Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Defendants, parents of a minor child who filed an unsuccessful administrative complaint against the school district, asserted that the district court's denial of attorneys' fees to the school district in turn rendered defendants prevailing parties. The court affirmed, however, the district court's denial of attorneys' fees to defendants because defeating a request for attorneys' fees was not the type of success on the merits required to establish prevailing party status. View "Alief Indep. Sch. Dist v. C. C." on Justia Law

Boyar died in 2010, suffering from dementia. His will, under which his son Robert was administrator, distributed all property to a trust for the benefit of Boyar’s children and grandchildren. Under the trust, Robert and a bank were named co-trustees, with a provision that a trustee could be removed by beneficiaries. Less than a month before his death, Boyar had executed an amendment naming a lawyer who was his neighbor as trustee, not be subject to removal by beneficiaries. The trust provided that personal property should be divided among the children by their own agreement, which they began to do about a week after the demise. A few weeks later the lawyer informed Robert of the amendment and demanded a personal property itemization. Robert believed that the amendment, not changing substantive dispositions, was orchestrated to permit the lawyer to maintain control of the trust and collect fees. The circuit court rejected a claim of undue influence and dismissed the petition challenging the amendment. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that there was no need to address whether the “doctrine of election” (applicable to will contests) should be extended to living trusts that serve the same purpose as a will, since that doctrine could not be invoked under the circumstances. Allowing Robert to challenge the amendment had no impact on substantive distribution. By accepting the items of personal property, he cannot be said to have made a “choice” that precludes the challenge. View "In re Estate of Boyar" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Miami Business Services LLC (Miami), and Real Parties in Interest were involved in a joint venture. The law firm of Phillips Murrah, P.C. (Phillips) served as general counsel for Miami as well as Real Parties in Interest and their joint venture. Over the course of that joint venture, Jennifer Fogg, one of the defendants, acted as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Miami and acted as the principal in the real party in interest business entities. While COO of Miami, Fogg sought counsel from Phillips regarding issues affecting Miami's operations and for work undertaken by Real Parties in Interest and the joint venture. Miami terminated Fogg from her role as its COO in October, 2010. Subsequent to Fogg's termination, Miami brought suit against Real Parties in Interest, including Fogg, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy. Phillips entered its appearance in the suit on behalf of the Real Parties in Interest. Miami then filed a motion to disqualify Phillips, claiming that Phillips had a conflict of interest which violated Rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, stemming from Phillips' involvement with both Miami and Real Party in Interest Asset Group, Inc. The trial judge denied Miami's motion and Miami appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court recast Miami's appeal as an application for original jurisdiction and petition for mandamus. In granting the petition, the Court held that denial of a motion to disqualify was immediately appealable as a final order affecting the substantial rights of a party pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 953 and that the addition of Comment 3 to Rule 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct did not alter the requirement for an evidentiary hearing on motions to disqualify counsel for conflicts of interest based upon possession of confidential information. View "Miami Business Services, LLC v. Davis" on Justia Law

Robert G. Smith, an Assistant Federal Defender for the Western District of New York, moved to withdraw from representing defendant in a criminal action pending in the district court. In this interlocutory appeal, Smith challenged the denial of his motion. The court did not reach the merits of Smith's argument based on his professional responsibility as an attorney because the court concluded on other grounds that the denial of the motion exceeded the limits of the district court's discretion. Defendant, having been informed of his right to counsel, stated that he did not wish to have appointed counsel, made no attempt to establish financial eligibility for appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A, and refused to recognize Smith as his attorney. Under these circumstances, Smith's appointment was improper from the outset, and he could not be required to continue serving as defendant's attorney. View "United States v. Barton" on Justia Law

