Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Family PAC filed suit alleging that three provisions of the Washington election law violated the First Amendment as applied to ballot measure committees. The district court granted summary judgment in part for Family PAC and Family PAC subsequently sought attorneys fees and expenses. The court held that the term "costs" under Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure did not include attorney's fees and recoverable as part of costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 and similar statutes. Therefore, in this case, the district court properly concluded that the statement in the court's previous opinion that "[e]ach party shall bear its own costs of appeal," did not preclude Family PAC, as prevailing party, from obtaining an award of appellate attorney's fees under section 1988. View "Family Pac v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Defendant is a Texas law firm engaged in an advertising campaign to solicit former dental patients from Kool Smiles dental clinics as potential clients. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of its Texas anti-SLAPP motion brought under the Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.001-27.011, to dismiss a claim brought by Kool Smiles. The court held that it had jurisdiction to interlocutorily consider the denial of a TCPA anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss; because Kool Smiles waived its argument that the TCPA was a procedural law that conflicted with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the court assumed that it did not; and the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that defendant's ads and other client solicitations were exempted from the TCPA's protection because defendant's speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. View "NCDR, L.L.C., et al. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the bankruptcy court's order imposing sanctions and judgment, and an order denying a motion to vacate or alter or amend judgment. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that defendant violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, as well as its imposition of sanctions in connection therewith, including suspension of defendant from practice for six months under Local Rule 2090-2; reversed the bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions against defendant under 11 U.S.C. 105 and its inherent authority because defendant did not receive separate prior notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding such sanctions; and remanded to the bankruptcy court the decision regarding sanctions for alleged misrepresentations by defendant at the Order to Appear and Show Cause hearing. View "Young v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Lewis was injured in an automobile accident and her health plan paid $180,000 for her medical treatment Lewis filed a tort suit against the driver (her son-in-law), represented by Georgia lawyer Lashgari, and obtained a $500,000 settlement. Lashgari knew the plan had a subrogation lien, but split the proceeds between himself and Lewis. He claimed that the plan was owed nothing. The plan filed suit under ERISA to enforce the lien, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3). The defendants argued that because the settlement funds have been dissipated, the suit was actually for damages, not authorized by ERISA. The district judge ordered the defendants to place $180,000 in Lashgari’s trust account pending judgment. The defendants did not comply. A year later, the defendants having neither placed any money in a trust account nor produced any evidence of their inability to pay, the judge held them in civil contempt, ordered them to produce records that would establish their financial situations, and ordered Lashgari to documents relating to the contempt to the General Counsel of the State Bar for possible disciplinary proceedings against him. The defendants appealed the contempt order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, characterizing the appeal as frivolous and the defendants’ conduct as outrageous. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought attorney's fees from Ceres for his purusit of a claim for disability benefits under section 928(a) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 928(a). The court concluded that section 928(a)'s plain language requires fee-shifting only when an employer has paid no compensation within 30 days of receiving the official claim. In this case, Ceres voluntarily paid petitioner one week's compensation within 30 days of receiving his claim, and thereby admitting to liability for the injury for the purposes of section 928(a). Ceres met the requirement of section 928(a), moving the dispute to section 928(b). Petitioner was entitled to the services of an attorney but, under the LHWCA's fee-shifting scheme, petitioner was not entitled to have that attorney paid for by Ceres. The court held that Ceres's payment of one week's benefits at the maximum compensation rate, being directly tied as it was to petitioner's alleged injury, qualified as "compensation" within the meaning of section 928(a). Finally, the court rejected petitioner's claim that when Ceres filed a notice of controversion prior to the payment at issue, it signaled that it was controverting his claim, and by doing so, irrevocably triggered section 928(a). Accordingly, the court denied the petition View "Lincoln v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

