Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Judicial Conduct Commission recommended a reprimand against the Honorable Keith L. Stoney due to the issuance of an excessive warrant. Judge Stoney argued before the Supreme Court that the excessive amount of the warrant was a mistake not amounting to misconduct. The court agreed and declined to discipline Judge Stoney, holding (1) the record evidence did not support the Commission's conclusion that Judge Stoney issued a warrant with improper intent; (2) Judge Stoney's mistake did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct; and (3) because parties to a judicial discipline proceeding are not required to marshal evidence, the Court did not need to dismiss Judge Stoney's brief for failure to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's order. View "In re J. Stoney" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sex offenses against his wife’s daughter in Henry County. While still married, he had moved in with another woman in Rock Island County and was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against her nine-year-old daughter. In the Henry County case, the state introduced testimony about the Rock Island crime and the conviction. Defendant was again convicted. In both prosecutions, defendant was represented by the same attorney. On appeal of his Henry County conviction, he alleged that his lawyer had a per se conflict of interest because the Rock Island victim, who also testified at the Henry County trial, had been represented by this attorney in the capacity of guardian ad litem in an unrelated matter. The appellate court remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the conviction. A per se conflict of interest, requiring automatic reversal, does not require proof of impact on the attorney’s performance. The guardian ad litem involvement with the witness was long over when defendant was tried and the witness, as person, could not be considered an “entity” assisting the prosecution.View "People v. Fields" on Justia Law

Rodgetta Colvin Jett n/k/a Octavia R. Cantelow-Jett ("Jett") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against her in a legal-malpractice action against attorney James M. Wooten and his law firm, the Law Offices of James M. Wooten, P.C. ("Wooten P.C."). Jett was injured when she fell down the stairs while leaving a YMCA facility in Birmingham. Jett filed a legal-malpractice action against the Wooten defendants as a result of their failure to initiate legal actions on her behalf against the YMCA before the limitations period expired on those claims. The trial court thereafter entered a summary judgment in favor of the Wooten defendants, holding that Jett's claims against them were themselves barred by the two-year statute of limitations that applied to Alabama Legal Services Act (ALSA) claims because Jett did not initiate her action until December 30, 2010, more than two years after the two YMCA incidents. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALSA tolled the statute of limitations and that the two-year period in which Jett could initiate an action against the Wooten defendants based on Wooten's failure to file actions against the YMCA did not begin to run until Jett discovered that Wooten had not filed the legal actions she alleged he told her he had filed. Accordingly, her lawsuit against the Wooten defendants was timely filed. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Jett v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Todd attempted to purchase claims against a collection agency (Franklin) from Fletcher. He then sued Franklin. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the assignment was void because Todd was using it merely to attempt to practice law without a license and that Todd failed to state a claim for relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The assignment was void as against public policy. Illinois public policy forbids the assignment of legal claims to non-attorneys in order to litigate without a license. Undisputed evidence showed that Todd created a business providing legal advice and repeatedly agreed to purchase claims in order to litigate. Even if the assignment was not void, Todd failed to state a claim. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act preempts state-law claims, 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Todd did not attempt could not bring a claim directly under the FCRA because the section Franklin allegedly violated does not create a private right of action. View "Todd v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Elusta sued tChicago and police officers for excessive force, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He first retained Cerda and De Leon, who conducted discovery and obtained a settlement offer of $100,000. Elusta rejected this offer, apparently because his retainer contained a 40% contingent fee provision. The district court permitted the attorneys to withdraw. Elusta retained Smith and Genson. A jury found in Elusta’s favor on two counts and awarded $40,000. Smith and Genson petitioned for attorney’s fees on behalf of Elusta pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. Before the court could rule, Elusta retained new attorneys, Johnson and Gentleman, to litigate the fee issue. They sought direct payment of some of the fees to Elusta, rather than to Smith and Genson. Smith and Genson’s petition languished for nearly 16 months before Cerda and De Leon filed sought fees, asserting an attorney’s lien or a right to recover under quantum meruit. The court granted Smith and Genson’s request for $82,696.50 under section1988. Cerda and De Leon had not perfected an attorneys’ lien, but the court allowed recovery of $15,000 in quantum meruit. The court rejected Elusta’s motion to have 60% of both amounts paid to him directly. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Elusta v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Goldberg, a medical malpractice attorney, appeared before Judge Maloney in several cases. Following complaints that Goldberg concealed assets and retained unearned fees, Maloney ordered Goldberg to pay the estates involved. Goldberg failed to do so. Maloney directed him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Following a hearing, Maloney found Goldberg to be in criminal contempt and cited Goldberg for attempting to suborn witnesses, charges that did not appear on the hearing notice. Goldberg received a sentence of 18 months. An Ohio appellate court affirmed. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Goldberg argued for the first time that he had not received sufficient notice of the charges and ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to raise this notice claim. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2004, the district court granted habeas relief on the basis that Goldberg received constitutionally inadequate notice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Goldberg had procedurally defaulted on his lack-of-notice claim by failing to raise it in the state court of appeals. On remand, the district court determined that Goldberg had not demonstrated sufficient cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default, and denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Goldberg v. Maloney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought review of the SSA's denial of his application for social security disability benefits. The federal magistrate judge who presided over plaintiff's action determined that the agency's decision improperly disregarded the opinions of an examining psychologist and remanded to the agency. Plaintiff sought reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The magistrate judge granted the request in part but determined that the 60.5 hours plaintiff's attorneys spent working on the case were excessive and subsequently reduced the number of hours by nearly one-third. The court held that it was improper for district courts to apply a de facto cap on the number of hours for which attorneys could be compensated under the EAJA in a "routine" case challenging the denial of social security benefits. Rather individualized consideration must be given to each case. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Costa v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin." on Justia Law

