Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellant Erika Fabian brought this action for legal malpractice and breach of contract by a third-party beneficiary, alleging respondents attorney Ross M. Lindsay, III and his law firm Lindsay & Lindsay made a drafting error in preparing a trust instrument for her late uncle and, as a result, she was effectively disinherited. Appellant appealed the circuit court order dismissing her action under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP for failing to state a claim and contended South Carolina should recognize a cause of action, in tort and in contract, by a third-party beneficiary of a will or estate planning document against a lawyer whose drafting error defeats or diminishes the client's intent. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fabian v. Lindsay" on Justia Law

The district court awarded attorneys fees to Lynn Urrutia against appellants Ty Harrison and Robert Schutte under Idaho Code section 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123, as well as sanctions against the appellants' attorney under Idaho Code section 12-123 and I.R.C.P. 11. These awards stemmed from the divorce of Lynn and Johnny Urrutia in 2007 and the divorce decree's division of the marital property. "'The most egregious conduct of defendants,' in the district court's opinion, was the filing of the Third Amended Counterclaim, which 'states two causes of action against Lynn: (1) that the second lien has priority over Lynn's claims and (2) that Lynn as the owner of the property was unjustly enriched.' The judge noted that the Second Lien, with a priority date of 2008, could not conceivably be higher in priority than Lynn's deed of trust, which was recorded in 2007. He observed that the Appellants knew the $220,000 claimed in the Second Lien, like the First Lien, contained numerous items that did not constitute improvements to the arena property and were not lienable under the mechanic's lien statutes. And, even though the Appellants knew that the owner of record of the arena property was Sundance Arena, LLC, they sought personal recovery against Lynn under an unjust enrichment theory for improvements made to the property, which she did not own." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the award of fees and sanctions to Lynn Urrutia. View "Urrutia v. Harrison" on Justia Law

This case was a permissive appeal of an order denying the appellants' motions for summary judgment. The central issue was whether an attorney who, as counsel for a corporation, issued an opinion letter stating that a stock redemption agreement did not violate the law, could be held liable to the shareholder whose stock was redeemed if the opinion was incorrect and the redemption agreement was later declared void as violating state law. The Supreme Court held that the claim against appellant Richard Riley was barred by res judicata and that there could be a claim against the remaining appellants where the opinion letter was addressed to respondent and stated that he could rely upon it. View "Taylor v. Riley" on Justia Law

On May 15, 2012, Karl H. Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney, and he was. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying "A"Ranch, Inc., and others, and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. In early 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them in their individual capacities. Substitution counsel entered appearances for the county commissioners in both cases. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. During the hearing, Lewies contended that substitution counsel should have been disqualified from representing the commissioners and that a deputy prosecutor should represent them. Ultimately the trial court entered a written order affirming its preliminary rulings. After several hearings, the court entered its memorandum decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees in the sum of $1,185.00 against Mr. Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), and Lewies appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Lewies v. Fremont County" on Justia Law

In 2005 class counsel initiated a class action against Wells Fargo on behalf of thousands of mortgage consultants who had allegedly been misclassified as exempt employees. In 2006 ILG filed a putative class action alleging similar claims on behalf of a similar class. An ILG class was initially certified, but was decertified in 2010. Eventually, ILG filed multiple lawsuits, each with 30 to 90 plaintiffs, on behalf of 600 clients, including Maxon. ILG, Wells Fargo and class counsel mediated all pending claims. In 2011, class counsel moved for preliminary approval of a proposed class and settlement; Wells Fargo agreed to pay $19 million, including attorney fees to class counsel, to settle all class claims and $6 million for the ILG claims. At the preliminary approval hearing, the court was told that ILG’s clients would opt out of the class action. Contrary to that explanation, ILG assisted its class member clients in securing the benefits of the class action settlement rather than in opting out to seek recompense from the $6 million fund. ILG claimed that that settlement was for its attorney fees, but was willing to pay $1,750 to each plaintiff for a claim arguably not resolved in the class action. Maxon objected. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order requiring ILG to deposit the funds into escrow. The appeals court affirmed. The court presiding over the class action had jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the settlement of class member claims, even for class members represented by ILG and had a duty to ensure that ILG’s fees were reasonable in light of the overall result. View "Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg." on Justia Law

