Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

After the FAA suspended petitioner's license as an airplane mechanic, the NTSB vacated the suspension and found that the FAA's position had been unreasonable and not substantially justified. Petitioner filed suit seeking recovery of legal fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). The NTSB denied fee-shifting under the Act because it concluded that petitioner had not "incurred" the fees associated with his legal defense in the license suspension proceedings. The court held that the NTSB's conclusion was arbitrary and capricious where the NTSB should have considered that under the Alabama law of quantum meruit, petitioner was obligated to pay his attorneys for the value of their services. Therefore, petitioner "incurred" fees and may obtain EAJA fee-shifting. The court granted the petition, vacated the decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. NTSB" on Justia Law

During 2002 and 2003, a Colorado state public defender with the Mesa County Regional Office represented defendant Thomas West after the victim's mother, D.S., informed police that she discovered West lying in bed next to her six-year-old daughter with his genitals exposed. D.S. and her ex-husband, D.E.S., both testified at trial for the prosecution. Colorado public defenders had represented D.S. approximately 23 times over the eight years preceding West's case. Although West's trial counsel had never himself represented D.S., the Mesa County Office represented her seven times between 1998 and 2001. D.S. was also a client of the El Paso County Regional Office, where she had an open case during West's trial at issue here. In addition, the Mesa County Office represented D.S.'s ex-husband, D.E.S., five times between 1999 and 2002. West's trial counsel had filed an entry of appearance in one of these cases, although the prosecution dismissed that case four days after that entry of appearance. West's trial counsel did not inform West or the trial court about these possible conflicts of interest. There was no record regarding the conflict at trial. The jury convicted West of sexual assault on a child. Following his trial, West filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, alleging that his trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest. The trial court found no conflict and denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that an actual conflict of interest arose from the public defender's dual role as prior and current counsel for D.S. and as prior counsel for D.E.S. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the analytical framework a trial court should use to resolve a criminal defendant's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on alleged conflicts of interest arising from concurrent or successive representation of witnesses against the defendant. The Court shared petitioners' contention that, under "Colorado v. Castro," (657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983)), they should not be required to demonstrate a separate "adverse effect" in addition to a conflict of interest in order to receive new trials. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on trial counsel's alleged conflict of interest arising from concurrent or successive representation of trial witnesses against a defendant, the Court held that a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence both a conflict of interest and an adverse effect resulting from that conflict. View "West v. People" on Justia Law

In 1999, Christeson was convicted of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Christeson’s conviction and sentence and denial of his post-conviction motion for relief. Under the one-year limitations period imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U. S. C. 244(d)(1), Christeson’s federal habeas petition was due on April 10, 2005. Nine months before that deadline, the court appointed attorneys Horwitz and Butts to represent Christeson, 18 U. S. C. 599(a)(2). The attorneys subsequently acknowledged that they failed to meet with Christeson until six weeks after his petition was due. There is no evidence that they communicated with him at all. They finally filed the petition 117 days late. The district court dismissed; the Eighth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Christeson, who has severe cognitive disabilities, relied entirely on his attorneys, and may not have known of the dismissal. About seven years later, the attorneys contacted attorneys Merrigan and Perkovich to discuss Christeson’s case. Christeson’s only hope for merits review was to move under FRCP60(b) to reopen final judgment on the ground that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled. Horwitz and Butts would not file that motion, premised on their own malfeasance. In 2014, Merrigan and Perkovich unsuccessfully moved to substitute counsel. The Eighth Circuit dismissed, reasoning that they were not authorized to file on Christeson’s behalf. The Missouri Supreme Court set an October 29, 2014 execution date. The district court denied a second motion as untimely, stating that Horwitz and Butts had not “abandoned” Christeson, and reasoning that allowing the motion would permit “‘abusive’” delays in capital cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court stayed execution and reversed, stating that the denials contravened its 2012 decision, Martel v. Clair, concerning the “interests of justice” standard, and noting the obvious conflict of interest with respect to the original attorneys. View "Christeson v. Roper" on Justia Law

The underlying litigation in this appeal stemmed from WM's suit against a former employee for misappropriating confidential business information and violating the terms of his employment agreement. This appeal arose from a contempt proceeding ancillary to the merits of the underlying case where Michael A. Moore, the attorney for the employee, appealed the imposition of sanctions following a finding that Moore was in civil contempt. The court concluded that the district court's finding that Moore participated in an attempt to mislead the court as to the existence of a thumb disk drive is clearly erroneous; Moore's failure to comply with the terms of a preliminary injunction by not producing an iPad image was excusable because the order required Moore to violate the attorney-client privilege; and requiring Moore to produce the iPad itself also violated the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court. The court denied Moore's motion to remove WM as appellee. View "Waste Mgmt. of WA v. Kattler" on Justia Law

Flora worked as Luzerne County Public Defender from 1980- 2013. He became Chief Public Defender in 2010, maintaining a private practice. His predecessor had tried to secure additional funding by submitting weekly reports concerning excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies. Flora obtained grant funding for representing juveniles, but was not able to obtain additional money for adult offenders. Flora reported that the existing level of resources did not allow the Office to provide constitutionally adequate representation. The County was unresponsive, so Flora refused representation to those not faced with incarceration. In 2012 Flora initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants and sought an injunction to prevent his firing. The state court ordered the County to provide adequate funding and prohibited refusing representation to indigent defendants. While the parties were in mediation, the County approved new positions. The funding litigation followed the “Kids for Cash” scandal. From 2003-2008, about 50% of Luzerne County juvenile offenders appeared in court without counsel. Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent. Federal investigators uncovered that judges had accepted kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention facilities to send unrepresented juveniles to those facilities. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency adjudications. Flora alleges that, in 2013, he learned that 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged and reported the matter. Flora was relieved of his duties. Flora sued, alleging retaliation for his funding lawsuit and for reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that, under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Lane v. Franks, Flora pled facts sufficient to allege that he spoke as a citizen. View "Flora v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

