Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In lieu of undergoing a formal audit, Louisiana law requires justices of the peace to file a sworn annual financial statement with the Louisiana Legislative Auditor. Officials who fail to file timely financial statements are notified that their names have been placed on a noncompliance list. According to a database maintained by the Legislative Auditor, respondent failed to file her annual financial statement for 2007, 2008, 2009. As of May 2013, when the hearing was held in this matter, respondent was still out of compliance for those years. In December 2010, the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission authorized the Office of Special Counsel to open a file regarding respondent based on the news report from a New Orleans television station that respondent's name had been placed on the Auditor's list. The Supreme Court found that the record established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to comply with the filing requirement of La. Rev. Stat. 24:514, thereby subjecting her to discipline. Respondent was ordered suspended without pay for twelve months, with six months deferred conditioned on her filing the requisite sworn annual financial statements for years 2007, 2008, and 2009 within three months of the date of this judgment. Respondent was further ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $246.70 in costs. View "In re Justice of the Peace Meyers" on Justia Law

The Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) served a notice of investigation on Circuit Judge Sandy Kautz pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the FLorida Judicial Qualifications Commissions Rules. The judge entered into a stipulation admitting that her appearance on behalf of her sister at her sister’s first appearance after an arrest was inappropriate. The judge further admitted that she had not comported herself with the requisite dignity and patience expected of her judicial office in presiding over certain types of cases. The JQC found and recommended that Judge Kautz receive a public reprimand. The Supreme Court approved of the stipulation and the JQC’s findings and recommendation. View "Inquiry Concerning Judge Sandy K. Kautz" on Justia Law

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board (collectively, the ODC) issued an informal advisory opinion that determined (1) the Attorney General did not have authority to prosecute criminal cases outside of the limited prosecutorial authority granted by W. Va. Code 5-3-2, and (2) the Rules of Professional Conduct would be violated if the Attorney General prosecuted assisted county prosecutors in certain criminal prosecutions. The Attorney General subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent ODC from enforcing the informal advisory opinion, contending that county prosecutors have authority to request the Attorney General to assist with criminal prosecutions and that the office of the Attorney General has independent common law authority to prosecute criminal cases. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) county prosecutors do not have statutory authority to appoint the Attorney General as a special prosecutor; and (2) under the state Constitution and statutory law, the common law criminal prosecutorial authority of the Attorney General was abolished. View "State ex rel. Morrisey v. W. Va. Office of Disciplinary Counsel" on Justia Law

In December 1995, Teresa Schmidt slipped and fell while visiting a Tacoma grocery store. She retained Timothy Coogan to represent her in a claim against the store. Just days before the statute of limitations ran, Coogan filed a complaint naming the wrong defendant. He subsequently filed two amended complaints, but the trial court dismissed the case as barred by the statute of limitations. Schmidt filed a complaint against Coogan, asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract. The case went to trial in November 2003, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt and granted recovery for past economic and noneconomic damages. The trial court granted a new trial on the issue of damages only, finding that Coogan was denied a fair trial: Schmidt's counsel gave an improper closing argument, and the damages were so excessive as to unmistakably indicate that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial. In 2010, Schmidt moved for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for outrage/reckless infliction of emotional distress, alleging that Coogan harassed, intimidated, and belittled her when she raised the problem of the statute of limitations before it expired. In the 2003 trial, the jury was instructed to determine general damages arising out of Coogan's conduct and malpractice. In the second trial, however, Coogan challenged the availability of general damages in legal malpractice cases. Because her counsel could not find settled authority either affirming or denying the availability of emotional distress damages in Washington, Schmidt sought to add a claim that encompassed the damages. The trial court denied Schmidt's motion to amend. Schmidt also filed a motion for summary judgment on the availability of general damages and a motion in limine. The court denied both motions. After Schmidt rested her case in the damages-only trial, Coogan moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that collectibility was an essential element of legal malpractice and that Schmidt presented no evidence that a judgment against Grocery Outlet would have been collectible. The court denied the motion, and the jury again returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt. Coogan appealed the jury verdict, and Schmidt cross appealed on the ground that general damages are available in attorney malpractice claims and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint. The Court of Appeals concluded that collectibility was an essential component of damages that Schmidt failed to prove, and it reversed the trial court's denial of Coogan's motion. This case presented two issues of first impression for the Supreme Court: (1) whether the elements of legal malpractice include the collectibility of an underlying judgment; and (2) whether emotional distress damages are available in legal malpractice cases. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment, holding that the uncollectibility of an underlying judgment is an affirmative defense to legal malpractice that defendant-attorneys must plead and prove. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court properly denied emotional distress damages because Coogan's actions were not particularly egregious, nor was the subject matter personal. View "Schmidt v. Coogan" on Justia Law

