Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff successfully sued various Greenwood County Sheriff's Office officials for First Amendment violations. The court held that qualified immunity, the absence of a policy or custom of discrimination, and the nature of the relief granted here - whether considered individually or together through a "totality of the circumstances" lens - could not support the denial of attorneys' fees to plaintiff, a prevailing civil rights plaintiff; the district court abused its discretion by denying these fees and the court reversed the judgment; and the court remanded with instructions to allow plaintiff to make a fee application and for ensuing determination of the reasonable fee award for his successful prosecution of the civil rights matter, including the time spent defending entitlement to attorney's fees. View "Lefemine v. Wideman" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal John R. Grele and his former client, Markette Tillman, appealed an order removing him to the California State bar for disciplinary proceedings. The court concluded, under Flanagan v. United States, that it lacked jurisdiction over Tillman's claim where the removal order is nonfinal and not immediately appealable. Tillman has the opportunity to raise the issue on direct appeal. In regards to Grele's petition as to the sanctions order, the court concluded that mandamus jurisdiction is appropriate to consider the sanctions order, that the district court erred in imposing sanctions without notice and a hearing, and that the order should be vacated.View "United States v. Tillman" on Justia Law

After the jury returned a verdict in favor of ING on its breach of contract claims, the jury awarded ING attorney's fees under Georgia law. UPS moved under Rule 59(e) to amend the judgment to set aside the award of attorney's fees or, alternatively, for a new trial on the issue of attorney's fees. The court held that the district court erred in setting the verdict aside in light of UPS's failure to move for relief under Rule 50(a) and the existence of evidentiary support in the record for the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that a new trial was not warranted. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting UPS's motion and remanded with instructions to reinstate the verdict and resolve ING's motion to set attorney's fees. View "ING Global v. United Parcel Service Oasis Supply Corp." on Justia Law

The district court denied attorney-client privilege protection regarding confidential employee communications made during KBR's internal investigation led by company lawyers. The court concluded that the district court's privilege ruling was legally erroneous and irreconcilable with Upjohn Co v. United States. Accordingly, the court granted KBR's petition for a writ of mandamus and vacated the district court's document protection order.View "In re: Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from contempt sanctions issued by the bankruptcy court against the Diazes for failing to transfer a Mexican coastal villa to Kismet. The court concluded that: (1) the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to substitute Axolotl as transferee; (2) the bankruptcy court did not violate due process in imposing certain sanctions; (3) the ACJ was sufficiently specific to support a finding of contempt; (4) even if "legal impossibility" excused noncompliance, the Diazes have not demonstrated that compliance with the ACJ was legally impossible; (5) the bankruptcy court's findings of contempt for the period up to November 25 were not clearly erroneous; (6) the Diazes' claim that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to quantify fees and costs in its order of December 18, 2008 was moot where the order was vacated by the district court; and (7) the bankruptcy court properly abrogated attorney-client privilege where Mr. Diaz implicitly waived privilege with regard to communications on certain subjects. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in vacating the compulsory sanctions of $25,000 per day for the period from November 26, 2008 to December 4, 2008. Finally, the court granted requests for judicial notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "In re: Icenhower" on Justia Law

McLaughlin had a mortgage. As a result of an error, the mortgage company believed that he was in default and referred the matter to a law firm, PHS, which sent McLaughlin a letter about the debt that he claims violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 by referring to attorneys’ fees and costs that McLauglin claims had not yet been incurred. The district court dismissed certain claims because McLaughlin did not ask PHS to validate the debt before he filed suit. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that he was not required to request validation. The court affirmed imposition of sanctions against PHS for its failure to produce certain documents during discovery. View "McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP" on Justia Law

The district court entered a Rule 60(a) clarifying order imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney, Peter A.T. Sartin. Sartin hired the McNair Firm to represent him and to appeal the clarifying order, but the McNair Firm filed the notice of appeal two days late. The appeal was voluntarily abandoned. Sartin then filed a malpractice suit against the McNair Firm and the district court granted the Firm's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court's original intent was to impose sanctions on Sartin individually and, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving effect to that intent in its Rule 60(a) clarification order. Because the court concluded that the district court's earlier case properly employed Rule 60(a), the court affirmed the district court's conclusion in this case that the McNair Firm's failure to appeal the earlier Rule 60(a) clarification order caused Sartin no injury. The court disposed of Sartin's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Sartin v. McNair Law Firm PA" on Justia Law

The court concluded that this appeal presented an issue of first impression that the Alabama Supreme Court is best-suited to resolve. Accordingly, the court certified the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court: Is an attorney whom an insurance company hires as an attorney agent providing a "legal service" within the meaning of Ala. Code 6-5-574 when he performs a title search, forms an unwritten opinion about the status of title, and then acts on that unwritten opinion by issuing a commitment to insure or an insurance policy?View "Mississippi Valley Title Ins., et al. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Montanez sued the City of Chicago and Officers Fico and Simon, alleging that Fico used excessive force while arresting him for drinking on a public way and Simon failed to intervene. He sustained minor injuries and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law. The state-law claims were dismissed as time-barred. The city conceded its obligation to indemnify, so the section 1983 claims proceeded to trial. Fico was found liable, Simon was cleared, and the jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. Montanez’s lawyers submitted a bill for more than $426,000 in attorneys’ fees and about $6,500 in costs and expenses. The judge scrutinized the bill line-by-line, discounted entries where more than one partner oversaw the same activities, or where the lawyers researched or drafted motions that were never filed, excluded hours spent on a full-day mock trial and entries related to matters that were essentially administrative matters, and reduced the hourly billing rates. After these and other reductions, the final award of costs was $3,051.94 and the court awarded $108,350.87 in fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the city’s “scorched-earth” defense strategy and the need for trial judges to exercise their broad discretion to adjust bloated bills for attorney’s fees after the fact and case-management authority during the litigation. View "Montanez v. Simon" on Justia Law

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, thousands of lawsuits were filed against the City, private contractors, and the WTC Captive. Following years of litigation and extensive negotiations, the parties agreed on a comprehensive settlement process. In these consolidated appeals, three of the district court's orders regarding the settlement process are at issue. The court vacated the order of the district court with respect to the Bonus Payment and remanded for further proceedings in this respect; reversed the order of the district court as to the Contingent Payment; affirmed the order of the district court denying a contingency attorneys' fees as to the Bonus Payment; and dismissed the appeal from the order denying a contingency attorneys' fee as to the First Contingent Payment.View "Cirino et al. v. City of New York et al." on Justia Law