Appellants, attorney Barbara Bonar and her law firm, claimed entitlement to a portion of the attorney's fees awarded in a class action settlement. Bonar and Appellees, a law firm and attorneys, initiated the class action as co-counsel. Before the settlement was negotiated, Bonar withdrew. Bonar claimed she was forced to withdraw. Following a bench trial, the circuit court concluded Bonar was not entitled to any of the attorney's fees because her withdrawal was voluntary. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the weight of the evidence supported the conclusion that Bonar withdrew from the case voluntarily, and therefore, Bonar was not entitled to any portion of the attorney's fees awarded to class counsel; (2) the trial court did not improperly limit discovery; and (3) the trial court did not violate Bonar's right to a fair trial by commenting on Bonar's conduct. View "B. Dahlenburg Bonar, P.S.C. v. Waite, Schneier, Bayless & Chesley Co., LPA" on Justia Law

Russell D. Alred, judge of the 26th judicial circuit of Kentucky, became the focus of a lengthy investigation by the judicial conduct commission, culminating in formal charges consisting of twenty allegations of misconduct in office. Following an adversarial hearing on these charges, the commission found official misconduct on nine of the charges and ordered Judge Alred removed from office. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order of the commission as to eight counts of official misconduct and the commission's decision to remove Judge Alred from office, holding that there was good cause to remove Judge Alred from his judicial office for misconduct; but (2) reversed the commission's findings and legal conclusions as to Count V, holding that the commission's findings regarding Count V were not supported by sufficient evidence. View "Alred v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Miller, a Fund beneficiary, fell from a ladder and was injured. He hired attorney Darr on a contingent fee basis to sue the person who was supposed to hold the ladder. The Fund advanced $86,709.73 in medical and disability benefits on the condition that Miller repay from any recovery, without deducting attorneys’ fees. Miller and Darr, signed a subrogation agreement. The lawsuit settled for $500,000. Calculating his fee based on $413,290.27, Darr submitted $57,806.48 to the Fund, stating that he was withholding $28,903.25 as a fee. To avoid jeopardizing Miller’s benefits Darr later submitted the $28,903.25. The Fund indicated that if Darr pursued his claim, it would consider Darr and Miller in breach of Plan terms and in repudiation of the subrogation agreement and would consider terminating coverage and seeking relief under ERISA. Darr sued the Fund in Illinois state court under the common fund doctrine, which permits a party who creates a fund in which others have an interest to obtain reimbursement for litigation expenses incurred in creating that fund. The district court enjoined Darr’s lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A federal court may not enjoin “proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments,” 28 U.S.C. 2283.View "Trs. of the Carptenters' Health & Welfare Trust v. Darr" on Justia Law