Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

There is no hospital in Valencia County. People in Valencia County who are faced with a medical emergency must deal with the emergency itself, and find a way to travel twenty to thirty-five miles to an Albuquerque hospital. Ambulances coming from Valencia County can take two hours or longer to transport a patient to the nearest hospital, process the patient, and return. The long turnaround times mean that ambulance companies sometimes run at full capacity, or “zero status,” and cannot respond to calls from new patients because all available ambulances are in use. Since 1987, appellant Living Cross Ambulance Service has been the only ambulance company in Valencia County operating under a permanent certificate from the Public Regulation Commission (PRC). Living Cross has been at zero status and unavailable to transport patients for less than one percent of ambulance service requests. When Living Cross is at zero status, dispatch requests mutual aid from a nearby ambulance company, and if those mutual aid ambulances are also unavailable, the municipality whose EMTs first responded to the scene must transport the patients at the municipality’s expense. This case was a direct appeal from a final order of the Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granting a permanent certificate to American Medical Response Ambulance Service, Inc. d/b/a American Medical Response, Emergicare (AMR) for both emergency and nonemergency ambulance service in Valencia County. Living Cross petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court to vacate the final order of the PRC, claiming that the PRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by granting AMR’s certificate because there was no evidence of need for non-emergency ambulance service in Valencia County, and because there was insufficient evidence of need for additional emergency ambulance service. Living Cross also claimed that the PRC abused its discretion by allowing Living Cross’s former attorney to represent AMR in an initial hearing before ruling on its motion to disqualify the attorney. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PRC decision to allow the former Living Cross attorney to appear for AMR during the hearing for the temporary permit was contrary to law, and that the wholesale admission of the record from that hearing as evidence in the hearing for the permanent certificate was plain error, requiring reversal. Because the Court determined that the attorney disqualification issue is dispositive, it did not reach the other issues in this case. View "Living Cross Ambulance Serv. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners Conley Hoskins and Jane Medicals, LLC, sought to vacate a trial court's order disqualifying the Peters Mair Wilcox (PMW) law firm as their counsel. The trial court disqualified the firm on the grounds that the firm previously represented another party, All Care Wellness, LLC, in the same matter for which PWM represented petitioners. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that All Care and petitioners had materially adverse interests. Petitioners argued on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' retained counsel of choice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court record was insufficient to support the finding that the interests of petitioners and All Care were materially adverse to one another. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court indeed abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' counsel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

G&K filed suit against Bill's for breach of contract and sought liquidated damages. Bill's counterclaimed, asserting common-law clams and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code 4-88-113. A jury found in favor of G&K on the common-law counterclaims but returned a verdict for Bill's on its deceptive trade practices counterclaim, awarding Bill's damages. The district court subsequently awarded G&K attorney's fees and denied Bill's motion for attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $82,766.50 in attorney's fees to G&K where the district court expressly considered G&K's degree of success and reduced its requested award based on time devoted to unsuccessful causes of action; the district court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that the hourly rates claimed by G&K's Little Rock-based attorneys were reasonable; the documentation was sufficient to support the district court's conclusion where the record includes invoices that detail the amount of time spent on this litigation and the activities on which that time was spent; although the district court did not expressly mention all eight of the Chrisco factors, the district court did address several and provided enough explanation for the court to conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court rejected Bill's challenge to the award of attorney's fees to G&K. In light of comments from the Arkansas courts and the absence of mandatory language in section 4-88-113(f), the court agreed with the district court that Bill's was not automatically entitled to an award of fees when it prevailed on a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. However, the court found little explanation for the district court's ruling and remanded for the district court to consider whether Bill's should be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee under section 4-88-113(f). The Act establishes an independent basis for awarding fees and does not restrict awards to a party that prevails in whatever larger litigation involves a claim under the Act. A party who prevails on a cause of action to recover actual damages under the Act is eligible for an award of attorney's fees, even when another party is the prevailing party in the overall action for purposes of Ark. Code Sec. 16-22-308. View "G&K Services Co., Inc. v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the "private attorney general" attorney fee statute and the trial court denied his application. The court concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff enforced an important right affecting the public interest, satisfying the first prong of the statute. The court concluded, however, that the court erred in concluding that the second and third prongs were not satisfied. The trial court erroneously concluded that the benefit plaintiff's lawsuit conferred on others "may not prove to be significant." The trial court also erred when it concluded that because plaintiff sought recovery of a large amount of money paid as tax on investment gains, and therefore had "significant assets," he did not need the incentive of the private attorney general statute to bring his lawsuit. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying attorney fees and remanded for a determination of the fees to be awarded. View "Cutler v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Alberto Daniel Saucedo Suarez and his attorneys, Allan Davis and the law firm of Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc. appealed a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the City of Corona. In 2008, Suarez was injured when the compressed natural gas (CNG) tank in a van in which he was a passenger exploded while being filled at a fueling station owned by the City. In April 2009, Suarez sued the City and a number of other defendants. Suarez proceeded against the City on a theory of dangerous condition of public property. Appellants contended the trial court erred because: (1) section 1038 did not authorize an award of attorney fees and costs against a party's counsel; (2) the commissioner issuing the award did not have jurisdiction; (3) the award was not proper where the action was brought and maintained with reasonable cause; (4) the fees and costs awarded were not reasonably and necessarily incurred; and (5) the award violated due process. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1038 did not authorize an award of fees and costs against a party's attorney. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the judgment awarding the City its fees and costs against the Attorneys. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Suarez v. City of Corona" on Justia Law

