Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

More than 13 years ago, lawyers around the country began class actions challenging the installation of fiberoptic cable on property without landowners’ consent. The cases began to settle on a state-by-state basis, leaving the lawyers to allocate awarded and expected attorney’s fees. The lawyers informally grouped themselves based on their negotiation and litigation positions. The Susman Group participated in mediation and agreed to a fee division, but balked at signing a written agreement, ostensibly because Susman disliked its enforcement terms. The district court held that Susman is bound by the agreement despite his failure to sign. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, given the parties’ lengthy course of dealing, Susman’s failure to promptly object to the written agreement can objectively be construed as assent. A finding that Susman’s refusal to sign was a case of “buyer’s remorse” rather than a genuine objection to the enforcement terms in the agreement was supported by the record. View "McDaniel v. Qwest Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

The client was the target of a grand jury investigation into alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The grand jury served a subpoena on the client’s former attorney and the government moved to enforce this subpoena and compel testimony, under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The client sought to quash the subpoena by asserting the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. After questioning the attorney in camera, the district court found that the crime-fraud exception applied and compelled testimony. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied the correct standard in determining whether to conduct an in camera examination of a witness, requiring a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies. The court did not abuse its discretion in applying that standard, in determining procedures for the examination, or in ultimately finding that the crime-fraud exception applied. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Convicted of robbing three banks, Johnson was sentenced to 220 months’ imprisonment. At trial Prince told the jury that he and Johnson had planned and executed the robberies together. Williams testified that Prince asked her to give him a ride one day and was accompanied by a stranger. She drove them several places, lastly a grocery store. Prince and the stranger entered the store and robbed the branch bank inside. Williams picked a photo of Johnson from an array of six photos. On appeal, Johnson argued that the judge should not have allowed Williams and the agent who conducted the array to testify about the identification because the Seventh Circuit has suggested that police show photographs sequentially rather than in an array. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, noting that Johnson did not attempt to show that all photo spreads are unnecessary and suggestive, or make it impossible for counsel to use the tools of the adversary process to explore an identification’s reliability. All six photos met Williams’s description and the array was not suggestive. The court also imposed a fine on Johnson’s attorney for omitting, from his brief, the court’s reasons for declining to exclude the identification. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs. Under Costa v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, where a fee award has been reduced by almost 30 percent, as here, the district court was required to provide relatively specific reasons for making such significant reductions. In this instance, the court concluded that the district court did not explain its decision to reduce plaintiff's fee request with sufficient specificity to allow the court to review the reasonableness of the fee award. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC" on Justia Law

The Republic and Diego Garcia Carrion (collectively, the "Applicants") sought discovery, including expert materials, for use in a foreign proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 1782. On appeal, Chevron and two of its experts challenged two district court decisions ordering the production of documents. The court concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) did not provide presumptive protection for all testifying expert materials as trial preparation materials; the 2010 amendments did not fundamentally restructure Rule 26 to do so; and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay" on Justia Law

Off-duty Officer Macon argued with Richardson about Macon’s former girlfriend. Macon fired his gun at Richardson but missed. When on-duty officers arrived, Macon said that Richardson had struck him with a baseball bat. Richardson was arrested and charged with assault and battery. After the charges were dismissed, Richardson filed suit, with 39 claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against Chicago, Macon, the arresting officers, and others. Chicago was dismissed before trial because municipalities are not vicariously liable under section 1983, and the district judge found that none of the city’s policies (including its training regimens) was constitutionally deficient. The jury rejected claims against the other defendants, but decided in Richardson’s favor on one claim, concerning the shot Macon fired, and awarded $1 in nominal damages plus $3,000 in punitive damages. Macon did not appeal, nor did Chicago, which under Illinois law must indemnify Macon for the $1 but not the punitive award. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, Richardson sought more than $675,000 in fees. The district judge awarded $123,000, noting that the firm’s billing did not allow non‑compensable time to be separated out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award as “generous, considering Richardson’s recovery.” View "Richardson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Attorneys appealed, and the City cross-appealed, the district court's determination of the fees owed by the City to Attorneys for representing the City. Although the court applied slightly different reasoning that the district court in determining that the Attorneys' contingency contract was unenforceable, the court affirmed the district court's quantum meruit award of $1.3 million to Attorney Davidson; Davidson could not recover the contracted-for contingency fee where there was only partial performance of a joint, indivisible obligation before default; and the district court's quantum meruit award was proper and reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of Alexandria v. Cleco Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant sought attorneys' fees following his largely unsuccessful attempt to obtain documents from the FHFA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that, even if appellant were eligible for attorneys' fees, he was not entitled to them. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's assessment of each of the factors of the entitlement inquiry and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McKinley v. FHFA" on Justia Law

This appeal relates to a discovery dispute that arose in this action challenging Washington's rules that require pharmacies to maintain a representative assortment of drugs for which there was patient demand and to dispense prescription drugs and drugs approved by the FDA for restricted distribution, unless one of several enumerated exceptions applies. On appeal, Law Center challenged the district court's denial of sanctions and costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d). Concluding that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal, the court affirmed the denial of sanctions under Rule 45(d)(1). The court agreed with the D.C. Circuit's analysis of the amended rule and held that Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) requires the district court to shift a non-party's costs of compliance with a subpoena, if those costs are significant. The court concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) framing the issue in terms of undue burden, rather than significant expense. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of costs and remanded for consideration of the proper allocation of costs. View "Legal Voice v. Stormans, Inc." on Justia Law

Bill Graham, a successful promoter of rock and roll concerts, died testate and his will created individual trusts for his sons, Alexander and David. Nicholas Clainos was the trustee of the trusts and the executor of the estate and Richard Greene, through his firm, provided Clainos legal counsel. On appeal, Alexander and David challenged the district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss, a special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Proc. Code 425.16(b)(1), and related attorney's fees awards. The court affirmed the disposition of the motion to strike in part and reversed in part. The court concluded that striking plaintiffs' conversion and unjust enrichment claims against Clainos was erroneous. The court also concluded that striking plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim against Clainos was erroneous. The court further concluded that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims for conversion, copyright infringement, and declaratory relief against the BGA Defendants and that dismissal of those claims was erroneous. In regards to attorney's fees, the court vacated the post-motion-to-strike fee award to Clainos, as well as the post-motion-to-dismiss fee award to the BGA Defendants. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Graham-Sult v. Clainos" on Justia Law