In 2004, plaintiff appealed the denial of his long term disability (LTD) benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Liberty moved for summary judgment. In a 2009 Report and Recommendation (R&R), the magistrate judge recommended denying Liberty's motion and granting summary judgment sua sponte to plaintiff. In 2012, the district court adopted the R&R and entered summary judgment for plaintiff, but denied his request for attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for LTD benefits because Liberty's denial of LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious where Liberty ignored substantial evidence from plaintiff's treating physician that he was incapable of performing his current occupation, while failing to offer any reliable evidence to the contrary; the court retained discretion to consider the Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan factors, in determining whether to grant an eligible plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees, but must do so in a manner consistent with the court's case law, and could not selectively consider some factors while ignoring others; the district court misapplied the Chambliss framework, and therefore erred, in denying fees to a prevailing plaintiff primarily on the conclusion that Liberty had not acted in bad faith; and the record revealed no particular justification for denying plaintiff's attorneys' fees, and awarding fees in the circumstances presented here furthered the policy interest in vindicating the rights secured by ERISA. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Donachie v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming malicious prosecution and violations of his civil rights. After plaintiff's attorney failed to comply with discovery deadlines, the district court dismissed plaintiff's suit with prejudice for failure to prosecute and failures to comply with a court order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that, in these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion to impose the "ultimate sanction" of dismissal with prejudice without first considering the viability of lesser sanctions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Bergstrom v. Sgt. Michelle Frascone, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged HUD's refusal to authorize reimbursement of defense costs plaintiff incurred while successfully defending criminal charges stemming from a series of transactions involving Middletown's use of funds it received from HUD. The court held that HUD acted arbitrarily and capriciously by incorrectly determining that plaintiff's legal fees were a result of his acting solely as Middletown's mayor's private counsel. The court held that the legal fees and expenses incurred by plaintiff in successfully defending the criminal charges were legal expenses required in the administration of federal programs under the OMB Circular. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and ordered HUD to authorize Middletown to reimburse the criminal defense costs to plaintiff. View "Guertin v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1985, a manager was shot to death during a robbery of his restaurant. In the following months, a second manager was murdered and another survived similar robberies. In each restaurant, the robber fired two .38 caliber bullets; all six bullets were recovered. The survivor, Smotherman, described his assailant and picked Hinton’s picture out of a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and recovered from his house a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his mother, who shared the house. The Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences concluded that the six bullets had all been fired from the Hinton revolver. Hinton was charged with two counts of murder. He was not charged with the Smotherman robbery. The prosecution strategy was to link Hinton to the Smotherman robbery by eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence about the bullets and to persuade the jury that, given the similarity of the crimes, Hinton must have committed the murders. Hinton presented witnesses in support of his alibi that he was at work at the time of the Smotherman robbery. The six bullets and the revolver were the only physical evidence. Hinton’s attorney obtained a grant of $1,000 to hire an expert to challenge that evidence and did not request more funding, nor correct the judge’s mistaken belief that a $1,000 limit applied. Under that mistaken belief, Hinton’s attorney found only one person who was willing to testify: Payne. Hinton’s attorney believed that Payne did not have the necessary expertise. The prosecutor discredited Payne. The jury convicted Hinton; the court imposed a death sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings, Hinton alleged ineffective assistance and produced three highly credible experts, who testified that they could not conclude that any of the bullets had been fired from the Hinton revolver. The state did not submit rebuttal evidence. Following a remand by the state’s highest court, the trial court held that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms and toolmark expert under the then-applicable standard. The Alabama Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that Hinton’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance under its “Strickland” test. It was unreasonable to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was limited. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that the judge who presided over the administration of the Yellowstone Mountain Club ski resort's bankruptcy was biased against him and should have recused himself. The bankruptcy judge denied the recusal motion and the district court affirmed. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the judge made ex part communications; the rulings made by the judge purportedly denied plaintiff due process; and the judge made supposed biased statements during various proceedings. Plaintiff's claims were a transparent attempt to wriggle out of an unfavorable decision by smearing the reputation of the judge who made it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the recusal motion. View "Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, et al." on Justia Law