Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

G&K filed suit against Bill's for breach of contract and sought liquidated damages. Bill's counterclaimed, asserting common-law clams and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code 4-88-113. A jury found in favor of G&K on the common-law counterclaims but returned a verdict for Bill's on its deceptive trade practices counterclaim, awarding Bill's damages. The district court subsequently awarded G&K attorney's fees and denied Bill's motion for attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $82,766.50 in attorney's fees to G&K where the district court expressly considered G&K's degree of success and reduced its requested award based on time devoted to unsuccessful causes of action; the district court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that the hourly rates claimed by G&K's Little Rock-based attorneys were reasonable; the documentation was sufficient to support the district court's conclusion where the record includes invoices that detail the amount of time spent on this litigation and the activities on which that time was spent; although the district court did not expressly mention all eight of the Chrisco factors, the district court did address several and provided enough explanation for the court to conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court rejected Bill's challenge to the award of attorney's fees to G&K. In light of comments from the Arkansas courts and the absence of mandatory language in section 4-88-113(f), the court agreed with the district court that Bill's was not automatically entitled to an award of fees when it prevailed on a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. However, the court found little explanation for the district court's ruling and remanded for the district court to consider whether Bill's should be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee under section 4-88-113(f). The Act establishes an independent basis for awarding fees and does not restrict awards to a party that prevails in whatever larger litigation involves a claim under the Act. A party who prevails on a cause of action to recover actual damages under the Act is eligible for an award of attorney's fees, even when another party is the prevailing party in the overall action for purposes of Ark. Code Sec. 16-22-308. View "G&K Services Co., Inc. v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the "private attorney general" attorney fee statute and the trial court denied his application. The court concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff enforced an important right affecting the public interest, satisfying the first prong of the statute. The court concluded, however, that the court erred in concluding that the second and third prongs were not satisfied. The trial court erroneously concluded that the benefit plaintiff's lawsuit conferred on others "may not prove to be significant." The trial court also erred when it concluded that because plaintiff sought recovery of a large amount of money paid as tax on investment gains, and therefore had "significant assets," he did not need the incentive of the private attorney general statute to bring his lawsuit. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying attorney fees and remanded for a determination of the fees to be awarded. View "Cutler v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Alberto Daniel Saucedo Suarez and his attorneys, Allan Davis and the law firm of Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc. appealed a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the City of Corona. In 2008, Suarez was injured when the compressed natural gas (CNG) tank in a van in which he was a passenger exploded while being filled at a fueling station owned by the City. In April 2009, Suarez sued the City and a number of other defendants. Suarez proceeded against the City on a theory of dangerous condition of public property. Appellants contended the trial court erred because: (1) section 1038 did not authorize an award of attorney fees and costs against a party's counsel; (2) the commissioner issuing the award did not have jurisdiction; (3) the award was not proper where the action was brought and maintained with reasonable cause; (4) the fees and costs awarded were not reasonably and necessarily incurred; and (5) the award violated due process. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1038 did not authorize an award of fees and costs against a party's attorney. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the judgment awarding the City its fees and costs against the Attorneys. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Suarez v. City of Corona" on Justia Law

FLIR filed suit against their former employees for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets (the underlying action). The former employees prevailed in the underlying action and they obtained a ruling that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim had been brought against them in bad faith, which resulted in an order that FLIR pay their attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, the former employees filed suit against the attorneys who represented FLIR in the underlying action, Latham, for malicious prosecution. Latham moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the former employees were unable to establish a probability of prevailing on their malicious prosecution action because the action was untimely brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. However, the court agreed with the former employees that section 340.6 is not the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action and that the former employees have presented sufficient evidence that they otherwise have a probability of prevailing. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Parrish v. Latham & Watkins" on Justia Law