FLIR filed suit against their former employees for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets (the underlying action). The former employees prevailed in the underlying action and they obtained a ruling that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim had been brought against them in bad faith, which resulted in an order that FLIR pay their attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, the former employees filed suit against the attorneys who represented FLIR in the underlying action, Latham, for malicious prosecution. Latham moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the former employees were unable to establish a probability of prevailing on their malicious prosecution action because the action was untimely brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. However, the court agreed with the former employees that section 340.6 is not the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action and that the former employees have presented sufficient evidence that they otherwise have a probability of prevailing. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Parrish v. Latham & Watkins" on Justia Law

Mishkin appealed the district court's order denying an award of attorneys' fees for services performed as plaintiffs' liaison counsel in the bodily injury, non-respiratory cases arising out of the events of September 11, 2001. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mishkin a fee without further inquiry. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for the district court to determine whether Mishkin kept sufficiently detailed contemporaneous records as to be eligible for a fee award pursuant to New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, and if Mishkin kept such records. View "In Re: World Trade Center" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation involving long grain rice producers' allegations that Bayer contaminated the United States rice supply. After plaintiffs settled, the district court awarded common benefit fees from a common benefit trust fund to leadership counsel and denied Phipps' request for a common benefit award. Phipps and Phipps' clients raise various challenges to the establishment of the fund and the award of fees, and lead counsel cross-appealed. The court concluded that the Settlement Agreement, by which Phipps agreed to be bound, resolved that a percentage of payments due to clients of Phipps would be allocated to the Fund in accordance with the 2010 Order. Therefore, Phipps waived its challenge to the creation of the Fund and to the order that Phipps and its clients must contribute to the Fund. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Phipps' request for additional procedures before the Fund monies were disbursed; the procedures employed by the district court were not an abuse of discretion; the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the requested award as substantively reasonable; the district court's rationale for approving the fee request was reasonable when it adopted the Special Master's analysis; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phipps' request for a benefit award. In regards to the cross-appeal, the court concluded that lead counsel had standing to pursue the cross-appeal but that the district court did not have jurisdiction to order holdbacks from state-court plaintiffs' recoveries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "The Phipps Group v. Don Downing & Adam Levitt, etc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation involving long grain rice producers' allegations that Bayer contaminated the United States rice supply. Plaintiff class representatives filed suit for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit against other plaintiff lawyers, alleging that these other lawyers benefited in their state court actions from litigation materials and work product generated in the MDL by the plaintiff class but refused to pay for it. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that each defendant voluntarily entered Missouri more than once to negotiate settlement of their state court cases, a settlement process which ultimately resulted in their receiving compensation as part of a settlement. Their voluntary entry into Missouri for financial benefit was both the transaction of business as that term is used in the Missouri long arm statute and constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Downing, et al. v. Goldman Phipps, et al." on Justia Law

This mandamus proceeding related to a disciplinary proceeding against a former prosecutor Jon L. Hall, who allegedly suppressed exculpatory evidence in an aggravated robbery prosecution. The Commission for Lawyer Discipline commenced a disciplinary action against Hall, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. The Commission then filed a motion seeking access to expunged records in the aggravated robbery case. The trial court refused the Commission access to the expunged criminal records for use in the disciplinary proceeding and ordered the Commission to turn over investigative records. The grievance panel in the disciplinary proceeding construed the district court’s actions as a bar to the disciplinary proceeding and granted Hall’s motion for summary judgment. The Commission then petitioned for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ and directed the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the expungement order did not bar the Commission from using records from the criminal trial in the grievance proceeding. View "In re State Bar of Tex. " on Justia Law