Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This matter stemmed from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of respondent Justice of the Peace Lorne L. Landry to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Supreme Court Rule XXXIX. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent willfully and knowingly failed to comply with the filing requirement of Rule XXXIX, thereby subjecting him to discipline. Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500, plus costs. Respondent was further ordered to file his 2011 financial disclosure statement. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Lorne L. Landry, Plaquemines Parish, Ward 8" on Justia Law

This matter comes before the court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana that Judge Sheva M. Sims of the Shreveport City Court, Caddo Parish, be suspended without pay for 90 days and ordered to reimburse the Commission's costs. The charge arose from an incident that occurred between Judge Sims and an assistant city prosecutor, Katherine Gilmer, on April 24, 2012, wherein Judge Sims stated that Ms. Gilmer was “held in contempt” of court and then ordered the dismissal of fifteen criminal cases on the docket that day. After reviewing the record and applicable law, the Supreme Court found that the charge against Judge Sims was supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, the Court rejected the recommended discipline and instead ordered Judge Sims be suspended without pay for a period of 30 days. Furthermore, the Court ordered Judge Sims to reimburse the Commission’s costs incurred relative to its investigation and prosecution of this case. View "In re: Judge Sheva M. Sims, Shreveport City Court, Caddo Parish" on Justia Law

Colosi lost a wrongful termination suit against her former employer, JLL. As the prevailing party, JLL filed a $6,369.55 bill of costs that the court clerk approved without modification, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Colosi objected to most of the charges and moved to reduce the bill to $253.50. The district court denied the motion, finding each cost reasonable, necessary to the litigation, and properly taxable under statute, 28 U.S.C. 1920. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Most of the costs Colosi challenged related to witness depositions. Necessity is determined as of the time of taking, and the fact that a deposition is not actually used at trial is not controlling. View "Colosi v. Jones Lang LaSalle Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The district court appointed two attorneys from the Des Moines adult public defender’s office to represent Defendant. When the two attorneys discovered that other attorneys in their office had previously represented three of the State’s witnesses on unrelated matters, the attorneys requested a determination whether a conflict of interest existed requiring their disqualification. After a hearing, the district court concluded that a conflict of interest disqualified all attorneys employed at the public defender’s office from serving as Defendant’s counsel in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prior representations of the witnesses in unrelated matters by other members of the public defender’s office did not represent an actual conflict or a serious potential conflict that justified disqualification of the attorneys. View "State v. McKinley" on Justia Law

Gordon was admitted to the New York State bar in 1989. Following referral by the Second Circuit, the Committee on Admissions and Grievances found clear and convincing evidence that Gordon had engaged in misconduct in that Gordon had: filed several nearly identical “summary judgment” motions in at least nine cases that were not authorized by any rule of appellate procedure; failed to comply with an order directing him to either withdraw those motions or explain their legal basis; failed in 17 cases to file scheduling notification letters, in violation of court rules; failed in 11 cases to comply with court-imposed deadlines, resulting in dismissal of two cases; and failed to oppose the government’s motion for summary affirmance in at least one case. The Committee found that Gordon’s explanations for his failure to comply were “inconsistent, disingenuous, and lacking in credibility,” and that his lack of candor during its hearing violated New York Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1). After considering mitigating and aggravating factors, the Committee recommended that Gordon be publicly reprimanded and required to attend continuing legal education classes in appellate immigration law. The Second Circuit adopted the Committee’s report, reprimanded Gordon, and suspended him from practice for two months. View "In re Gordon" on Justia Law

In this original disciplinary proceeding against district judge Timothy H. Henderson (Respondent), the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed a formal complaint against Respondent, alleging three counts of judicial misconduct constituting various violations of the Kansas Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent denied that he violated the Code. After a public hearing, the hearing panel found Code violations under all three counts and recommended that Respondent be disciplined by public censure. The Supreme Court concluded that Respondent violated the Code and ordered that Respondent be suspended from his judicial duties for ninety days without pay and that he complete a course in sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation prevention training. View "In re Henderson" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought the disqualification of the law firm of AlvaradoSmith, which: (1) previously represented another law firm in an attorney fee dispute; and (2) in this case, represented an expert seeking consulting fees arising out of the same underlying litigation as the attorney fee dispute. The Court of Appeal issued a stay order and order to show cause, and later concluded that due to AlvaradoSmith's wide-ranging access to privileged information in the first representation and the substantial relationship between the two matters required the firm to be disqualified. View "Acacia Patent Acquisition v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of first-degree statutory sodomy. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to disqualify the entire Newton County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (NCPAO) due to a conflict of interest, and (2) entering a written judgment reflecting convictions of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy when, in fact, Defendant was convicted of only one count of that offense. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to one count of first-degree statutory sodomy and vacated the judgment as to the second count of first-degree statutory sodomy, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant’s motion to disqualify the entire NCPAO; and (2) because the written judgment erroneously stated that Defendant was found guilty on two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, the written judgment must be corrected to reflect what actually occurred. View "State v. Lemasters" on Justia Law

In the underlying federal action commenced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against David Smith and his investment services firm, the SEC obtained a temporary restraining order freezing Smith’s assets and those of his wife, including the couple’s irrevocable trust (Trust). The Trust, represented by Jill Dunn, intervened in the matter. Due to Dunn’s actions in that action, the United States Magistrate Judge sanctioned Dunn with a public admonishment. Thereafter, the Committee on Professional Standards for the Third Department filed a petition alleging that Dunn had engaged in fraudulent conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The text of the Magistrate’s sanctions opinion was essentially the basis of the complaint. The Appellate Division concluded that collateral estoppel applied to the Magistrate’s sanctions order and found Dunn guilty of the charged misconduct. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, Dunn did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of her alleged misconduct, and therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply in her disciplinary proceeding to bar her from challenging the findings of the Magistrate. View "In re Dunn" on Justia Law

In 2009, the dissolution court dissolved the marriage of James and Diana Jordan. The court ordered that, after payment of attorneys fees and other obligations, the balance of the parties’ account at Northwestern Mutual (account) be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff, Diana’s father, brought this action against James to collect the outstanding balance on James’s promissory note to him. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. James then filed a claim for a determination of interests in the account. Defendants, the attorney and firm that represented James in the dissolution action, also sought a determination of interests in the account, claiming that they had a claim prior in right to Plaintiff’s claim by virtue of the charging lien arising by operation of law in the dissolution action. The trial court concluded that Defendants had no superior interest in the account because a charging lien in connection with a dissolution action would be prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that attorneys are not entitled by operation of law to equitable charging liens on marital assets for fees and expenses incurred in obtaining judgments for their clients in marital dissolution proceedings. View "Olszewski v. Jordan" on Justia Law