Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio filed with the Supreme Court a certified copy of a judgment entry of a felony conviction against Rosenfield, a Cleveland attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Ohio. The court suspended Rosenfield from the practice of law for an interim period, pending disciplinary counsel’s investigation and the commencement of disciplinary proceedings. View "In re Rosenfield" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a complaint charging Tate County Youth Court Referee, Drug Court Judge, and Family Master Leigh Ann Darby with judicial misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission and Judge Darby entered into an “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation” providing that Judge Darby had violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and recommended that she be removed from office, prohibited from holding judicial office in the future, and assessed costs of $200. The Commission unanimously accepted and adopted the “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation.” In this latest incident, Judge Darby stipulated to multiple incidents in which she denied citizens their due-process rights. Between 2008 and 2010, she “unlawfully ordered the incarceration of” eight parents and denied each his or her “constitutional right of due process” prior to being “order[ed] . . . to jail for conduct allegedly occurring outside of court.” In 2011, three fifteen-year-old minors (two girls and one boy) were arrested by Senatobia police after a neighbor of one of the children complained that they had walked across her yard. Judge Darby, in her official capacity as youth court referee and youth court judge, but without authority of law, ordered that the three minors be drug-tested while in custody. Without conducting any hearings, Judge Darby ordered the minors to be taken into custody and transported to a detention facility in Alcorn County, Mississippi. Unrepresented by counsel and denied due process, the minors spent Friday until the following Monday in the detention facility. On October 3, 2011, the Tate County Board of Supervisors passed a “No Confidence Resolution” regarding Judge Darby. That resolution declared that it was not in the best of interest of Tate County that she continue in her judicial capacity and called upon the senior chancellor of the district to remove her from all Tate County judicial offices. Judge Darby was suspended from office for a period of sixty days. Thereafter, she tendered her resignation to the senior chancellor. The Supreme Court performed its mandated review of the Commission’s recommendation consistent with Miss. Const. art. 6, section 177A, Miss. Comm’n on Jud. Perf. R. 10, M.R.A.P. 16(a), and Mississippi case law. The Supreme Court concluded Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Court ordered that Judge Darby be removed from office, fined $1,000, and assessed costs of $200. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Darby" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ringgold and Ringgold-Lockhart appealed the district court's vexatious litigant order. The court concluded that the district court provided proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, in accordance with the court's case law's first procedural requirement and due process; the district court compiled an adequate record to permit the court to review the basis of its order; the district court failed to consider alternative sanctions before issuing this injunction; the district court erred by issuing an order against Ringgold-Lockhart on the basis of state litigation in which he played no part; and the scope of the order is too broad in several respects. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Davis retained Fenton to represent her in a home foreclosure proceeding. Davis later sued Fenton for malpractice. Davis claimed that, although she paid Fenton several thousand dollars, he did virtually nothing to help her and that he targeted her for inferior service based on her race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601. That case is stayed pending arbitration. Fenton brought his own lawsuit in state court, against Davis’s lawyers: Dudley and Sidea, alleging that they intentionally spread false information about him to clients and business associates. Fenton also alleged that Sidea, who had previously worked at Fenton’s law office, had improperly obtained confidential information about Fenton’s clients and shared it with Dudley. The complaint claimed conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, and defamation. Dudley and Sidea filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441, and the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. Days later, despite the ongoing removal proceedings, the Cook County Court entered an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea. The district court found that the case did not meet the removal requirements under either 28 U.S.C. 1441 or 1443 and remanded, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fenton v. Dudley" on Justia Law

Although Michael Mandelman entered into a stipulation with the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), under which he pled no contest to 22 counts of misconduct and agreed that his license to practice law in Wisconsin should be revoked, he appealed from the report and recommendation of the referee, which was based on that stipulation. The court stated that “Essentially, he seeks ... to comment on certain characterizations and findings by the referee and to provide additional support for the referee's recommendation to make his revocation effective as of the date of his prior suspension, May 29, 2009. The court accepted the referee's factual findings and legal conclusions and agreed that the 22 counts of misconduct support the revocation of Mandelman's license to practice law effective as of the effective date of his prior suspension. Because the record was not sufficient to award restitution to any particular person, the court directed Mandelman to work with the OLR and his former colleague to determine who is owed money from trust accounts utilized by Mandelman and in what amounts. Because Mandelman litigated the matter vigorously prior to entering into the stipulation, the court ordered him to pay the full costs of the proceeding, which were $16,943.16. View "Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Mandelman" on Justia Law