"[A]ll too often attorney fees become the tail that wags the dog in litigation." Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties LLC challenged an award of $14,553.50 in attorney fees to Ellis Law Group LLP (ELG) as the prevailing party on a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion). Sugar Loaf argued the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees for work on the anti-SLAPP motion performed by attorney Joseph Major because Major was a member of ELG on whose behalf the motion was filed. Relying on case law holding self-represented law firms may not be awarded attorney fees for an anti-SLAPP motion, Sugar Loaf argued the fee award must be reversed. ELG contended that Major acted as an independent contractor to the firm because he had no billable hour requirements, did not accrue vacation time, received no health care benefits, and was paid by the hour without deduction for taxes. The trial court agreed with ELG that Major's status as an independent contractor to ELG allowed the law firm to receive attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in awarding fees to ELG under the anti-SLAPP statute: Major was listed as a member of ELG in the caption of documents filed in support of ELG's anti-SLAPP motion; Major signed documents for ELG's anti-SLAPP motion as an attorney with ELG; Major did not file a notice of association or substitution to indicate he was acting as outside counsel to ELG; and when Major contacted opposing counsel regarding the filing of a document concerning the anti-SLAPP motion, he used an e-mail address and signature that identified him as a member of ELG. "The possibility that Major was paid in a manner different than a regular 'employee' of ELG may render him an independent contractor for taxation purposes, but does not make him separate counsel for ELG for purposes of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute." View "Ellis Law Group v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Prop." on Justia Law

Bradley Ian Berger and his law firm filed suit against debtor and his law partner in state court for outstanding fees owed to plaintiffs under a referral agreement between the parties. Berger had difficulty proving the amount of fees owed because debtor's partnership failed to file certain documents with the State. The failure led to discovery sanctions and the parties eventually settled. Berger subsequently filed an adversary proceeding against debtor in the bankruptcy court, arguing that 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(3) prevented debtor from obtaining bankruptcy relief. The court concluded that Berger failed to show that the facts of this case fell within the scope of section 727(a)(3) and the court rejected Berger's contention that the court's ruling permits debtor to evade his "legal and ethical duties" where debtor had already been sanctioned by the state court for failure to keep legally required documents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of debtor's motion for summary judgment.View "Berger & Assocs. Attorneys, P.C. v. Kran" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to approve the contingency fee arrangement he agreed to with his lawyer, following a successful claim for social security benefits. The magistrate judge determined that a fee in the amount of $11,876.65 was reasonable under 42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1). Plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the magistrate judge correctly started with the fee agreement, and after determining that the early retirement benefits were not past-due benefits "owed," went on to conclude an independent review of the resulting fee for reasonableness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the fee award because the court agreed with the magistrate judge's interpretation of the contract and found no error in his review of the fee.View "Keller v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five former seasonal and part-time police officers, filed suit against defendants, alleging wrongful termination and defamation claims. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of attorney's fees and costs to defendants under Rule 54(d) and 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). The court concluded that the County Defendants were the prevailing parties under Nemeroff v. Abelson. Plaintiffs' claims were frivolous from the outset, and required the County Defendants to litigate continuously at taxpayer expense since March 2007. Therefore, the award was within the district court's discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "Carter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced this action against their attorney and his law firm in state court for legal malpractice, alleging that the attorney was negligent in the performance of his duties as counsel to the unsecured creditors' committee. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction over the malpractice action for the committee and correctly dismissed the claim. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the removed legal malpractice action because it was a core proceeding. In this case, the employment of the attorney was approved by the bankruptcy court and was governed by 11 U.S.C. 1103; the attorney's duties pertained solely to the administration of the bankruptcy estate; and the claim asserted by plaintiffs was based solely on acts that occurred in the administration of the estate. The court also concluded that the district court correctly concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in dismissing the complaint because the attorney did not owe an individual duty of care. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case on the merits.View "Schultze, et al. v. Chandler, Sr., et al." on Justia Law

B&N, a law firm, represented debtor in his Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court converted the case to Chapter 7 and B&N's services were terminated. B&N then filed an application for fees in excess of $130,000. The bankruptcy court allowed approximately $20,000 and disallowed the remainder. The district court affirmed. Based on the court's review of the statutory framework and the court's decision in In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not apply the wrong standard in making its ruling on the fee application and thus did not abuse its discretion. The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that B&N was entitled to only a small subset of the fees requested. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Barron & Newburger, P.C. v. Texas Skyline, Ltd., et al." on Justia Law