Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were two limited liability companies that made loans to Goldan, LLC. Goldan failed to repay the loans. Plaintiffs later discovered that their mortgages had not been recorded as agreed upon. Plaintiffs sued Goldan and its two principals, Mark Goldman and Jeffrey Daniels, alleging a number of claims. One claim was asserted against Daniels, a lawyer, for legal malpractice for failing to record the mortgages. Daniels' malpractice carrier, American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (American) refused to provide defense or indemnity coverage. Daniels defaulted in Plaintiffs' action against him. Daniels assigned to Plaintiffs his rights against American. Plaintiffs subsequently brought an action against American for breach of contract and bad faith failure to settle the underlying lawsuit. Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs' motions as to the breach of contract claims and dismissed the bad faith claims. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by breaching its duty to defend Daniels, American lost its right to rely on policy exclusions to escape its duty to indemnify; and (2) the lower courts properly dismissed Plaintiffs' bad faith claims. View "K2 Inv. Group, LLC v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Carl and Pamela Morton filed a petition for guardianship against Defendant-Appellant Terry Hanson. An in-house attorney who did not carry malpractice insurance was appointed by the Family Court to represent Defendant. The Family Court certified a question to the Supreme Court concerning in-house attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in-house counsel appointed by the Family Court had qualified immunity under the Delaware Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, lack of malpractice insurance is not "good cause" for an attorney to withdraw from court-appointed representation. View "Hanson v. Morton" on Justia Law

K.F.'s (a juvenile) father appealed the termination of his parental rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for new counsel since his previous lawyer had a conflict of interest. As justification, father argued that his trial counsel failed to pursue certain strategies he suggested, and that she would not introduce or object to what he felt was important evidence at trial because she had been a foster parent and was therefore sympathetic to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). The trial court did not find these arguments persuasive and denied father's motion to remove father's trial counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that father did not demonstrate that his lawyer rendered ineffective counsel, and accordingly affirmed the trial court's decision. View "In re K.F." on Justia Law

After Sarah West was involved in a motor vehicle accident, West made a claim against her insurer, State Farm, for underinsured motorist benefits of $75,000. State Farm paid only $20,000 in benefits. Attorney Tracey Morin subsequently filed a complaint against State Farm on behalf of Sarah and her parents, Ausra and James West, for breach of contract, violation of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At the conclusion of the action, the district court imposed sanctions on Morin individually under Mont. R. Civ. P. 11. Morin appealed, contending that the depth and breadth of the sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the level of sanctions imposed in this case. View "Morin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This matter involved two consolidated writs of prohibition filed under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of circuit court orders that denied their motions to disqualify private attorneys from representing the State as special assistant attorneys general, contending that the fee arrangements of the special assistant attorneys general violated the West Virginia Governmental Ethics Act and the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and that the attorney general lacked the authority to appoint special assistant attorneys general. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding (1) Petitioners failed to establish that the special assistant attorneys general actually engaged in any improper conduct that caused an injury; (2) the Court improperly held in Manchin v. Browning, which was heretofore overruled, that the office of attorney general did not retain inherent common law powers; and (3) while the circuit courts relied on the wrong reasons for rejecting the motions to disqualify the special assistant attorneys general, those courts nevertheless were correct in denying the motions. View "State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

From 1895 to 1954 the Jersey City chrome manufacturing plant deposited 1.5 million tons of industrial waste into wetlands along the Hackensack River. In 1954, Honeywell’s predecessor purchased the plant and ended the dumping. The contaminated area was not cleaned up. In 1995, ICO, represented by the Terris law firm, filed a citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901. The district court entered judgment for ICO in 2003, awarded more than $4.5 million in fees and expenses, and required Honeywell to pay future fees and costs for monitoring cleanup. The Third Circuit vacated the fee award. In 2005, Terris sued Honeywell based on the same contamination but relating to different areas, on behalf of Riverkeeper. The parties entered into consent decrees; Honeywell agreed to pay $5 million for fees and costs already incurred and to pay “reasonable” fees and expenses for monitoring. In 2009, the parties failed to agree on monitoring fees. The district court substantially upheld the fee requests, allowing Terris to be paid Washington, D.C. rates, rejecting challenges to the reasonableness of the hours expended, and holding that Rule 68 offers of judgment cannot be made in RCRA citizen suits. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to Rule 68 offers, upheld with respect to the hourly rates, and remanded with respect to the number of hours claimed. View "Interfaith Cmty. Org, v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc, " on Justia Law

Higher Taste sued the Park district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, requesting a declaration that Resolution 40-05 violated its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction barring the resolution's enforcement. The district court granted Higher Taste's motion for a preliminary injunction, expressly ruling that Higher Taste had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The parties later executed a written settlement agreement. Higher Taste then moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), which permitted an award to the "prevailing party" in certain civil rights actions, including those brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the motion. The court reversed and concluded that, because Higher Taste was a prevailing party within the meaning of section 1988, it should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. On remand, the district court should determine in the first instance whether such special circumstances exist. View "Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

Gomberg briefly represented Goyal in 2004 settlement negotiations with a former employer over his claims of retaliation for whistle-blowing and gave Goyal’s employer notice of an attorney lien on any settlement or judgment. The negotiations did not produce an agreement; Goyal later retained new counsel to pursue litigation. In 2009, without the aid of any counsel, Goyal settled with his former employer. After Goyal settled, Gomberg reappeared and demanded a share. The employer paid a portion of the settlement to Gomberg. The district court granted Goyal’s motion to quash the lien, effectively ordering Gomberg to pay Goyal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Gomberg is not entitled to any part of the settlement funds Goyal secured and that “Gomberg’s professional conduct is questionable.” His position that he “secured” funds for Goyal when the opposing party made an unacceptable and unaccepted settlement offer is unreasonable to the point of being frivolous and possibly warranting sanctions. Gomberg’s assertion of a lien for $70,000 was far greater than 10 percent of even the employer’s unaccepted (and not yet made) offer of $375,000 and was without basis. View "Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst." on Justia Law

In this suit - which was originally filed in state court in California, later removed to federal court in California, and then voluntarily transferred to the district court - the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to California's anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) rule, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, on the basis that New York law governed plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. The court held that the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss under California's anti-SLAPP rule constituted an immediately appealable collateral order because it (1) conclusively determined the disputed issue; (2) resolved an important question that was completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) would be effectively unreviewable in a later appeal. The court also held that the district court erred in concluding that California's anti-SLAPP rule could not apply to a claim transferred from a California federal court to a New York federal court and governed, under the Erie doctrine, by New York law. Accordingly, the district court's order denying defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP rule was vacated, and the cause was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a jury award of emotional distress and economic damages in a legal malpractice action. Defendant challenged the damages award on the grounds that emotional distress damages were not available in a legal malpractice case and that the award of economic damages equal to the amount plaintiff paid to settle the underlying case was improper because plaintiff failed to establish that the underlying settlement was reasonable. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed as to the award of emotional distress damages and affirmed as to the economic damages award. View "Vincent v. DeVries" on Justia Law