Mishkin appealed the district court's order denying an award of attorneys' fees for services performed as plaintiffs' liaison counsel in the bodily injury, non-respiratory cases arising out of the events of September 11, 2001. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mishkin a fee without further inquiry. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for the district court to determine whether Mishkin kept sufficiently detailed contemporaneous records as to be eligible for a fee award pursuant to New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, and if Mishkin kept such records. View "In Re: World Trade Center" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation involving long grain rice producers' allegations that Bayer contaminated the United States rice supply. After plaintiffs settled, the district court awarded common benefit fees from a common benefit trust fund to leadership counsel and denied Phipps' request for a common benefit award. Phipps and Phipps' clients raise various challenges to the establishment of the fund and the award of fees, and lead counsel cross-appealed. The court concluded that the Settlement Agreement, by which Phipps agreed to be bound, resolved that a percentage of payments due to clients of Phipps would be allocated to the Fund in accordance with the 2010 Order. Therefore, Phipps waived its challenge to the creation of the Fund and to the order that Phipps and its clients must contribute to the Fund. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Phipps' request for additional procedures before the Fund monies were disbursed; the procedures employed by the district court were not an abuse of discretion; the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the requested award as substantively reasonable; the district court's rationale for approving the fee request was reasonable when it adopted the Special Master's analysis; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phipps' request for a benefit award. In regards to the cross-appeal, the court concluded that lead counsel had standing to pursue the cross-appeal but that the district court did not have jurisdiction to order holdbacks from state-court plaintiffs' recoveries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "The Phipps Group v. Don Downing & Adam Levitt, etc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from litigation involving long grain rice producers' allegations that Bayer contaminated the United States rice supply. Plaintiff class representatives filed suit for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit against other plaintiff lawyers, alleging that these other lawyers benefited in their state court actions from litigation materials and work product generated in the MDL by the plaintiff class but refused to pay for it. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that each defendant voluntarily entered Missouri more than once to negotiate settlement of their state court cases, a settlement process which ultimately resulted in their receiving compensation as part of a settlement. Their voluntary entry into Missouri for financial benefit was both the transaction of business as that term is used in the Missouri long arm statute and constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Downing, et al. v. Goldman Phipps, et al." on Justia Law

This mandamus proceeding related to a disciplinary proceeding against a former prosecutor Jon L. Hall, who allegedly suppressed exculpatory evidence in an aggravated robbery prosecution. The Commission for Lawyer Discipline commenced a disciplinary action against Hall, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. The Commission then filed a motion seeking access to expunged records in the aggravated robbery case. The trial court refused the Commission access to the expunged criminal records for use in the disciplinary proceeding and ordered the Commission to turn over investigative records. The grievance panel in the disciplinary proceeding construed the district court’s actions as a bar to the disciplinary proceeding and granted Hall’s motion for summary judgment. The Commission then petitioned for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ and directed the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the expungement order did not bar the Commission from using records from the criminal trial in the grievance proceeding. View "In re State Bar of Tex. " on Justia Law

Illinois insurance regulators permitted WellPoint to acquire RightCHOICE health insurance. WellPoint caused RightCHOICE Insurance to withdraw from the Illinois market. WellPoint offered the policyholders costlier UniCare policies as substitutes. Those who chose not to pay the higher premiums had to shop for policies from different insurers, which generally declined to cover pre-existing conditions. Former RightCHOICE policyholders filed a purported class action. The district court declined to certify a class and entered judgment against plaintiffs on the merits. No one appealed. Absent certification as a class action, the judgment bound only the named plaintiffs. Their law firm found other former policyholders and sued in state court. Defendants removed the suit under 28 U.S.C. 1453 (Class Action Fairness Act); the proposed class had at least 100 members, the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, and at least one class member had citizenship different from at least one defendant. Plaintiffs sought remand under section 1332(d)(4), which says that the court shall “decline to exercise” jurisdiction if at least two-thirds of the class’s members are citizens of the state in which the suit began and at least one defendant from which “significant relief” is sought is a citizen of the same state. The district court declined remand, declined to certify a class, and again rejected the case on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “Counsel should thank their lucky stars that the district court did not sanction them under 28 U.S.C. 1927 for filing a second suit rather than pursuing the first through appeal." View "Phillips v. Wellpoint Inc." on Justia Law

KDC had cash flow problems and, in 2004, hired Johnson. Johnson retained the law firm (GPM) of his acquaintance, Tenenbaum. GPM sent KDC an engagement letter that included conflict‐waiver language regarding Johnson and a company affiliated with Johnson. Johnson soon resigned and joined First Products. GPM resigned as KDC’s counsel. KDC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Its assets were purchased at auction by First Products. No other bids were received; the bankruptcy court approved the sale. The bankruptcy was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. The bankruptcy trustee hired Sullivan as special counsel. Sullivan had filed a shareholder derivative action before KDC filed for bankruptcy, alleging that directors and officers of KDC had conspired to defraud the company of its intellectual property by driving KDC out of business and purchasing its assets at bargain prices. In 2010, a Wisconsin state judge entered judgment, finding some defendants, including Johnson, had engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud KDC and steal its assets. In 2012, KDC, through its bankruptcy trustee, brought claims against GPM, alleging involvement in the scheme to defraud KDC orchestrated by Johnson. On summary judgment, the district court determined that the remaining claims were barred by the six‐year Wisconsin statute of limitations because KDC was on notice of GPM’s alleged fraud by 2006, when Sullivan received KDC’s client file. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "KDC Foods, Inc. v. Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.C." on Justia Law