Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Bowers joined Ophthalmology Group as an employee in 1999 and, in 2002, became one of six partners. In November 2009, Bowers tendered a resignation letter to her partners. Although she did not give a date of departure, the partnership agreement required a one-year notice. In March, 2010, the partners voted to expel Bowers from the partnership, stating that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy and creditors’ proceedings and other personal conduct were detrimental to the Partnership.” After exhausting administrative remedies, Bowers filed suit, alleging: gender discrimination under Title VII; wrongful termination in breach of contract or in violation of public policy under Kentucky common law; gender discrimination under Kentucky statutes; retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. and the state law; and misappropriation of name for commercial advantage. Bowers moved to disqualify defendant’s counsel because another attorney at the firm previously represented Bowers in a substantially related matter. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because Bowers, as a former partner, was not an “employee” under Title VII and denied the motion to disqualify “as moot.” The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment and granted the motion to disqualify.View "Bowers v. Ophthalmology Grp." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against his employer, Wal-mart. Plaintiff's attorney represented to the court that plaintiff had pled a gender discrimination claim when he had not. The district court subsequently reprimanded the attorney and imposed Rule 11 sanctions on her. The attorney appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard where the district court's analysis indicated that it was applying an objective reasonableness test. Under the proper standard, pursuant to In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, sua sponte sanctions should issue only upon a finding of subjective bad faith. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment. View "Muhammad v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

Brindley and Thompson entered appearances as counsel for one of two defendants charged with drug offenses. A joint trial was scheduled. Both moved for continuance; the court set a hearing and ordered defendants counsel to be present. Thompson was present; Brindley was not. At a subsequent status conference, the court scheduled a jury trial and set a deadline for pretrial motions. Britton did not file any motions. On November 6, the court set a status conference for November 26 to discuss pretrial motions and ordered Brindley “to be present in person … not through other counsel.” Defendant appeared, but Brindley and Thompson did not and did not contact the court. The court set a show cause hearing; Brindley moved for continuance, claiming that he had not seen the order and had obligations in another trial. He apologized. The district court denied the motion and ordered Brindley to appear on November 30. Brindley appeared, but the court rejected his explanations as lies, held Brindley in contempt under Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b), and remanded him to custody for two days. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court erred in using Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b)ʹs summary contempt procedures, which apply only when there is a compelling reason for an immediate remedy, contempt occurred in the judge’s presence, and the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct. The court noted that if the district court chooses, on remand, to proceed under 18 U.S.C. 401, a different judge will preside. View "United States v. Britton" on Justia Law

The district court denied habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioner but issued a certificate of appealability (COA) on five issues. The district court then appointed appellate counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A. Counsel subsequently filed an opening brief under Anders v. California, seeking permission to withdraw. At issue on appeal was what procedure appointed counsel in a habeas appeal should follow when seeking to withdraw. The court concluded that Ninth Circuit Rule 4-1 directly addressed the issue; counsel followed the proper procedure under Rule 4-1(c)(6); and, on the merits, the certified issues provided no basis for appellate relief and the court declined to expand the COA to cover the uncertified issues identified in the Anders brief. Accordingly, the court granted the district court's judgment and granted the motion for counsel to withdraw as counsel of record for petitioner. View "Graves v. McEwen" on Justia Law

The Millers retained Ettinger in 2008 to represent them in a landlord/tenant dispute. Over 23 months, Ettinger billed $43,000. The dispute settled for $9,500. The Millers paid Ettinger $20,000, but even before the landlord-tenant matter settled, Ettinger sought relief in Pennsylvania state court to accelerate the speed at which he was paid. He petitioned to withdraw as a counsel, first based on alleged failure to pay and then due to professed “lack of cooperation.” Both petitions were rejected, though the Millers were ordered to make “good faith” payments. Despite their continued payments, Ettinger sued the Millers, who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection the following month. Ettinger filed an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court to prevent discharge of the Millers’ remaining debt to him, alleging fraud. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the complaint and imposed a $20,000 sanction against Ettinger jointly with his attorney. The district court vacated on the ground that the sanctions violated the “safe harbor” requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011, which requires 21 days between serving and filing a sanctions motion, during which period the challenged conduct may be remedied, but refused to remand for further consideration. The Third Circuit remanded with instructions to permit the Bankruptcy Court to consider alternative avenues to impose sanctions. View "In re: Miller" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute over attorney's fees related to a settlement of numerous civil rights lawsuits against the City and others. The court held that several important principles bear on the district court's determination of a reasonable fee amount: (1) the court must compute the fee award using an hourly rate that is based on the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community;" (2) when a district court reduces either the number of hours or the lodestar by a certain percentage greater than 10%, it must provide a clear and concise explanation for why it chose the specific percentage to apply; and (3) it was not per se unreasonable for the prevailing party in a civil rights case to be awarded an amount of attorney's fees that exceeds the amount of money recovered by his or her client. In this instance, the court vacated and remanded because the district court did not apply these principles when determining the amount of plaintiffs' attorney's fee award. View "Gonzalez v. City of Maywood" on Justia Law