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Seamus McCaffery has been temporarily relieved of his responsibilities on the Court. Media reports alleged that Justice McCaffery attempted to fix traffic tickets against his wife, authorized her "to accept hundreds of thousands of dollars in referral fees from plaintiffs’ firms while she served as [his] administrative assistant, and that he may have attempted to exert influence over a judicial assignment on the Philadelphia common pleas bench outside the scope of his official duties. Adding to the controversy was the Justice's acceptance of responsibility for exchanging hundreds of sexually explicit emails with a member or members of the Office of Attorney General, which surfaced in the course of the Attorney General’s review of the handling of the Gerald Sandusky investigation. Within thirty days, the Judicial Conduct Board shall make a determination, on an emergency basis, whether there is or is not probable cause to file formal misconduct charges against Justice McCaffery concerning any of the aforementioned allegations. View "In re: Mr. Justice Seamus McCaffery" on Justia Law

Noel Bisges represented debtor in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. United States Trustee Nancy Gargula moved to reopen the case after it was closed because she learned that debtor possibly failed to disclose in her bankruptcy petition that she owns horses. On appeal, Bisges challenged the district court's decision upholding the bankruptcy court's denial of Bisges's motion to dismiss and the imposition of sanctions against him. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where there is insufficient evidence of bad faith by Gargula. Further, the court saw no clear error in the bankruptcy judge's findings that Bisges advised debtor to omit from her bankruptcy petition a payment to her mother and Bisges violated 11 U.S.C. 707(b)(4)(C) by attaching to the bankruptcy petition schedules that significantly differed from the schedules that debtor had signed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bisges v. Gargula" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging that defendants breached a contract for legal services, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The district court granted defendants' motion to transfer the legal malpractice suit to the District of Nebraska. The district court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion to retransfer and concluded that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. Plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that, because the malpractice occurred exclusively in the District of Nebraska, there was no error in concluding that the Southern District of Iowa was an improper venue. Further, this issue is governed by the Nebraska, the transferee forum, choice-of-law principles. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment applying Nebraska's legal malpractice statute of limitations in ruling that plaintiffs' claim was time-barred. View "Steen v. Murray" on Justia Law

The attorneys filed suit on behalf of Carabello, who was injured in a collision while acting in the course of his employment. Old Republic, the workers’ compensation insurer, intervened to seek reimbursement. Casby, the other driver, raised a defense that limits the ability of an employer, or its insurer, to obtain reimbursement out of an injured worker’s recovery against a third party where the employer’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The drivers settled for her $100,000 policy limits. The check was deposited in the attorneys’ account, with signatures of both parties required to withdraw any money” Old Republic sought apportionment, claiming the entire settlement, but later withdrew its motion and filed a notice of lien seeking $111,026.33. It is not clear that the attorneys were notified of the dismissal. The attorneys later dismissed the Carabello complaint with prejudice and took the position that by dismissing its pleading, Old Republic had forfeited any right to litigate employer negligence and to recover on its lien. The attorneys later moved, under the anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), to strike claims that they wrongfully withdrew the settlement. The trial court concluded that dismissal of all affirmative pleadings had deprived it of jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed. In determining whether a claim arises from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP law, the focus is on the wrongful, injurious acts or omissions identified in the complaint and whether they fit the statute’s description of protected conduct. Because the withdrawal of funds was neither communicative nor related to an issue of public interest, the trial court properly denied the motion. View "Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo Law Firm" on Justia Law

In 2002, David hired the Attorneys to represent him in petitioning for his appointment as probate conservator of the person and estate of his mother, Donna. In his petition, David represented there were no conservatorship assets and that all of Donna’s assets were held in her Trust, so that no bond was required. Donna actually owned significant assets, including real property and several individual retirement accounts (IRAs), individually and not as assets of her Trust. The probate court appointed David as conservator of both Donna’s person and estate and waived bond. The Attorneys continued to represent David and allegedly “knew that Donna . . . had assets in her name that under California law were assets of the conservatorship,” but never informed the probate court of their existence nor petitioned the court to require or increase a bond. David subsequently misappropriated over one million dollars. Stine, a subsequently-appointed licensed professional fiduciary sued David for financial elder abuse and conversion and the Attorneys for legal malpractice. The trial court dismissed the Attorneys. The court of appeal reversed holding that the successor trustee is not subject to any defense that can be interposed against David and David’s malfeasance. View "Stine v. Dell'Osso" on Justia Law