Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The underlying case in this matter concerned a property dispute between BNSF Railway (BNSF) and Roy D. Mercer, LLC (Mercer) and the interpretation of an easement. BNSF claimed a right to construct large berms on Mercer's property (to divert water from railroad tracks) pursuant to a 1936 easement granted to BNSF's predecessor in interest by Mercer's predecessor in interest. BNSF hired Gandy Dancer, LLC to construct the new berms. Mercer objected and threatened to remove them. Relying upon its easement claim, BNSF filed suit in state court against Mercer seeking to enjoin Mercer from removing the berms and requesting damages. Mercer filed a counterclaim against BNSF for tort damages and inverse condemnation, and joined Gandy Dancer as a party defendant for trespass, negligence, and prima facie tort. Once joined as a party, Gandy Dancer, through its attorneys Riley, Shane & Keller, P.C. (Riley Law Firm), removed the matter to federal court. Upon removal, Mercer hired the Wagner Ford Law Firm. At that time, the firm consisted of attorneys Kenneth Wagner and Lisa Ford. Although the firm was named "Wagner Ford," Ford was only an associate. In January 2010, Mercer added another law firm, Law & Resource Planning Associates, P.C. (the LRPA Law Firm) to represent it in the state court proceeding because of water law issues involved in that case. The Wagner Ford Law Firm ceased representing Mercer in late 2010. In late June 2012, while the state court proceeding was ongoing, the LRPA law firm learned via the Riley firm's website that the Riley firm had hired Ford as a new associate. LRPA promptly sent a letter to the Riley firm raising Ford's conflict of interest and stating that the Riley firm could no longer represent Gandy Dancer in the litigation with Mercer, Ford's former client. The Riley firm filed a motion in the state case seeking judicial approval of a Rule 16-110(C) screening process for Ford that Riley believed would allow its continued representation of Gandy Dancer. The court found that Ford had previously represented Mercer in the same or a substantially similar matter, her role was substantial, and she had a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the district court found that the equities favored Gandy Dancer and declined to disqualify the Riley firm. Mercer appealed the district court's decision not to disqualify the Riley Firm. In interpreting and applying the rule to this case, the Supreme Court held that when an attorney has played a substantial role on one side of a lawsuit and subsequently joins a law firm on the opposing side of that lawsuit, both the lawyer and the new firm are disqualified from any further representation, absent informed consent of the former client. "We also specifically conclude under the same rule that screening the new attorney from any involvement in the lawsuit is not an adequate response to the conflict." View "Mercer v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Respondent was a candidate for judge of the fifth district court of appeals of Ohio for the six-year term beginning February 11, 2013. Respondent won in the primary election but lost in the general election. A five-member judicial commission appointed by the Supreme Court concluded that the record before a hearing panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline supported the panel's finding that Respondent violated several provisions of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct during her campaign by using campaign flyers depicting Respondent wearing a judicial robe. The Supreme Court agreed with the commission that the finding of professional misconduct was supported by the record and affirmed the sanctions imposed by the commission of a $1000 fine and $2500 in attorney fees. View "In re Moll" on Justia Law

After the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct began an attorney discipline proceeding against Donald Gilbert, Gilbert moved to implead the Utah Down Syndrome Foundation pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 14(a). The district court granted the motion. The Foundation filed a motion for summary judgment challenging the propriety of impleader and claiming that res judicata barred the causes of action in Gilbert's third-party complaint. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment, holding (1) the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline do not permit litigation of collateral matters in attorney discipline proceedings; and (2) therefore, impleader was improper in this case. View "In re Gilbert" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Luann Landry (St. Bernard Parish, Ward E) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Landry failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Landry was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00, plus costs of $554.00. View "In re Justice of the Peace Luann Landry" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Stacie P. Myers (Point Coupee Parish, District 4) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010.Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Myers failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Myers was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $1,500.00. View "In re Justice of the Peace Stacie Myers" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet (Calcasieu Parish, Ward 6) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record established by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Threet failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting him to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Threet was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $2,500.00, plus costs of $253.20. In addition, Justice of the Peace Threet was ordered to file his financial disclosure statement for 2010. View "In Re: Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition in the county court seeking an investigation into alleged misconduct of an assistant clerk of the court and a determination that he violated his obligation under the Code of Professional Responsibility for Clerks of the Courts. A single justice ordered that the petition be dismissed on the ground that there is no right to bring a private action in court to obtain discipline of a clerk. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although a private individual may file a complaint with the Board of Bar Overseers or the Committee on Professional Responsibility for Clerks of the Courts, there is no private right to operate the disciplinary process. View "Gorbatova v. First Assistant Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are minority limited partners in Urban Shopping Centers, L.P., in which defendants acquired a majority interest in 2002. Plaintiffs allege breach of fiduciary and contractual duties, claiming that, pursuant to the operating agreement, defendants were not to compete with them in business opportunities. They alleged that defendants stopped growing plaintiffs’ business, disregarded partnership agreement terms, and stole plaintiffs’ opportunities. During discovery, plaintiffs moved to compel production of documents concerning business negotiations in which each defendant’s attorney discussed with nonclients liability and obligations as Urban’s general partner and use of a “synthetic partnership” to avoid partnership obligations. Defendants claimed privilege, but plaintiffs argued that, having disclosed legal advice on these subjects with each other outside of any confidential relationship, defendants could not later object that those subjects were privileged. The motion was granted; defendants refused to comply and were held in contempt. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed, holding that attorney-client privilege had not been waived because the sought-after disclosures had occurred in an extrajudicial context and were not thereafter used by the clients to gain a tactical advantage in litigation. The “subject-matter waiver” doctrine was not shown to be applicable.View "Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, " on Justia Law

The Church appealed a sanction order granting attorneys' fees and costs to appellees. The court held that appellant did not take reasonable steps to avoid imposing an undue burden on appellees, who were non-parties to the underlying case. In reversing the sanctions order, the court held that Rule 45(c)(1) could not properly support a sanction where the cost of complying with the subpoena was minimal and there was no showing that the subpoena was facially defective or issued in bad faith. View "Mount Hope Church, et al v. Bash Back!" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted this appeal to determined whether a lawyer's potential violation of the ethical rule governing communications with a person represented by another lawyer constitutes criminal contempt pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 29-9-102(1),(2). The trial court in this case convicted the attorney of criminal contempt. The attorney appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the "misbehavior" element of criminal contempt pursuant to section 29-9-102(1). The court of criminal appeals found the evidence sufficient and upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of criminal appeals and vacated the attorney's conviction, holding that although a lawyer's violation of an ethical rule may in some circumstances amount to criminal contempt, the attorney's potential violation of the ethical rule governing communications with a person represented by another lawyer did not constitute criminal contempt pursuant to section 29-9-102(1),(2) because the evidence of "willful misbehavior" was insufficient to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Beeler" on Justia Law