Rojas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Cicero fired him because he supported a political opponent of the town president. A jury awarded him $650,000 in damages, but the judge granted a new trial, concluding that Kurtz, Rojas’s lawyer, had engaged in misconduct by making misleading statements, eliciting hearsay responses to prejudice the defendants even though the judge would strike them, arguing in a way that informed the jury about excluded evidence, and undermining the credibility of a defense witness by asking questions that presented him in a bad light, without a good-faith basis for the questions. The parties settled, providing Rojas with $212,500 compensation for the discharge and Kurtz with fees of $287,500. The settlement did not resolve motions for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927, which authorizes sanctions against lawyers who needlessly multiply proceedings, and under FRCP 26(g)(3) based on not revealing bankruptcy proceedings that could have affected whether Rojas was a proper plaintiff. The judge denied sanctions, reasoning that Rojas and Kurtz lost about $400,000 apiece when the settlement replaced the verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to section 1927, but vacated with respect to the rule, which does not afford judges the same discretion. View "Rojas v. Town of Cicero" on Justia Law

In 2009 defendant was sentenced to 24 months in prison, with 3 years of supervised release, as a felon in possession of a gun. After his 2011 release, he violated probation and was sentenced to five months in prison plus 30 months more of supervised release. After subsequent violations, the judge ordered 45 days of home confinement with electronic monitoring and enrollment in a mental health treatment program. In 2013, the probation officer advised the judge that defendant had committed five traffic offenses in one day. The judge revoked supervised release, imposing a five-month sentence of imprisonment with two more years of supervised release. He was released; his probation officer advised the court that defendant had again violated. Although the recommended range was 5 to 11 months, the government asked for 15 months. Counsel noted that defendant had young children and that prior employers would rehire him. The judge sentenced him to 15 months with no more supervised release. After supplemental briefing, the Seventh Circuit vacated, after learning that the prosecutor in an earlier matter involving the defendant became the judge who sentenced him. The possibility that a conscious or unconscious recollection influenced the sentence cannot be excluded. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Howard allegedly rear-ended Gumby's vehicle, Gumby sued Howard and his employer, UPS. Contending that Gumby’s health might have contributed to the accident, UPS requested information including medical records and the identity of anyone with knowledge concerning this defense. Gumby provided the names of one physician and one hospital from which he had received pre-accident care. Gumby died a year later. Comstock, Gumby’s daughter and estate administrator, was substituted as plaintiff. A year after discovery began, Comstock produced documents revealing more medical providers, but did not produce all requested information. The court ordered Comstock to complete production by September 28. She failed to do so. In December 2012, Comstock provided UPS with over 3,000 pages of documents. Some were duplicates, but new documents showed that Gumby had vision problems; suffered dizziness, paranoia, and hallucinations while driving; had been instructed not to drive at night; and had been hospitalized hours before the accident. Comstock had called law enforcement that night, worried because Gumby, had left Pennsylvania to drive to Arkansas. UPS had already deposed Gumby and family members. The district court noted further misconduct concerning expert test results. The court found “extreme prejudice” and sanctioned Comstock under FRCP37(b)(2) by dismissal. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.View "Comstock v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

Howard allegedly rear-ended Gumby's vehicle, Gumby sued Howard and his employer, UPS. Contending that Gumby’s health might have contributed to the accident, UPS requested information including medical records and the identity of anyone with knowledge concerning this defense. Gumby provided the names of one physician and one hospital from which he had received pre-accident care. Gumby died a year later. Comstock, Gumby’s daughter and estate administrator, was substituted as plaintiff. A year after discovery began, Comstock produced documents revealing more medical providers, but did not produce all requested information. The court ordered Comstock to complete production by September 28. She failed to do so. In December 2012, Comstock provided UPS with over 3,000 pages of documents. Some were duplicates, but new documents showed that Gumby had vision problems; suffered dizziness, paranoia, and hallucinations while driving; had been instructed not to drive at night; and had been hospitalized hours before the accident. Comstock had called law enforcement that night, worried because Gumby, had left Pennsylvania to drive to Arkansas. UPS had already deposed Gumby and family members. The district court noted further misconduct concerning expert test results. The court found “extreme prejudice” and sanctioned Comstock under FRCP37(b)(2) by dismissal. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Comstock v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

Symetra appealed the district court's refusal to award attorneys' fees under the Texas and Washington State Structured Settlement Protection Acts (SSPAs). Rapid cross appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees as damages for tortious interference and the district court's permanent injunction, arguing that the injunction relies on an erroneous interpretation of the SSPAs. The court concluded that the district court erroneously held that Symetra could not recover any fees under the SSPAs where specific transfers were challenged throughout this litigation and Symetra can recover some portion of its fees related to some of those transfers. Therefore, remand is appropriate, but Symetra bears the burden of segregating fees and the district court retains discretion to deny Symetra's attorneys' fees request for failure to segregate. The court also concluded that the district court's award of fees incurred in state court with respect to one annuitant as damages for tortious interference under Texas law was proper where the natural and proximate cause of Rapid's conduct toward the annuitant was to drag Symetra into Indiana state court litigation. The district court's requirement that state court transfer orders also list first-refusal rights contravenes the SSPAs. However, the court found no error in the district court's analysis of first refusal rights under the SSPAs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symetra Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd." on Justia Law