Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellant, the representative of a decedent's estate, hired attorneys David Mushlin and William Nefzger and their law firm to pursue a medical negligence claim against a hospital and several physicians. The trial court later disqualified Mushlin on the ground that Mushlin's prior representation of the hospital was sufficient to create a conflict of interest or at least the appearance of impropriety. The court also noted that Nefzger and the entire firm were conflicted because Mushlin could not effectively be screened from the case and there was a great likelihood of his having constant contact with the other attorneys who would be working on the case in his stead. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show she would suffer great injustice and irreparable injury from the trial court's order disqualifying her lawyer and his law firm from representing her. View "Robertson v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

In an infringement suit, the district court declared Minton’s patent invalid under the “on sale” bar since he had leased his interactive securities trading system to a brokerage more than one year before the patent application, 35 U. S. C. 102(b). Seeking reconsideration, Minton argued for the first time that the lease was part of testing and fell within the “experimental use” exception to the bar. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, concluding that the argument was waived. Minton sued for legal malpractice in Texas state court. His former attorneys argued that Minton’s claims would have failed even if the experimental-use argument had been timely raised. The trial court agreed. Minton then claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 1338(a), which provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over any case “arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.” The Texas Court of Appeals rejected Minton’s argument and determined that Minton failed to establish experimental use. The state’s highest court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 338(a) does not deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over Minton’s malpractice claim. Federal law does not create that claim, so it can arise under federal patent law only if it necessarily raises a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which may be entertained without disturbing an approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. Resolution of a federal patent question is “necessary” to Minton’s case and the issue is “actually disputed,” but it does not carry the necessary significance. No matter the resolution of the hypothetical “case within a case,” the result of the prior patent litigation will not change. Nor will allowing state courts to resolve these cases undermine development of a uniform body of patent law. View "Gunn v. Minton" on Justia Law

In 2010 the U.S. and Wisconsin sued, alleging that defendants polluted the Lower Fox River and Green Bay with PCBs, and had liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, for response costs and destruction of natural resources, estimated at $1.5 billion. The Justice Department submitted a proposed consent decree, negotiated among the state, defendants (Brown County and the City of Green Bay), and Indian tribes. The U.S. offered $4.5 million because federal agencies might have contributed to the pollution. Menasha opposed the decree and counterclaimed against the U.S. for costs that Menasha would incur if found liable. Ordinarily a non-party to a consent decree is not bound by it, but approval of the consent decree would otherwise extinguish Menasha’s claims. Menasha sought information under the Freedom of Information Act, claiming that U.S. attorneys, being from defense and prosecution teams, actually have adverse interests, and that their communication concerning the case resulted in forfeiture of attorney work product privilege. The district court held that Menasha was entitled to the documents. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Menasha’s claim actually amounted to assertion that the federal attorneys “ganged up” to reduce federal liability and that the documents are privileged. View "Menasha Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

This case arose out alleged defamatory statements an attorney (Attorney) allegedly took in the course of investigating an underlying defamation action he was hired to defend. The legal issue was whether absolute immunity applied to Attorney's alleged defamatory statements, which were made during ex-parte, out-of-course questioning of a potential, nonparty witness. The court of appeal concluded that absolute immunity applied to Attorney's statements. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision and held (1) Florida's absolute privilege was never intended to sweep so broadly as to provide absolute immunity from liability to an attorney under the circumstances presented here; and (2) a qualified privilege instead should apply to ex-parte, out-of-court statements, so long as the alleged defamatory statements bear some relation to the subject of inquiry in the underlying lawsuit. View "DelMonico v. Traynor" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Hancock County Justice Court Judge Tommy Carver. It alleged that Judge Carver had ex parte communication with Steven K. Roche about his pending criminal case; failed to disclose such ex parte communication to the prosecutor; dismissed the charges against Roche without a hearing and without any motion to dismiss by the prosecutor; and falsified court records by noting on the file that two witnesses, Officers Bryce Gex and John Grimsley of the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources Marine Patrol, were absent when Roche's case was called for trial. A three-member committee appointed by the Commission recommended that Judge Carver be suspended thirty days from office without pay, publicly reprimanded, and assessed costs. The Commission adopted the committee's findings. After conducting an independent inquiry of the record and giving careful consideration to the findings of fact and recommendations of the Commission, the Supreme Court ordered that Judge Carver be publicly reprimanded and assessed costs. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Carver" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' complaint asserting state and federal causes of action against eight defendants. At issue on appeal was the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiff Joseph Padgett. The court vacated the district court's award of costs and attorney's fees because the district court provided no explanation of how it calculated them. The court remanded to the district court for an explanation of how it used the lodestar method to reduce Padgett's fees and how it calculated Padgett's reduced costs. For the same reason, the district court erred in failing to explain why it denied costs to the prevailing defendants. While the district court had discretion to depart from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) in appropriate cases, the court could not review its unexplained order for abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Padgett, et al v. Loventhal, et al" on Justia Law

