Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Reifer suffered a worker’s compensation injury at IU-20 where she provided special education. Her injuries prevented her from returning to work. She retained Attorney Russo. Russo carried legal malpractice insurance with Westport in compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. When IU-20 initiated disciplinary proceedings against Reifer, Russo failed to appear at the hearing. When IU-20 terminated her, Russo failed to appeal. Russo filed suit alleging violation of Reifer’s employment rights, which he lost for failure to exhaust state remedies. When Reifer sought alternate employment, Russo advised her to answer an application question as to whether she had ever been terminated in the negative. Reifer was terminated and disciplined for the false answer. Reifer commenced a malpractice claim against Russo. Russo’s “claims-made” policy only covered losses claimed during the policy period or within 60 days of the policy’s expiration. Russo failed to inform Westport of the action until several months after the policy lapsed and he failed to secure a replacement policy. Westport refused to defend Russo. Russo admitted liability. A jury awarded Reifer $4,251,516. Russo assigned to Reifer his rights under the Westport policy. Reifer sought a declaratory judgment that Westport was required to show it was prejudiced by Russo’s failure to notify and, failing to do so, owed a duty to defend and indemnify. The federal district court, sua sponte declined to exercise jurisdiction and remanded to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Hill formed Blythe Corporation to acquire vacant lots in Chicago and was Blythe’s sole owner and employee. Blythe entered into a contract with Flawless Financial, which was to acquire the lots; Blythe agreed to pay legal fees of $50,000 to the attorney recommended by Flawless (DeAngelis) and deliver a $25,000 retainer fee. Blythe signed a representation agreement that had been drafted by DeAngelis, an employee of Brown Udell, on Brown Udell letterhead, but never informed Brown Udell of the representation. Blythe remitted a $25,000 check, payable to DeAngelis which was deposited into the “John A. DeAngelis Client Fund Account.” DeAngelis never shared fees received from Blythe with Brown Udell. Blythe investors transferred $250,000 to the DeAngelis Client Fund Account. Following Hill’s instructions, DeAngelis transferred $249,978 to a Flawless account. None of those funds were ever used to purchase lots on behalf of Blythe. Forte, a Blythe investor, contributed an additional $250,000. DeAngelis submitted an Application for Purchase of Redevelopment Project Area Property to obtain the vacant lots. The Department of Planning and Development reviewed the application and indicated steps necessary to move forward. Blythe, however made no effort to amend its application or to pursue necessary approvals. Blythe did not respond to inquiries by DeAngelis; Hill “[could] not recall” what happened to the funds received from Forte. Blythe sued DeAngelis and Brown Udell, claiming legal malpractice and unjust enrichment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Blythe Holdings, Inc. v. DeAngelis" on Justia Law

The Federal Election Commission opened an investigation into alleged discrepancies in ARMPAC's financial reporting. ARMPAC conceded that it had violated federal election laws and agreed to pay a civil penalty and terminate operations. Appellant, former treasurer of ARMPAC, was named in the Conciliation Agreement in his official capacity as treasurer. Appellant then filed suit against the law firm that represented ARMPAC and three lawyers, alleging that defendants failed to keep him informed about the Commission's investigation of ARMPAC, signed documents on his behalf without permission, and defamed him in the Agreement. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment to defendants on each of appellant's claims. The district court concluded that appellant's defamation claim based on the signing of the Agreement was barred by the judicial privilege. The district court also concluded that appellant's remaining negligence claim was barred under D.C. law. The court concluded that appellant's defamation claim was based on statements contained within the Agreement reached between the Commission and ARMPAC, and therefore was encompassed within the judicial privilege. The court also concluded that no D.C. case holds that a plaintiff may maintain a negligence action based on the allegedly defamatory communication. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Teltschik v. Williams & Jensen, PLLC, et al." on Justia Law

