Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against justices of the Arizona Supreme Court challenging the Arizona Supreme Court Rule 34(f) (the AOM Rule). The AOM Rule permits admission on motion to the Arizona Bar for attorneys who are admitted to practice law in states that permit Arizona attorneys to be admitted to the bars of those states on a basis equivalent to Arizona’s AOM Rule, but requires attorneys admitted to practice law in states that do not have such reciprocal admission rules to take the uniform bar exam (UBE) in order to gain admission to the Arizona Bar. The court concluded that although plaintiffs can establish Article III standing based on injuries suffered by Plaintiff Girvin, plaintiffs failed to establish that the AOM Rule is unconstitutional on First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, or Privileges and Immunities Clause grounds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the justices. View "NAAMJP V. Berch" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff fell behind on her payments to Attorney in the underlying litigation, Attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff and requested a charging lien in the amount of approximately $300,000. Plaintiff did not oppose Attorney’s withdrawal but did oppose the entry of a charging lien. The Court of Chancery found that a charging lien was appropriate and granted a charging lien in the amount of $200,000 against any judgment in this action, holding (1) a fee agreement between the parties did not preclude the entry of a charging lien; (2) the total amount of the charging lien that was appropriate in this case should not exceed Plaintiff’s lowest-possible net recovery of $263,872; and (3) Attorney was not liable to the experts for their fees, so there was no basis for include those fees in the charging lien. View "In re Zutrau v. Jansing & ICE Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent Mickey K. Weber, Judge of the Clarksville Town Court, pled guilty to criminal mischief in the second degree and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1 and 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and was aggravated by the fact that Respondent had previous legal issues related to alcohol abuse. The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications (Commission) brought a judicial disciplinary action against Respondent based on his conduct. The Supreme Court reprimanded Judge Weber, ordered Respondent’s resignation from the Clarksville Town, and directed that Weber shall be ineligible for future judicial service until he successfully completes an approved treatment plan and two-year monitoring agreement approved by the Indiana Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. View "In re Hon. Mickey K. Weber" on Justia Law

The Nelsons sued Chicago law firm Freeborn & Peters for malpractice, seeking $1.3 million in damages and were awarded more than $1 million. The malpractice claim arose from a transaction that the law firm handled involving acquisition of a shopping center under construction in Algonquin, Illinois. The law firm represented both the contract purchaser and the Nelsons, who invested in the venture, which suffered losses following the downturn of September 2008. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that any error in the allocation of damages did not hurt the law firm or any creditors. View "Nelson Bros. Prof'l Real Estate, LLC v. Freeborn & Peters, LLP" on Justia Law

Cohen and Cohen and Associates Law Corporation represented Slack in a personal injury action on a contingent fee basis. They withdrew from the representation and Drell took over the case. Cohen asserted an attorney fee lien, informing one of the insurers in the personal injury case that any payment of funds to Slack was subject to a lien for their fees incurred during their representation. Drell negotiated settlement of the case, but the insurer made the check payable to Cohen and Drell. Cohen filed a special motion to strike Drell’s complaint seeking declaratory judgment, claiming that it arose from their protected activity of asserting a lien in a demand letter that threatened litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16 (b)(1).)1. The trial court denied the motion, finding the gravamen of the complaint was not protected activity and denied Drell’s request for attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the declaratory relief action targeted protected activity. View "Drell v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In 2006 Bey was convicted for making false statements in a bankruptcy proceeding and received a below-guidelines sentence of three months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed her conviction found that the sentence was too low and remanded for resentencing. After remand by the Supreme Court, the district court resentenced Bey to 24 months in prison and ordered her to self-surrender. After the second extension, Bey’s lawyer, Anderson, mailed her a letter enclosing the court’s order resetting her surrender date to December 2008. When Bey did not surrender, an arrest warrant was issued. After a year, she was arrested and charged with knowingly failing to surrender to serve her sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(2). Bey moved to dismiss her indictment and to suppress evidence that attorney Anderson notified her of the self-surrender date because, she asserted, it was a privileged communication. The district court denied the motion. At trial Bey objected to testimony from Anderson about any conversations they had and to the admission of his letter to Bey. The judged redacted part of the letter, admitting three sentences from it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A lawyer’s communication of the defendant’s surrender date is not a privileged communication. View "United States v. Bey" on Justia Law