The law firm represented a potential buyer in the purchase of a drugstore. Buyer and Seller executed the sales contract separately. The firm misfiled the contract executed by Buyer, however, and Seller subsequently attempted to rescind the contract, which it characterized as an offer, because it had not timely received a copy of the contract executed by Buyer. When Seller’s efforts to avoid the purported contract were successful, Buyer sent a “formal notice of claim” to the firm, which sought coverage from its professional liability insurer. That insurer concluded that the firm was not entitled to coverage because it failed to properly notify the insurer of the mistake that ultimately led to the malpractice claim. The firm sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted the insurer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the firm’s knowledge of the email exchange with Seller’s counsel and of an Alabama declaratory-judgment action constituted knowledge of “any circumstance, act or omission that might reasonably be expected to be the basis of” a malpractice claim. View "Koransky, Bouwer & Poracky, P. C. v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner David Stacy appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Bar Association Public Protection Fund Committee (PPFC) denying his claim for reimbursement for the fees and costs that he and his conservatorship estate paid to attorney Donald Wyatt. The PPFC found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the funds at issue were lost as a result of Wyatt’s embezzlement, conversion, or theft. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the PPFC sustainably exercised its discretion when it denied petitioner's claims. View "Appeal of Stacy" on Justia Law

On rehearing, Clay C. Slagle moved the Supreme Court to "disqualify" Robert Bernard Harwood, Jr., from sitting as a Special Justice on this case on the ground, among others, that he was then-currently engaged in the private practice of law. Slagle based this argument solely on the text of Art. VI, section 147(a), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.). "In effect, Slagle [was] contending that, notwithstanding the provision in 12-2-14, Ala. Code 1975, for the appointment of 'member[s] of the bar' to sit as Special Justices in certain circumstances, the Constitution prevents such an appointee from engaging in the private practice of law." The Supreme Court rejected Slagle's contention and overruled his application. View "Slagle v. Ross" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to being in the U.S. illegally after having been removed. The judge sentenced him to 84 months in prison. The statutory maximum prison sentence for illegal reentry is usually 2 years, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), but removal after conviction for an aggravated felony (defendant had two such convictions) increases the maximum to 20 years. § 1326(b)(2). Defendant’s appellate attorney asked to be allowed to withdraw from the case on the ground that there is no colorable basis for appealing, but also stated that the district court imposed conditions beyond its authority. The Seventh Circuit modified the judgment of the district court to eliminate the post-release terms concerning the use of controlled substances, drug tests, and collection of a DNA sample, and otherwise dismissed the appeal, granting the lawyer’s motion to withdraw. View "United States v. Gutierrez-Ceja" on Justia Law

Complainant, a sitting Rochester City Court Judge, accused Defendant of sending her three offensive text messages. Defendant was charged with two misdemeanor counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree. A visiting judge from a neighboring county was assigned to preside over pretrial hearings. Despite repeated plea negotiations, the District Attorney's office did not offer Defendant a reduced charge or agree to a plea that included a favorable sentence. Defendant filed a motion and a renewed motion to disqualify the District Attorney due to the existence of a conflict of interest and requested that a special prosecutor be appointed. The District failed to rebut the allegations of disparate treatment with a single example of a comparable case it had similarly refused to resolve with a plea that included a favorable sentence. Both motions and requests were denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of one count of aggravated harassment in the second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the District Attorney's office failed to take steps to dispel the appearance of inappropriate disparate treatment in this case, this was one of those rare cases in which a significant appearance of impropriety was created, requiring disqualification. View "People v. Adams" on Justia Law

More than a year after Wife's and Husband's divorce, Wife filed a motion to reopen discovery. Wife also filed a motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery, asserting that Judge Gonzalez hearing the motion would create an appearance of impropriety because Husband and others connected to the parties' divorce contributed to the judge's reelection complain. Judge Togliatti denied Wife's motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez, and the Judge Gonzalez went on to preside over Wife's motion to reopen discovery. Wife subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition vacating Judge Togliatti's order and disqualifying Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery. The Supreme Court denied Wife's petition, holding that the failure to disqualify Judge Gonzalez did not violate Wife's due process rights or Nevada law, as all of the campaign contributions at issue were within statutory limits and made after the divorce decree. View "Ivey v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law