Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff challenged HUD's refusal to authorize reimbursement of defense costs plaintiff incurred while successfully defending criminal charges stemming from a series of transactions involving Middletown's use of funds it received from HUD. The court held that HUD acted arbitrarily and capriciously by incorrectly determining that plaintiff's legal fees were a result of his acting solely as Middletown's mayor's private counsel. The court held that the legal fees and expenses incurred by plaintiff in successfully defending the criminal charges were legal expenses required in the administration of federal programs under the OMB Circular. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and ordered HUD to authorize Middletown to reimburse the criminal defense costs to plaintiff. View "Guertin v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1985, a manager was shot to death during a robbery of his restaurant. In the following months, a second manager was murdered and another survived similar robberies. In each restaurant, the robber fired two .38 caliber bullets; all six bullets were recovered. The survivor, Smotherman, described his assailant and picked Hinton’s picture out of a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and recovered from his house a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his mother, who shared the house. The Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences concluded that the six bullets had all been fired from the Hinton revolver. Hinton was charged with two counts of murder. He was not charged with the Smotherman robbery. The prosecution strategy was to link Hinton to the Smotherman robbery by eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence about the bullets and to persuade the jury that, given the similarity of the crimes, Hinton must have committed the murders. Hinton presented witnesses in support of his alibi that he was at work at the time of the Smotherman robbery. The six bullets and the revolver were the only physical evidence. Hinton’s attorney obtained a grant of $1,000 to hire an expert to challenge that evidence and did not request more funding, nor correct the judge’s mistaken belief that a $1,000 limit applied. Under that mistaken belief, Hinton’s attorney found only one person who was willing to testify: Payne. Hinton’s attorney believed that Payne did not have the necessary expertise. The prosecutor discredited Payne. The jury convicted Hinton; the court imposed a death sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings, Hinton alleged ineffective assistance and produced three highly credible experts, who testified that they could not conclude that any of the bullets had been fired from the Hinton revolver. The state did not submit rebuttal evidence. Following a remand by the state’s highest court, the trial court held that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms and toolmark expert under the then-applicable standard. The Alabama Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that Hinton’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance under its “Strickland” test. It was unreasonable to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was limited. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that the judge who presided over the administration of the Yellowstone Mountain Club ski resort's bankruptcy was biased against him and should have recused himself. The bankruptcy judge denied the recusal motion and the district court affirmed. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the judge made ex part communications; the rulings made by the judge purportedly denied plaintiff due process; and the judge made supposed biased statements during various proceedings. Plaintiff's claims were a transparent attempt to wriggle out of an unfavorable decision by smearing the reputation of the judge who made it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the recusal motion. View "Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant faxed tens of thousands of unsolicited advertisements, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. After defendant’s insurer intervened, a second proposed class action settlement was reached. The insurer, Continental, agreed to make $6.1 million available to class members. The total is approximately equal to the number of faxes sent (110,853) times per-fax damages offered by Continental ($55.03) with an attorney fee award of 1/3 the total amount: $2,033,333.33. The district court preliminarily approved the settlement and 24,389 of the 28,879 class members were successfully notified; five requested exclusion. None objected. Only 1,820 returned a claim form, seeking damages for 7,222 unlawful fax transmissions, so that Continental would pay out only $397,426.66 of the $6.1 million, with the remainder, less attorney fees and incentive awards, to revert. Despite the relatively meager final payout to class members, plaintiffs’ attorneys continued to demand more than $2 million. The district court employed the lodestar method, rather than the percentage method, applying a risk multiplier of 1.5 to arrive at a final fee award of $1,147,698.70. After arguments on appeal, the attorneys sought to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit declined to dismiss and affirmed the reduced fee award. View "Americana Art China Co., Inc. v. Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc." on Justia Law

More than 13 years ago, lawyers around the country began class actions challenging the installation of fiberoptic cable on property without landowners’ consent. The cases began to settle on a state-by-state basis, leaving the lawyers to allocate awarded and expected attorney’s fees. The lawyers informally grouped themselves based on their negotiation and litigation positions. The Susman Group participated in mediation and agreed to a fee division, but balked at signing a written agreement, ostensibly because Susman disliked its enforcement terms. The district court held that Susman is bound by the agreement despite his failure to sign. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, given the parties’ lengthy course of dealing, Susman’s failure to promptly object to the written agreement can objectively be construed as assent. A finding that Susman’s refusal to sign was a case of “buyer’s remorse” rather than a genuine objection to the enforcement terms in the agreement was supported by the record. View "McDaniel v. Qwest Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

The client was the target of a grand jury investigation into alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The grand jury served a subpoena on the client’s former attorney and the government moved to enforce this subpoena and compel testimony, under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The client sought to quash the subpoena by asserting the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. After questioning the attorney in camera, the district court found that the crime-fraud exception applied and compelled testimony. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied the correct standard in determining whether to conduct an in camera examination of a witness, requiring a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies. The court did not abuse its discretion in applying that standard, in determining procedures for the examination, or in ultimately finding that the crime-fraud exception applied. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Convicted of robbing three banks, Johnson was sentenced to 220 months’ imprisonment. At trial Prince told the jury that he and Johnson had planned and executed the robberies together. Williams testified that Prince asked her to give him a ride one day and was accompanied by a stranger. She drove them several places, lastly a grocery store. Prince and the stranger entered the store and robbed the branch bank inside. Williams picked a photo of Johnson from an array of six photos. On appeal, Johnson argued that the judge should not have allowed Williams and the agent who conducted the array to testify about the identification because the Seventh Circuit has suggested that police show photographs sequentially rather than in an array. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, noting that Johnson did not attempt to show that all photo spreads are unnecessary and suggestive, or make it impossible for counsel to use the tools of the adversary process to explore an identification’s reliability. All six photos met Williams’s description and the array was not suggestive. The court also imposed a fine on Johnson’s attorney for omitting, from his brief, the court’s reasons for declining to exclude the identification. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs. Under Costa v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, where a fee award has been reduced by almost 30 percent, as here, the district court was required to provide relatively specific reasons for making such significant reductions. In this instance, the court concluded that the district court did not explain its decision to reduce plaintiff's fee request with sufficient specificity to allow the court to review the reasonableness of the fee award. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC" on Justia Law

The Republic and Diego Garcia Carrion (collectively, the "Applicants") sought discovery, including expert materials, for use in a foreign proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 1782. On appeal, Chevron and two of its experts challenged two district court decisions ordering the production of documents. The court concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) did not provide presumptive protection for all testifying expert materials as trial preparation materials; the 2010 amendments did not fundamentally restructure Rule 26 to do so; and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay" on Justia Law

Off-duty Officer Macon argued with Richardson about Macon’s former girlfriend. Macon fired his gun at Richardson but missed. When on-duty officers arrived, Macon said that Richardson had struck him with a baseball bat. Richardson was arrested and charged with assault and battery. After the charges were dismissed, Richardson filed suit, with 39 claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against Chicago, Macon, the arresting officers, and others. Chicago was dismissed before trial because municipalities are not vicariously liable under section 1983, and the district judge found that none of the city’s policies (including its training regimens) was constitutionally deficient. The jury rejected claims against the other defendants, but decided in Richardson’s favor on one claim, concerning the shot Macon fired, and awarded $1 in nominal damages plus $3,000 in punitive damages. Macon did not appeal, nor did Chicago, which under Illinois law must indemnify Macon for the $1 but not the punitive award. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, Richardson sought more than $675,000 in fees. The district judge awarded $123,000, noting that the firm’s billing did not allow non‑compensable time to be separated out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award as “generous, considering Richardson’s recovery.” View "Richardson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law