Justin S. Reynolds, Kristine Reynolds, and their construction company, Sunrise Development, LLC (Reynolds) brought a malpractice action against their law firm, Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., and its attorney-employee, David T. Krueck. Reynolds alleged professional negligence in both the drafting of a real estate agreement between Reynolds and Quasar Development, LLC, and in the subsequent handling of the litigation regarding that agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Trout Jones, holding that the two-year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) applied to bar the action and Reynolds timely appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reynolds v. Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, P.A." on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court from a personal injury case against a restaurant that ended with allegations of a party contracting a food-borne illness. THe plaintiff sought to have a small out-of-state law firm that specializes in food-borne illness claims admitted pro hac vice to help in the litigation. The defendant objected on grounds that defense counsel had previously consulted with an attorney at the the out-of-state-firm about her case and her trial strategy. The trial court denied the out-of-state firm's motion, thus disqualifying it from representing plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiff argued that Colo. RPC 1.7 applied only to situations where an attorney-client relationship was established, and that the trial court's disqualification was the trial court's abuse of discretion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order, holding that: (1) the consultation between defense counsel and out-of-state counsel concerned confidential information (which created a conflict under Colo. RPC 1.7; and, (2) the conflict was not waivable. View "In re Liebnow v. Boston Enterprises" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court: "Is it proper for a jury to consider a defendant’s worldly circumstances when deciding the amount of damages that should be imposed under OCGA 51-12-6?" The question arose from a case in which the issue on appeal was whether admission of "worldly circumstances" evidence in a tort action where the only injury to plaintiff was to his peace, happiness or feelings. Steven Caviness was injured in a train accident and retained attorney James Holland, II to pursue an action against the train company. The attorney filed a complaint; the company raised the affirmative defense of the expiration of the statute of limitation. The client was not told of the mistake until twenty days after his attorney learned of the missed statute of limitation. Caviness sued his attorney, and the attorney was granted summary judgment on the legal malpractice claim. A breach of fiduciary duty claim was allowed to proceed, but the district court found that because the only remaining injury to Caviness's peace, happiness or feelings, OCGA 51-12-6 applied. Caviness introduced evidence of Holland's worldly circumstances, including the law firm's income, the attorney's salary, the attorney's real estate holdings and personal property. A jury awarded Caviness $700,000 in damages. Holland's motion for a new trial was denied with leave to renew pending the Supreme Court's answer to the certified question. The Supreme Court responded that OCGA 51-12-6 precludes admission of worldly circumstances when the only injury is to a plaintiff's peace, happiness or feelings. View "Holland v. Caviness" on Justia Law

his matter came before the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana that respondent Judge Leo Boothe of the Seventh Judicial District Court, Parishes of Catahoula and Concordia, be removed from office and ordered to reimburse and pay the Commission for costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this case. The Commission determined that Judge Boothe violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), 3A(6), and 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in willful conduct relating to his official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brought his judicial office into disrepute, in violation of La. Const. art. V, sec. 25(C). After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found that certain charges against Judge Boothe were proven by clear and convincing evidence; however, the Court rejected the recommendation that he be removed from office. The Court suspended the Judge from office for one year, without pay, and ordered him to reimburse and pay the Commission $11,731.79 in costs. View "In re: Judge Leo Boothe, Seventh Judicial District court Catahoula & Concordia Parishes" on Justia Law