Andrea Richard allegedly violated the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct in seven different court proceedings between 2006 and 2012 by failing to comply with discovery requests and orders, causing her clients to be subjected to sanctions and expenses. According to the court she has substantial experience in the practice of law, she acted dishonestly or with a selfish motive, there was a pattern of misconduct, there were multiple offenses, she acted in bad faith to obstruct the disciplinary process by intentionally failing to comply with the rules, she refused until the very end of the process to acknowledge the wrongfulness of her conduct and the victims were vulnerable. The court adopted the recommendation of the Board of Professional Responsibility and suspended Richard from the practice of law for three years, among other sanctions. View "Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, WY State Bar v. Richard" on Justia Law

In this case and its companion, LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC,(No. 88132-4), the central issues on appeal arose from a joint venture agreement regarding a debt collection business. The debt collection business operated according to the terms of the joint venture agreement, as originally proposed, from approximately winter 2005 through summer 2007. In this opinion, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of equitable indemnification (known as the "ABC Rule") to hold that the legal malpractice plaintiffs here suffered no compensable damages as a matter of law and that summary judgment dismissal was appropriate. "Where the only damages claimed by a legal malpractice plaintiff are attorney fees incurred in a separate litigation and the only legal basis on which plaintiff asserts those fees are compensable is the ABC Rule, then the defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissal if the ABC Rule does not apply to the undisputed facts as a matter of law." That was the situation presented in this case, and as such, affirmed the trial court. View "LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

In this case and its companion, LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, (No. 88846-9) (Wash. July 31, 2014), the central issues on appeal arose from a joint venture agreement regarding a debt collection business. The debt collection business operated according to the terms of the joint venture agreement, as originally proposed, from approximately winter 2005 through summer 2007. This opinion addressed whether the trial court proceedings complied with due process requirements; whether, as a matter of law, the joint venture proposal was entered by an attorney in violation of one or both of former RPCs 1.7 (1995) and 1.8(a) (2000); and, if so, whether the remedy imposed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal is appropriate. The Supreme Court found: (1) the trial court proceedings satisfied the requirements of procedural due process; (2) though on different reasoning from that used by the Court of Appeals, that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that the joint venture proposal contemplated a business transaction subject to, agreed to, and entered into in violation of former RPC 1.8(a). The Court affirmed that the former RPC 1.8(a) violation rendered the terms of the business transaction unenforceable under the circumstances presented and the remedy imposed was appropriate. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the business transaction was entered in violation of former RPC 1. 7. The Court declined to determine whether the former RPC 1.7 violation would have also justified the remedy imposed. View "LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

Lightspeed operates online pornography sites and sued a defendant, identified only Internet Protocol address, which was allegedly associated with unlawful viewing of Lightspeed’s content, using a “hacked” password. Lightspeed identified 6,600 others (by IP addresses only) as “co‐conspirators” in a scheme to steal passwords and content. Lightspeed, acting ex parte, served subpoenas on the ISPs (then non‐parties) for the personally identifiable information of each alleged coconspirator, none of whom had been joined as parties. The ISPs moved to quash and for a protective order. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the ISPs. Lightspeed amended its complaint to name as co‐conspirator parties the ISPs and unidentified “corporate representatives,” alleging negligence, violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030 and 1030(g), and deceptive practices. Lightspeed issued new subpoenas seeking the personally identifiable information. The ISPs removed the case to federal court. The district judge denied an emergency motion to obtain the identification information. After several “changes” with respect to Lightspeed’s lawyers, the court stated that they “demonstrated willingness to deceive … about their operations, relationships, and financial interests have varied from feigned ignorance to misstatements to outright lies … calculated so that the Court would grant early‐discovery requests, thereby allowing [them] to identify defendants and exact settlement proceeds.” After granting Lightspeed’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the court granted attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927, stating that the litigation “smacked of bullying pretense.” Failing to pay, the lawyers were found to be in civil contempt and ordered to pay 10% of the original sanctions award to cover costs for the contempt litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Duffy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to using the telephone to facilitate his possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), and was sentenced to 24 months of probation. The sentencing judge imposed 18 conditions of probation and stated: “we’ll see what the next two years are going to bring in terms of your ability to conform …, because if you don’t, the 24 months of probation is going to be 24 months in prison,” meaning that if defendant violated any condition, he would be in prison for 24 months. Two months later, the probation service sought to revoke his probation. Defendant admitted: driving without a valid driver’s license; failing to attend a drug treatment program; and thrice submitting urine samples that tested positive for cocaine. Although the guidelines range for his probation violations was seven to 13 months, U.S.S.G. 7B1.4(a), the statutory maximum for his crime of conviction, the judge recalled the comments made at sentencing, and ordered 24 months’ custody. Defendant’s lawyer, stating that he had no non-frivolous ground for appealing the sentence, filed an Anders brief, to which defendant did not respond. The Seventh Circuit denied the Anders motion, stating that there is no authority indicating that a judge may treat a warning of consequences as creating a contract requiring him to impose those consequences should there be a violation. View "United States v. Tatum" on Justia Law