The Firm and its former partner seek a writ of mandate in this action for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract against the Firm and the former partner. At issue was whether the attorney-client privilege applies to intrafirm communications between attorneys concerning disputes with a current client, when that client later sues the firm for malpractice. The court concluded that when an attorney representing a current client seeks legal advice from an in-house attorney concerning a dispute with the client, the attorney-client privilege may apply to their confidential communications. Adoption of the so-called "fiduciary" and "current client" exceptions to the attorney-client privilege is contrary to California law because California courts are not at liberty to create implied exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. The court granted in part the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Palmer v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

During the underlying litigation, Attorney Jeffrey Ryan, counsel for the plaintiff, attempted to engage in allegedly surreptitious communication with his client while a question was pending at a deposition. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for discovery sanctions, concluding that Ryan did indeed attempt to communicate surreptitiously with his client, that Ryan manufactured false evidence, and that Ryan lied to the court. The court ordered Ryan to pay monetary sanctions and directed him to show cause why it should not revoke his permission to practice pro hac vice for the plaintiff for flagrant violations of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. After considering Ryan's response and conducting a de novo review of the entire record, the district court again found that Ryan lied to the court and opposing counsel and submitted false evidence and issued an order revoking Ryan’s pro hac vice admission. The First Circuit affirmed the orders revoking Ryan’s pro hac vice admission and imposing monetary sanctions, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the sanction for Ryan’s misbehavior. View "Ryan v. Astra Tech, Inc." on Justia Law

Holt threw eggs on the Katheiser driveway to frighten Kartheiser and his 6 year old daughter. Represented by counsel, she entered a negotiated guilty plea to resisting a peace officer. The other charge was nol-prossed. She was sentenced to 12 months of probation and was ordered to provide documentation of treatment. The court admonished Holt that the agreement involved a “conviction.” Days later, she filed a pro se motion to vacate, stating that she “was told there would be no conviction” and “never had the chance to testify.” Her counsel was allowed to withdraw. The circuit court granted the motion to withdraw the plea and appointed the public defender. The next day, Holt filed a pro se “Petition to Quash … the police report,” claiming tampering with the record, police brutality, and that her children were missing. After several more incidents, Holt was placed in a mental health center. She filed notice of appeal and a “Demand Letter for Formal Correction,” seeking to “hold Tim Brown accountable for ‘Bearing FALSE Witness’ the 8th Great Commandment and for Defamation.” The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Holt had been found fit to stand trial during the pendency of the appeal so that whether she received effective assistance of counsel during proceedings below was moot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating that public interest exception applies to warrant review. Where the evidence clearly indicates that defendant is unfit to stand trial, but a defendant contends that he is fit, counsel is not obligated to argue for a finding of fitness. In doing so, counsel would be violating his duty to the client and suborning a violation of due process. View "People v. Holt" on Justia Law

Edmonds was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1975. He became a member of St. Mark Church. In1998, Sloan asked Edmonds to rewrite Sloan’s will to benefit St. Mark’s. Edmonds knew Hannah, a lawyer who, in 1992, was suspended for neglecting and misrepresenting client matters, failing to maintain a client trust account, and commingling. In 1994, Hannah was suspended until further order; he never sought reinstatement. Edmonds was unaware of Hannah’s disciplinary status and believed that Hannah was an estate planning expert. Edmonds introduced Hannah to Sloan, who transferred some assets to American Express for Hannah’s management. Sloan’s trust held $3.36 million at one point. Sloan died in 2000. Edmonds acted as executor and trustee. At his direction, the trust and estate bought Range Energy stock recommended by Hannah. Hannah eventually became president and CEO of Range, which, by 2001, held all of Sloan’s personal assets and most of the trust assets. In 2003, the British Columbia Securities Commission suspended trading of Range stock, which ultimately became worthless. Edmonds did not inform St. Mark’s about the situation. The church eventually filed suit. In 2009, the successor trustee closed the trust with a balance of $1,149. The ARDC Hearing Board found that Edmonds breached fiduciary duties, engaged in dishonest conduct, neglected an estate matter associated with the trust, and commingled his funds with client or third-party funds. The Review Board reversed the findings of breach of fiduciary duty and dishonest conduct and recommended that Edmonds be suspended for 60 days. The Illinois Supreme Court imposed a three-month suspension. View "In re Edmonds" on Justia Law