attorneys' fiduciary obligation to the client encompasses ethical duties of loyalty and candor, which in turn require attorneys to fully disclose the scope and the terms of the arbitration clause. An attorney must clearly explain the precise types of disputes the arbitration clause is meant to cover and must set forth, in plain language, those legal rights the parties will give up by agreeing to arbitration. In this case, the Defendants did not make the necessary disclosures, thus, the arbitration clause was unenforceable. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "Hodges v. Reasonover" on Justia Law

This case concerned the scope of absolute privilege that grants immunity to litigants and their attorneys from being sued for defamation based on public statements they make about a judicial proceedings either before or after the proceeding is filed. Specifically, the issues before the Supreme Court in this case were: (1) whether pre-litigation statements made by an attorney to prospective clients in the presence of the press regarding a potential mass-tort lawsuit; and (2) whether statements made directly to the press by an attorney or party after such lawsuit was filed, are absolutely privileged, thus barring any lawsuit for defamation. The district court found in the affirmative on these issues and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision, finding that absolute privilege did not apply to statements made before or after a complaint was filed when the statements were made before the press. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that absolute privilege indeed does apply to pre-litigation statements made by attorneys in the presence of the press if (1) the speaker is seriously and in good faith contemplating a lawsuit at the time the statement was made; (2) the statement is reasonably related to the proposed litigation; (3) the attorney has a client or identifiable prospective clients at the time the statement was made; and (4) the statement is made while the attorney is acting in the capacity of counsel or prospective counsel. View "Helena Chemical Co. v. Uribe" on Justia Law

A 2007 conveyance of commercial property in Milton was characterized by mistakes, starting with an error-filled purchase offer, so that the deed ultimately conveyed a residential parcel that was not owned by the seller at the time of conveyance and that the seller did not intend to convey. In an opinion characterized as “unpleasant to write,” the chancellor declared the purported conveyance a nullity and noted that the “matter has been litigated far beyond what a rational evaluation of its costs and potential benefits would dictate.” The chancellor found that the deed, purporting to transfer the residential parcel, was altered by the buyer’s attorney, to the detriment of the seller and without the effective consent of the seller and was ineffective to convey any property. The actual deed signed by the parties contained a reference to the residential parcel by tax number, but omitted that property from the metes and bounds description. View "Point Mgmt., LLC v. MacLaren, LLC" on Justia Law

Draughon was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1987. In 1993, he formed NLMC to purchase property for $315,000, and lease it to a client. The seller, Onusic, received a $7,500 down payment and accepted a promissory note which required NLMC to make monthly payments. Onusic signed the deed with the understanding that Draughon would hold the deed in escrow and not record it until she received full payment. In 1997, Draughon recorded the deed. In 2001, Draughon transferred the property from NLMC to himself, took out a mortgage of $274,975, and used the money to pay personal tax liabilities; none of the funds were used to pay the $110,000 owed Onusic. In 2003 Onusic filed suit, but Draughon filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found actual intent to defraud. A referee recommended that Draughon be found guilty of violating Bar Rule 3-4.3: commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether committed in the course of the attorney’s relations as an attorney or otherwise. The referee recommended that Draughon be found not guilty of violating Rule 4-4.3(a) concerning dealings with persons not represented by counsel, and recommended public reprimand. The supreme court imposed a one-year suspension. View "FL Bar v. Draughon" on Justia Law

In 1995, Sheikh Abdel Rahman was convicted of soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Mubarak while he was visiting New York; attacking American military installations; conspiring to murder President Mubarak; conspiring in the successful 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center; conspiring to bomb other New York structures; and conspiring to commit sedition. His conviction was affirmed in 1999. Stewart was a member of his legal team and agreed to "Special Administrative Measures." Despite those obligations, Stewart smuggled messages to and from the incarcerated Sheikh, mostly relating to continuance of a ceasefire that an Egyptian militant group had declared on violent efforts to overthrow the Egyptian government. Stewart was convicted of conspiring to defraud the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 371; providing and concealing material support to a conspiracy to kill and kidnap persons in a foreign country, 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 18 U.S.C. 2; conspiracy to provide and conceal such support, 18 U.S.C. 371; and making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The Second Circuit affirmed but remanded for resentencing. On remand, he court determined that the Guidelines sentence was 360 months, which was also the statutory maximum, and imposed a sentence of 120 months. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law