Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Magistrate Douglas A. Krull, in his private practice, represented a mother in a pending action against her ex-husband to modify child custody provisions of their dissolution decree. A police officer sought a search warrant in a burglary investigation targeting the parties’ son, and Krull signed the warrant to search the home of his client. The Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications recommended that the Supreme Court publicly reprimand Krull based on its finding that Krull violated three disciplinary rules governing part-time judicial magistrates by signing the search warrant. The Supreme Court imposed the recommended sanction of a public reprimand, holding (1) by signing the warrant, Krull violated the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct; and (2) because Krull was previously admonished for signing a warrant to search the home of a party in a civil case he was handling in his private practice, a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction here. View "In re Krull" on Justia Law

Tuzzolino and his law firm represented Coletta. Coletta alleged that, in litigation, Tuzzolino failed to timely disclose expert witnesses; failed to retain needed expert witnesses; advised Coletta to settle for an amount far less than Coletta’s losses; told Coletta that negotiations were continuing after dismissal; and signed settlement documents without informing Coletta. According to Coletta, Tuzzolino offered to pay $670,000 to settle any potential malpractice claim, but never paid. Three months later, shortly before the expiration of the firm’s 2007-08 malpractice policy with ISBA Mutual, Tuzzolino completed a renewal application. In response to: “Has any member of the firm become aware of a past or present circumstance(s), act(s), error(s) or omission(s), which may give rise to a claim that has not been reported?” Tuzzolino checked “no.” Mutual issued the policy. Tuzzolino’s partner, Terpinas, learned of Tuzzolino’s malfeasance a month later, when he received a lien letter from Coletta’s attorney. Terpinas reported the claim to Mutual, which sought rescission and other relief. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Tuzzolino and rescinded the policy, finding that Mutual had no duty to defend Terpinas or the firm against Coletta’s action. The appellate court reversed as to Terpinas, citing the common law “innocent insured doctrine.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the rescission, citing 215 ILCS 5/154, which allows rescission in cases involving misrepresentations “made by the insured or in his behalf,” with an actual intent to deceive or that “materially affect the acceptance of the risk or hazard assumed by the insurer.” View "Ill. State Bar Ass'n Mut. Ins. Co. v. Law Office of Tuzzolino & Terpinas" on Justia Law

Guam attorney Lujan was sued in two lawsuits in Hawaii, followed by another in California, which could have cost him millions of dollars, loss of reputation, and possibly his license to practice law. He hired a law firm with offices in San Francisco and Guam to represent him, which included filing two more proceedings. The representation generated significant billings about which Lujan complained, refusing to pay a large balance. The firm withdrew from the representation, and sued. A jury returned a verdict for the firm of $945,947.90 “together with its disbursements and costs, including expert witness fees, in the amount of $_____, prevailing party attorneys’ fees as allowed by contract in the amount of $_____, and pre-judgment interest as allowed by contract in the amount of $_____.” The court later awarded $331,545.51 in prejudgment interest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The firm filed a memorandum of costs and a motion for attorney fees based on the engagement letter Lujan had signed. Following thousands of pages of briefing and oral argument, the trial court forwarded $1,532,674 in attorney fees, and $123,227 in expert witness fees, based on a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Calvo, Fisher & Jacob v. Lujan" on Justia Law

Knight, a member of the International Longshoremen’s Association, was financial secretary for the Local. In 2000, he distributed a flier stating the Local was hosting the Worker’s Coalition. McBride, director of Diamond State Port Corporation (which operates the Port of Wilmington where Union members work) offered to be a speaker and contributed $500 to the hotel hosting the meeting. The Union’s national vice president, Paylor, told McBride that Worker’s Coalition was not affiliated with the Union. McBride withdrew as a speaker, but he did not seek return of the $500. Knight filed Union charges against Paylor for interfering with the Local. Paylor counter-charged, alleging frivolous claims and using the Union name without permission. A hearing board cleared Paylor, but decided that Knight committed violations. Knight filed suit. On first remand, the district court ordered and the Union created a new policy and held a new hearing. The Union did not comply with an order to change its constitution. On second appeal, the Third Circuit held that Knight’s due process rights were not violated in the second hearing, but the district court awarded Knight attorney’s fees ($243,758.34), costs, and interest, reasoning that, because of Knight’s suit, Union members: can no longer be disciplined for harmless references to the Union name or logo; are more aware of disciplinary hearing due process rights; and, are properly informed about the Act. On third appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. View "McBride v. Int'l Longshoremens Ass'n" on Justia Law

