Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a petition in the county court seeking an investigation into alleged misconduct of an assistant clerk of the court and a determination that he violated his obligation under the Code of Professional Responsibility for Clerks of the Courts. A single justice ordered that the petition be dismissed on the ground that there is no right to bring a private action in court to obtain discipline of a clerk. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although a private individual may file a complaint with the Board of Bar Overseers or the Committee on Professional Responsibility for Clerks of the Courts, there is no private right to operate the disciplinary process. View "Gorbatova v. First Assistant Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are minority limited partners in Urban Shopping Centers, L.P., in which defendants acquired a majority interest in 2002. Plaintiffs allege breach of fiduciary and contractual duties, claiming that, pursuant to the operating agreement, defendants were not to compete with them in business opportunities. They alleged that defendants stopped growing plaintiffs’ business, disregarded partnership agreement terms, and stole plaintiffs’ opportunities. During discovery, plaintiffs moved to compel production of documents concerning business negotiations in which each defendant’s attorney discussed with nonclients liability and obligations as Urban’s general partner and use of a “synthetic partnership” to avoid partnership obligations. Defendants claimed privilege, but plaintiffs argued that, having disclosed legal advice on these subjects with each other outside of any confidential relationship, defendants could not later object that those subjects were privileged. The motion was granted; defendants refused to comply and were held in contempt. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed, holding that attorney-client privilege had not been waived because the sought-after disclosures had occurred in an extrajudicial context and were not thereafter used by the clients to gain a tactical advantage in litigation. The “subject-matter waiver” doctrine was not shown to be applicable.View "Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, " on Justia Law

The Church appealed a sanction order granting attorneys' fees and costs to appellees. The court held that appellant did not take reasonable steps to avoid imposing an undue burden on appellees, who were non-parties to the underlying case. In reversing the sanctions order, the court held that Rule 45(c)(1) could not properly support a sanction where the cost of complying with the subpoena was minimal and there was no showing that the subpoena was facially defective or issued in bad faith. View "Mount Hope Church, et al v. Bash Back!" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted this appeal to determined whether a lawyer's potential violation of the ethical rule governing communications with a person represented by another lawyer constitutes criminal contempt pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 29-9-102(1),(2). The trial court in this case convicted the attorney of criminal contempt. The attorney appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the "misbehavior" element of criminal contempt pursuant to section 29-9-102(1). The court of criminal appeals found the evidence sufficient and upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of criminal appeals and vacated the attorney's conviction, holding that although a lawyer's violation of an ethical rule may in some circumstances amount to criminal contempt, the attorney's potential violation of the ethical rule governing communications with a person represented by another lawyer did not constitute criminal contempt pursuant to section 29-9-102(1),(2) because the evidence of "willful misbehavior" was insufficient to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Beeler" on Justia Law

The City of White Plains and certain individually named law-enforcement officers appealed from an award of $290,997.94 in costs, of which some $286,065.00 represented attorneys' fees, awarded in connection with a $30,000 judgment for plaintiffs ordered pursuant to an offer judgment under Rule 68. Defendants contended that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees because (1) their Rule 68 offer of judgment to settle "all claims" should have been interpreted to encompass costs, including attorney's fees; and (2) the fee award bore no relationship to plaintiffs' degree of success in the litigation. The court held that the Supreme Court's ruling in Marek v. Chesny compelled rejection of the first argument. As to the second, the court's "highly deferential" review of attorney's fees awards coupled with defendants' failure to adequately advance the issue, compelled its rejection. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Barbour v. City of White Plains" on Justia Law

To help defendants resist child-pornography charges, technology expert and lawyer Boland downloaded images of children from a stock photography website and digitally imposed the children’s faces onto the bodies of adults performing sex acts. Boland’s aim was to show that the defendants may not have known they were viewing child pornography. When the parents of the children involved found out about the images, they sued Boland under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(f) and 2255. Section 2252A(f) provides a civil remedy to “[a]ny person aggrieved” by child pornography, while 2255 provides a civil remedy of at least $150,000 in damages to minor victims who suffer a “personal injury” from various sex crimes. The district court granted summary judgment to the parents and awarded $300,000 in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If Boland felt compelled to make his point with pornography, he could have used images of adults or virtual children. Instead, he chose an option Congress explicitly forbade: the choice was not protected by the First Amendment. View "Doe v. Boland" on Justia Law

Respondent Walter Martin was presiding over bond court when one of the defendants before him questioned the bond set. Respondent became upset with the defendant and asked the defendant whether he was calling respondent a liar. When the defendant responded, "[n]o, I'm not going anywhere," respondent replied, "[o]kay. Because I'll beat your ass if you call me a liar." Respondent immediately apologized to the defendant. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) charged Respondent with misconduct. Respondent regretted his comment, and the parties entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent whereby Respondent admitted to the misconduct, and consented to the imposition of a public reprimand, admonition, or letter of caution. The Supreme Court accepted the Agreement and issued a public reprimand. View "In the Matter of Greenwood County Magistrate Walter Martin" on Justia Law

Tim Wilborn appealed the reduction of attorneys' fees he earned while representing plaintiff in a Social Security benefits claim. At issue was whether Wilborn received fees for the same work under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, and the Social Security Act (SSA), 42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1). The court held that the $5,000 award under the EAJA was for the "same work" as the work for which Wilborn received the section 406(b)(1) award, and therefore the district court correctly offset the $5,000 from the 25% award. View "Parrish v. Commissioner Social Security" on Justia Law

The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission filed the present complaint against Jacqueline Waymack, judge of the sixth judicial district, pursuant to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Commission asserted that its charges against Judge Waymack for allegedly violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct were well founded in fact and that the violations were of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for censure or removal by the Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Judge Waymack engaged in either "misconduct" or "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice" under Va. Const. art. VI, 10. View "Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Waymack" on Justia Law

Chicago issued plaintiff, Downtown Disposal, notices for violating ordinances pertaining to dumpsters and requiring Downtown Disposal to appear at administrative hearings on various dates. When Downtown Disposal failed to appear, the department of administrative hearings entered default judgments for costs and penalties. Van Tholen, president of Downtown Disposal, moved to set aside the judgments, alleging the company did not receive notice. At a consolidated hearing, Van Tholen advised the hearing officer that for five years, Downtown Disposal had made several attempts to change its address on file with the city, but the city had not changed its records. The hearing officer rejected the argument. Van Tholen filled out and signed pro se complaints for administrative review, using preprinted forms supplied by the clerk’s office. Attorney Boonstra later filed appearances on behalf of Downtown Disposal. The trial court dismissed, holding that actions filed by nonattorneys on behalf of a corporation are null and void. The appellate court reversed and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. An attorney’s signature was not jurisdictional and its absence did not render the proceedings null and void. Application of the nullity rule would be harsh since no purpose underlying the rule was implicated and an alternative remedy was available. View "Downtown Disposal Servs. Inc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law