After the mutual funds, known as the Lancelot or Colossus group, folded in 2008, the trustee in bankruptcy filed independent suits or adversary actions seeking to recover from solvent third parties, including the Funds’ auditor, law firm, and some of the Funds’ investors, which the Trustee believes received preferential transfers or fraudulent conveyances. The Funds had invested in notes issued by Thousand Lakes, which was actually a Ponzi scheme, paying old investors with newly raised money. In these proceedings the trustee contends that investors who redeemed shares before the bankruptcy received preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547, or fraudulent conveyances, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B) and raised a claim under the Illinois fraudulent-conveyance statute, using the avoiding power of 11 U.S.C. 544. The bankruptcy court dismissed the claims against the law firm that prepared circulars for the Firms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No Illinois court has held that failure to report a corporate manager’s acts to the board of directors exposes a law firm to malpractice liability. The complaint does not plausibly allege that alerting the directors would have made a difference. View "Peterson v. Winston & Strawn, LLP" on Justia Law

This case arose after the settlement of Guard v. American Home Products, Inc., which was brought by Kentucky residents who had taken the diet drug known as Fen-Phen. Each Appellant was a plaintiff in the Guard case and was represented under a contingent fee contract by Appellees, a team of four attorneys. Appellants filed a complaint alleging that Appellees breached their fiduciary duties by wrongfully retaining or improperly disbursing a portion of the Guard case settlement money that should have gone to Appellants. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Appellants, finding three of the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case against the three attorneys for further proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion regarding the issue of the three attorneys' breach of fiduciary duty and reinstated the partial summary judgment entered against them, holding, primarily, (1) the facts established a breach of fiduciary duty that entitled Appellants to summary judgment on the three attorneys' liability as a matter of law; and (2) the court of appeals did not err by declining to review the trial court's denial of summary judgment against the fourth attorney, as the order was not appealable. View "Abbott v. Chelsea " on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court held that appellants violated 11 U.S.C. 527 and 528(a)(1), Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-3.3(a)(1), and 4-8.4(c), and possibly 18 U.S.C. 157(3) by helping appellee file an "ostensibly pro se [Voluntary Chapter 13] bankruptcy petition in bad faith to stall a foreclosure sale." The bankruptcy court held that appellants prepared the Chapter 13 petition as ghostwriters and consequently made false and fraudulent representations to the court. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in its determination that appellants committed fraud when they contracted with appellee to provide foreclosure defense services, took appellee's money, had appellee sign documents, and then filed an ostensibly "pro se," bad faith bankruptcy petition on appellee's behalf. At bottom, the court concluded that appellants did not "draft" a document within the scope of Rule 4-1.2(c) and did not commit fraud in violation of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct or 18 U.S.C. 157(3). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Torrens, et al. v. Hood, Jr." on Justia Law

Wilson Lucom was an American expatriate who wished to bequeath assets worth more than $200 million to a foundation established for impoverished children in Panama. Plaintiff, Lucom's attorney, filed suit against the Arias Group/Arias Family, Lucom's wife and step-children, under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, alleging that the Arias Group participated in a criminal conspiracy to thwart plaintiff through acts of intimidation, extortion, corruption, theft, money laundering, and bribery of foreign officials, so that the Arias Group could steal the Estate assets for themselves. At issue on appeal was RICO's four-year statute of limitations on civil actions and the "separate accrual" rule. Under the rule, the commission of a separable, new predicate act within a 4-year limitations period permitted a plaintiff to recover for the additional damages caused by that act. The court concluded that none of the injuries in plaintiff's complaint were new and independent because all of his alleged injuries were continuations of injuries that have been accumulating since before September 2007. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff had done little more than repackage his 2007 abuse of process complaint. Therefore, plaintiff's civil RICO complaint was untimely, and the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Arias Group. View "Lehman, et al. v. Lucom, et al." on Justia Law