Spencer stopped paying her mortgage in 2008. In Wisconsin state court foreclosure proceedings, Spencer’s attorney, Nora, adopted an “object-to-everything litigation strategy and buried the state court in a blizzard of motions.” While a hearing on a summary judgment motion was pending in state court, Nora removed the case to federal court. Finding no objectively reasonable basis for removal, the district court remanded the case and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the lender, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). The Seventh Circuit dismissed Spencer’s appeal as frivolous; the district court did not order her to pay anything. The court affirmed the award as to Spencer “because she has not offered even a colorable argument that removal was reasonable” and ordered Nora to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for litigating a frivolous appeal. Several months later, noting Nora’s similar behavior in another case, the court imposed an increased sanction of $2,500, suspended until the time, if ever, that Nora submits further inappropriate filings, and directed the clerk of court to forward a copy of the order and earlier opinion to the Office of Lawyer Regulation of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. View "PNC Bank v. Spencer" on Justia Law

HSBC initiated a Wisconsin foreclosure action on the Rinaldi’s mortgage. The Rinaldis counterclaimed, alleging that the mortgage paperwork had been fraudulently altered and that HSBC lacked standing to enforce the mortgage. The Rinaldis lost at summary judgment and did not appeal. The court later vacated its foreclosure judgment after HSBC agreed to modify the loan. The Rinaldis filed a new state lawsuit reasserting their counterclaims. Before the court ruled on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Rinaldis filed for bankruptcy. In those proceedings, HSBC filed a proof of claim for the mortgage. The Rinaldis objected and filed adversary claims, alleging fraud, abuse of process, tortious interference, breach of contract, and violations of RICO and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The bankruptcy court found in favor of HSBC and recommended denial of the adversarial claims. The district court agreed, noting the Rinaldis’ failure to comply with Federal Rules. The court dismissed the Rinaldis’ adversary claims as meritless and warned that the Rinaldis would face sanctions if they filed additional frivolous filings because their tactics had “vexatious and time- and resource-consuming” and their filings “nigh-unintelligible.” After additional filings of the same type, the Rinaldis voluntarily dismissed their bankruptcy. Their attorney filed additional frivolous motions. The court ordered the attorney to pay $1,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sanction. View "Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications brought a judicial disciplinary action against Respondent Dianna L. Bennington, Judge of the Muncie City Court. The parties subsequently jointly tendered a statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline stipulating to certain facts and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The stipulated facts and violations fell into four categories: misuse of judicial authority, failure to follow proper legal procedures in guilty plea and sentencing hearings, injudicious behavior outside of the courtroom, and noncooperation with the Commission. The Supreme Court accepted the joint submission and agreed sanction and ordered that Respondent be permanently banned from serving in any judicial capacity of any kind. As required by the Court’s order, Respondent tendered her resignation to the Governor. View "In re Hon. Dianna L. Bennington" on Justia Law

Defendant was awarded monetary sanctions for attorney's fees and expenses he accrued in defending a defamation action brought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that defendant, publisher of a website called Iranianlobby.com, defamed plaintiffs in a series of articles and blog posts claiming that they had secretly lobbied on behalf of the Iranian regime in the United States. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's award of sanctions. The court concluded that the district court was well within its discretion in sanctioning plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 where plaintiffs failed to obey two direct court orders. The district court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs acted in bad faith in light of their failure to explain their withholding of so many relevant documents, some of which they misrepresented to the district court that they could not locate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the district court's award of sanctions. The court reversed the award related to defendant's expenses in preparing the portions of his motion related to NIAC's alteration of a document and Trita Parsi's interrogatory responses, as well as the award of post-judgment interest to run from September 13, 2010. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Parsi v. Daioleslam" on Justia Law

Appellant and her law firm appealed the bankruptcy court's contempt order holding them in civil contempt for failing to pay sanctions imposed for prior misconduct. The misconduct stemmed from appellant's misconduct in her legal representation of debtor during bankruptcy proceedings. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to enforce the sanctions orders through any appropriate means, including a civil contempt order; the court rejected appellant's contention that she was "threatened" with imprisonment and concluded that the order does not violate the prohibition on imprisonment for a debt; and the order was not an abuse of the bankruptcy court's discretion because appellant is not protected by her alleged membership in her LLC where she was found in civil contempt for failure to pay sanctions that she owed because of her own misconduct in prior bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "Garrett v. Coventry II DDR" on Justia Law

Respondent, an attorney licensed to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts, was suspended from the practice of law in Maine based on a finding of incapacity by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants. After entry of the Maine order, bar counsel in Massachusetts petitioned for an order transferring Respondent to disability inactive status in Massachusetts pursuant to the reciprocal provisions of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 13(1). After a hearing, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court placed Respondent on disability inactive status in Massachusetts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Respondent’s suspension in Maine based on a finding of incapacity was the practical equivalent of a transfer to “disability inactive status” for purposes of the reciprocal disability provision of Rule 4:01, 13(1), and the single justice correctly concluded that Respondent was not entitled to a separate hearing in Massachusetts to evaluate her incapacity before transferring her to disability inactive status. View "In re Dwyer-Jones" on Justia Law