The United States investigated Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of minors, but failed to confer with the victims before entering a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Two victims filed suit under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771, to enforce their rights and sought to discover the correspondence between Epstein's attorneys and the United States regarding the non-prosecution agreement. Epstein and his attorneys intervened to object to that discovery as privileged. The district court overruled the objection and ordered disclosure. Intervenors appealed and the victims moved to dismiss. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and that the plea negotiations were not privileged from disclosure where Federal Rule of Evidence 410 provided no privilege for plea negotiations, the intervenors waived any work-product privilege, and the court declined to recognize a common-law privilege for plea negotiations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Doe v. Black" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying his motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412. The court concluded that the underlying agency action lacked a reasonable basis in law because the Social Security ALJ disregarded competent lay witness evidence on plaintiff's symptoms without comment. The court concluded that, because the ALJ disregarded competent lay witness evidence without comment, the position of the United States in the underlying action was not substantially justified. Because the government's underlying position was not substantially justified, the court awarded fees, even if the government's litigation position may have been justified. Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Tobeler v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiff, then fifty-eight years old, applied for a job with Defendant. Defendant extended a written offer of employment, which Plaintiff accepted, but before Plaintiff started on the job, Defendant rescinded the offer. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging, among other claims, that the rescission of the employment offer was a by-product of age discrimination. Defendant removed the case to the federal district court. Thereafter, Plaintiff’s attorneys blundered time and again, which led to the district court issuing an order for Plaintiff to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. After the district court received no response from Plaintiff, it dismissed the case. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) asking the court to set aside the judgment due to the neglect of one of Plaintiff’s attorneys. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, given Plaintiff’s persistent pattern of noncompliance, the district court’s refusal to set aside the order of dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. View "Rivera-Velazquez v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the district court's grant of plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment and declaring New York Judiciary Law 470 unconstitutional as violative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The court reserved decision and certified a controlling question of state law to the New York Court of Appeals: Under New York Judiciary Law 470, which mandates that a nonresident attorney maintain an "office for the transaction of law business" within the state of New York, what are the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy that mandate? View "Schoenefeld v. State of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code 216.6. On appeal, defendants challenged the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, arguing that they were entitled to a new trial. Defendants argued that the district court erred in overruling their objection to improper rebuttal closing argument by plaintiff's counsel, and then abused its discretion in denying defendants' post-trial motion because this argument, while improper, was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Counsel made emotionally-charged comments at the end of rebuttal closing argument, referencing her own sexual harassment during law school and assurances to the jury that her client testified truthfully about past sexual abuse. The court concluded that the timing and emotional nature of counsel's improper and repeated personal vouching for her client, using direct references to facts not in evidence, combined with the critical importance of plaintiff's credibility to issues of both liability and damages, made the improper comments unfairly prejudicial and required that the court remand for a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gilster v. Primebank, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a qui tam action against various providers of home health-care services and their officers, including Nursing Personnel. Plaintiff and the United States settled the claim against Nursing Personnel and the action remains pending against other defendants. Plaintiff subsequently moved to dismiss two appeals of Nursing Personnel from an interlocutory order entered by the district court awarding plaintiff attorney's fees. The court concluded that the fee award did not have to be appealed until entry of an appealable judgment, and that the pending collateral order appeal in Case No. 13-1688, taken in the absence of an appealable judgment, has become moot upon the entry of a Rule 54(b) partial judgment. The court also concluded that the appeal in Case No. 14-251 from the Rule 54(b) partial judgment was timely. Therefore the court denied the collateral order appeal and dismissed that appeal as moot. The court denied the motion to dismiss and directed briefing of that appeal in the normal course. View "United States ex rel. Maurice v. Nursing Personnel Home Care" on Justia Law

Appellant acted as counsel in district court for a criminal defendant (“Defendant”) who pleaded guilty to several charges arising out of a carjacking. The day before a disposition hearing was scheduled to take place, Appellant moved for a continuance, stating that she could not attend the scheduled sentencing because it conflicted with the commencement of a trial in another criminal case. The district court denied the motion. The court subsequently fined Appellant a monetary sanction, stating that Appellant had not been “candid with the Court” because she entered her appearance in the second case subsequent to requesting the continuance of Defendant’s sentencing. Appellant sought a vacation of the monetary sanction, asserting that she had been a key participant in the second case for several months. The district court denied relief. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the sanctions order and expunged the sanction, holding that the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Appellant, as there was no appropriate basis for a finding that Appellant had not been candid with the court. View "In re Plaza-Martinez" on Justia Law